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Many unfortunate and unintended adverse industrial incidents occur across the United 
States each year, and the nuclear industry is no exception.  Depending on their severity, these 
incidents can be problematic for people, the facilities, and surrounding environments.  Human 
error is a contributing factor in many such incidents.  This dissertation first explored the 
hypothesis that technological changes thataffect how operators interact within the systems of the 
nuclear facilities exacerbate the cost f incidents caused by human error.  I conducted a review 
of nuclear incidents in the United States from 1955 through 2010 that reached Level 3 (serious 
incident) or higher on the International Nuclear Events Scale (INES).  The cost of each incident 
at facilities that had recently undergone technological changes affecting plant operators’ jobs was 
compared to the cost of events at facilities that had not undergone changes.  A t-test determined a 
statistically significant difference between the two groups, confirming the hypothesis.  Next, I 
conducted a follow-on study to determine the impact of the incorporation of new technologies 
into nuclear facilities.  The data indicated that spending more money on upgrades increased the 
facility’s capacity as well as the number of incidents reported, but the incident severity was 
minor.  Finally, I discuss the impact of human error on plant operations and the impact of 
evolving technology on the 21st-century operator, proposing a methodology to overcome these 







In the course of this research, extensive benchmarking, evaluation, debate, and 
investigation revealed a key underlying hindrance to successful facility operation: a 
disproportionate dependence on “technology-nly” enhancements.  Technology is intended to 
make us more productive, but its use can carry a penalty.  The computers, decision support 
systems, and complex control and logic programs used at plants can gradually diminish intuition 
and expertise and can ultimately become the replacement for a robust, knowledge-based training 
and Human Performance Improvement (HPI) program.  Technology is a powerful tool, but in the 
operational setting, it must be properly balanced with thorough training and adherence to human 
error prevention techniques and conduct.   
During my study of human error, I recognized that devising suitable steps to prevent 
human error is crucial in all aspects of a project and must permeate all phases of the systems 
engineering process.  HPI is much more than employing a set of human performance tools.  
Human error psychology, effects, risks, error traps, and mental models must be examined, 
consciously applied, and woven into the operating structure of plant organizations, especially in 
light of the innate complexities associated with technological advancements.  Therefore, this 
study seeks to present empirical evidence for the importance of human performance anagement 








Without the encouragement and motivation from my brother Nick, the completion of this 
program would have been an impossibility.  In my youth, Nick was my protector; in my adult 
life, he was my number one fan; and throughout my whole life, he was my best friend.  This is 
for you big brother.  
v 




ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................... ii  
PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................... iii  
DEDICATION ............................................................................................................................... iv 
LIST OF TABLES ....................................................................................................................... viii  
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... ix 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 1 
1.1. BACKGROUND .............................................................................................................. 1 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT .............................................................................................. 2 
1.3. PURPOSE ........................................................................................................................ 3 
1.4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ................................................................................... 4 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION ................................................................................................ 8 
1.6. HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................................ 8 
1.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY ................................................................................. 8 
1.8. CHAPTER SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................................................................... 11 
2.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 11 
2.2. MODELING HUMAN PERFORMANCE .................................................................... 12 
2.2.1. SKILL-BASED BEHAVIORS ................................................................................... 14 
2.2.2. RULE-BASED BEHAVIORS .................................................................................... 15 
2.2.3. KNOWLEDGE-BASED BEHAVIORS ..................................................................... 17 
2.2.4. SYMBOLS, SIGNS, AND SIGNALS ........................................................................ 17 
2.2.5. ERRORS AND LIMITATIONS ................................................................................. 20 
2.2.6. TRANSLATION FOR THE OPERATOR IN THE INDUSTRIAL SETTING ......... 23 
2.3. ESCALATION ............................................................................................................... 27 
2.4. ACTIVE ERRORS ......................................................................................................... 27 
2.5. LATENT ERRORS ........................................................................................................ 30 
2.6. FORESEEABLE ERRORS ............................................................................................ 33 
2.7. UNEXPECTED EVENTS ............................................................................................. 36 
2.8. TAXONOMIES .............................................................................................................. 39 
2.9. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY ........................................... 40
2.9.1. THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE ............................................ 41
2.9.2. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS ........................................ 45
2.9.3. THE UNITED STATES .............................................................................................. 48 
2.10. FLUCTUATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY ................................................. 49 
2.11. THE NUCLEAR DEBATE ........................................................................................ 52 
2.12. CHAPTER CONCLUSION........................................................................................ 53 
CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH METHODS ...................................................................................... 54 
3.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 54 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN ................................................................................................... 54 
3.3. METHODS ..................................................................................................................... 56 
3.4. MATERIALS AND INSTRUMENTS .......................................................................... 56 
3.5. DATA COLLECTION, PROCESSING, AND ANALYSIS ......................................... 57
3.6. METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS ...................................................................... 59 
vi 
3.7. LIMITATIONS .............................................................................................................. 59 
3.8. ETHICAL ASSURANCES ............................................................................................ 60 
3.9. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 62 
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS ............................................................................................................ 63 
4.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 63 
4.2. DATA ANALYSIS  ..................................................................................................... 66 
4.2.1. INCIDENT COST ....................................................................................................... 66 
4.2.2. INCIDENT FREQUENCY ......................................................................................... 73 
4.3. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 77 
CHAPTER 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS 
AND ECONOMIC AND SAFETY FACTORS ..................................................................... 78 
5.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 78 
5.2. THE ECONOMICS AND SAFETY OF TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS .... 78 
5.3. INTERPRETATION OF THE OUTCOMES ................................................................ 83 
5.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 85 
CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS ............................................................................... 86 
6.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 86 
6.2. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN FACTORS ON PLANT OPERATION ........................... 86 
6.2.1. HUMAN BEHAVIOR MODELS ............................................................................... 87 
6.2.2. ERGONOMICS ........................................................................................................... 87 
6.3. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR ON PLANT OPERATION ............................... 90 
6.4. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR ON THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING  
PROCESS ......................................................................................................................... 92 
6.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 96 
CHAPTER 7: HUMAN ERROR REDUCTION UTILIZING THE SYSTEMS    
ENGINEERING PROCESS ................................................................................................... 97 
7.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 97 
7.2. ISSUES RELATED TO ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND THE                       
21ST-CENTURY OPERATOR........................................................................................ 97 
7.3. THE IMPROVEMENT OR UPGRADE OF EXISTING SYSTEMS ........................... 99 
7.3.1. A WAY FORWARD LEVERAGING THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING    
PROCESS ......................................................................................................................... 99 
7.3.2. OPERATOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING        
PROCESS ....................................................................................................................... 103 
7.3.2.1. LIFE-CYCLE ENGINEERING ............................................................................. 105 
7.3.2.2. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS ................................................ 105 
7.3.2.3. SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION ...................................................................... 106 
7.3.3. THE ASSOCIATION OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE WITH SYSTEM 
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SYSTEM TESTING, EVALUATION,   
AND VALIDATION  ...................................................................................................... 106 
7.3.3.1. HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND SYSTEM OPERATIONAL    
REQUIREMENTS .......................................................................................................... 107 
7.3.3.2. HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND SYSTEM TESTING, EVALUATION,         
AND VALIDATION  ...................................................................................................... 107 
7.3.4. PROCEDURE AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT IN THE SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING PROCESS ........................................................................................... 109 
vii 
7.3.4.1. CAREFUL PROCEDURE WRITING ................................................................... 113 
7.3.4.2. KNOWLEDGE-BASED OPERATOR TRAINING AND DRILL PROGRAM .. 114 
7.3.5. OPERATOR ATTRIBUTE DETERMINATION ..................................................... 117 
7.3.6. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING INFRASTRUCTURE................................................. 119 
7.3.7. THE FINAL PRODUCT ........................................................................................... 119 
7.3.8. WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR THROUGHOUT   
THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS ............................................................... 121 
7.4. DESIGN OF NEW SYSTEMS .................................................................................... 128 
7.4.1. HUMAN-MACHINE SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION ................................................. 129 
7.4.1.1. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................... 129 
7.4.1.2. THE HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE ............................................................. 131
7.4.1.3. HUMAN ERROR AND THE HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE ..................... 132 
7.4.1.4. DECISIONS AND THE HUMAN-MACHINE INTERFACE.............................. 133 
7.4.2. CONSIDERATIONS IN OPTIMIZATION ............................................................. 135
7.4.2.1. HUMAN INTERACTION IS INEVITABLE ........................................................ 135 
7.4.2.2. THE ROLE OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND HUMAN ACTORS ..................... 136 
7.4.2.3. ACCOUNT FOR HUMAN LIMITATIONS ......................................................... 138 
7.4.2.4. APPLICATION OF THE DASHBOARD CONCEPT IN NUCLEAR 
OPERATIONS ................................................................................................................ 140 
7.5. CONFIDENCE IN PROPOSED APPROACHES ....................................................... 141 
7.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 144 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................. 145 
8.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 145 
8.2. CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................... 146 
8.3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION ........................................................ 147 
8.4. RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................. 148 
8.4.1. RECOMMENDATION 1: ADDITIONAL RESEARCH ON THIS TOPIC ........... 148 
8.4.2. RECOMMENDATION 2:  INTEGRATION OF OPERATOR PERSPECTIVES      
IN EARLY STAGES OF SYSTEM DESIGN ............................................................... 149 
8.4.3. RECOMMENDATION 3: IMPROVE TRAINING, PROCEDURES, AND   
HUMAN PERFORMANCE AT FACILITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE 
DEVELOPMENT AND INSTALLATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY ....................... 149 
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................... 150 
APPENDIX A: SPECIFIC INCIDENTS.................................................................................... 158 
APPENDIX B: ERROR PRECURSORS ................................................................................... 186 
APPENDIX C: SURVEY STRUCTURE, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS ................................ 188 
APPENDIX D: MINOR EVENT STUDY ................................................................................. 205 
APPENDIX E: PAPERS............................................................................................................. 208 
E.1 INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR SAFETY JOURNAL REVIEW ARTICLE ............ 209 








Table 1. International Nuclear Events Scale ................................................................................. 44 
Table 2. Incidents at United States Nuclear Reactors from 1955 until 2010 ................................ 63 
Table 3. Average Costs for Each Incident Category ..................................................................... 71 
Table 4. Economic and Safety Factors Related to Technological Improvements at 12 Nuclear 
Facilities, 2008–2013 .............................................................................................................. 79 
Table 5. Regression Statistics ....................................................................................................... 80 
Table 6. Analysis of Variance Data .............................................................................................. 80 
Table 7. Regression Statistical Data ............................................................................................. 80 
Table 8. Residual Output .............................................................................................................. 84 
Table 9. Sample Prioritization of Technical Performance Measures ......................................... 110 
Table 10. Severity Criteria Matrix .............................................................................................. 125 
Table 11. Results of Survey Analysis ......................................................................................... 143 
Table 12. Operator Involvement in the Systems Engineering Process ....................................... 192 
Table 13. Human Performance Association with System Operational Requirements and     
System Test, Evaluation, and Validation .............................................................................. 193 
Table 14. Procedure and Training Development in the Systems Engineering Process .............. 194 
Table 15. Operator Attribute Determination ............................................................................... 196 
Table 16. Systems Engineering Infrastructure ............................................................................ 197 
Table 17. Means to Minimize Human Error Impact throughout the Systems Engineering   
Process .................................................................................................................................. 198 
Table 18. Survey Data................................................................................................................. 200 
Table 19. Minor Events on Each Day during November 2013................................................... 205 
ix 




Figure 1. The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale. ........ .................................... 42 
Figure 2. Q-Q Plot of Cost ............................................................................................................ 67 
Figure 3. Histogram of Cost.......................................................................................................... 68 
Figure 4. Q-Q Plot of Log-Transformed Cost .............................................................................. 68 
Figure 5. Histogram of Cost (Log-Transformed) ......................................................................... 69 
Figure 6. Histogram of Cost (Outliers Removed) ......................................................................... 72 
Figure 7. Histogram of Cost (Outliers Removed, Log-Transformed) .......................................... 72
Figure 8. Q-Q Plot of Cost (Outliers Removed, Log-Transformed)............................................. 73
Figure 9. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for Lower-Cost   
Technology-Induced Human Errors ....................................................................................... 75 
Figure 10. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for Higher-Cost 
Technology-Induced Human Errors ....................................................................................... 76 
Figure 11. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for Lower-Cost Non-
Technology-Related Human Errors ........................................................................................ 76 
Figure 12. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for Higher-Cost Non-
Technology Related Human Errors ........................................................................................ 77 
Figure 13. Scatterplot Showing the Relationship between Upgrades and Capacity Factor.......... 81 
Figure 14. Scatterplot Showing the Relationship between Upgrades and Incidents .................... 82 
Figure 15. The Systems Engineering Process ............................................................................... 94 
Figure 16. The Traditional Relationship of Human Performance and Human Factors within      
the Systems Engineering Process.......................................................................................... 101 
Figure 17. Human Performance Improvement Throughout the Systems Engineering Process . 102 
Figure 18. Human Performance Interface with the Systems Engineering Process ..................... 104 
Figure 19. Use Case Model of the Human Performance Improvement Process ........................ 122 
Figure 20. Human Performance Flowchart ................................................................................. 124 
Figure 21. Human Performance Significance Level Triangle .................................................... 127 









1.1. BACKGROUND   
Systems engineering has been recognized for over 60 years as essential to the proper 
development of complicated systems (Mitchell & Jolley, 2013).  It has been applied to a wide 
range of technological projects such as automobiles, urban infrastructure, environmental 
controls, aircraft, software, hardware, and ships.  Systems engineers are often the technical 
leaders for vast and complex projects (Rutherford, 2011). 
Systems engineers rely on the application of relationships and system science to analyze 
and determine system performance of a product under development.  Twenty-first-century 
systems engineering guides the development of each part within the systemthrough learned 
heuristics (Rutherford, 2011).  Both engineering managers and systems engineers understand that 
the practice of systems engineering has significant value.  For this reason, systems engineering 
concepts and practices are used in nearly all complex projects.  Despite the acknowledged 
importance of systems engineering, some observers argue that it is less fully understood than 
other engineering disciplines (Steinberg, 2011).   
Because of continualy evolving technology and accompanying increases in the level of 
system complexity, 21st-century systems engineering is frequently confronted with greater 
depths of contextual embedding (Rutherford, 2011).  Systemic behaviors today present an 
increasing number of specifications and environmental parameters for consideration (Mitchell & 
Jolley, 2013). 
One clear example of a complex system that involves systems engineering, human 
performance, and technological advances is nuclear facilities—more specifically, nuclear power 




facilities are among the most complex systems ever designed (Loomis, 2011).  They use state-of-
the-art technology and must continually update their systems to remain safe, regulatory 
compliant, and economically sound.  Unfortunately, like any complex system, nuclear fa ilities 
are not immune to failure, particularly with regard to human performance.  As one can presume, 
many of the adverse incidents that have occurred at nuclear facilities were the result of some type 
of human error.  Since these systems are astoundingly complex, any changes made in the 
technology have the potential to increase human error and result in a reduction in performance 
when they interact with machinery or software (Karakosta et al., 2013).  Technological changes 
in the intricate systems involved inthe operation and management of a nuclear facility may 
contribute to the increased impact of human errors, in terms of both cost and frequency (Loomis, 
2011). 
This dissertation investigates incidents at U.S. nuclear facilities that occurred due to 
human error by people who interacted with the complex systems involved with a nuclear plant, 
and especially with its changing technologies.  Realizing that the top level goal is for the safe and 
efficient operation of nuclear facilities (and the potential application of other complex systems) 
and that an optimized human-machine system is the desired end state, this work focuses on the 
human performance component of this complex system. 
 
1.2. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
 
Numerous adverse incidents have occurred at nuclear facilities across the United States, 
sometimes with considerable negative consequences for the facilities involved, the environment, 
human beings, and the nuclear industry.  Several have resulted in radiation being released to the 
environment and in fatalities.  Many of these incidents have been attributed to human error.  The 




be an important contributor to these errors.  Much research has been conducted on the causes and 
consequences of adverse incidents at nuclear plants, but not specifically on how technological 
changes could be a key factor increasing the risk of human error.  Accordingly, this dissertation 
focuses specifically on the role that human error elated to technological advances has played in 




Extensive research exists on the safety procedures used by nuclear facilities, including 
publications by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) along with scholarly research 
published in books and reputable journals.  Also, considerable research has investigated the 
effect of new technologies on human performance, especially when complex systems are 
involved.  This literature includes the foundational works Human Error by James Reason; 
Behind Human Error by David Woods, Sidney Dekker, Richard Cook, Leila Johannesen, and 
Nadine Sarter; and The Field Guide to Human Error by Sidney Dekker.  The systems involved 
with nuclear facilities are some of the most complex systems ever developed.  This fact suggests 
that these systems could be especially exposed to the threat of human error following the 
implementation of technological changes.  The purpose of this dissertation is to determine the 
relationship between human performance, technological advances, and the complex systems







1.4. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK  
 
This research applies theoretical frameworks from multiple disciplines.  The following 
frameworks and techniques are reviewed in this section:  human factors and ergonomics, 
sociotechnical systems, user-centered design, human reliability, probabilistic risk a sessment, 
human reliability assessment, and latent human error. 
Human factors and ergonomics, often abbreviated as HF&E, incorporates insights from 
numerous disciplines, including anthropometry, operations research, statistics, graphic design, 
industrial design, mechanobiology, biomechanics, engineering, and psychology (Karwowski, 
2006).  The field of HF&E emerged around World War II, at a time of considerable development 
in the complexity of weaponry and other machines, which placed great demands on operator 
cognition.  During the information age, HF&E has been xtended to human-computer 
interactions (Proctor and Zandt, 2008). 
HF&E is now used in a wide variety of fields including virtual environments, training, 
transportation, product design, information technology, healthcare, geriatrics, ero pace, and 
nuclear facilities (Proctor and Zandt, 2008).  At nuclear facilities, HF&E seeks to reduce the 
strain placed on operators in order to decrease the amount of cognitive and physical energy they 
must put forth in order to operate the facility (Karwowski, 2006). 
The concept of sociotechnical systems refers to a type of organizational development that 
recognizes that the interactions occur ing between technology and people at the workplace can 
be optimized through organizational work designs, which are often complex (Vermaas et al., 
2011).  The term can also be used to describe the in ricate infrastructures present in society and 
how they interact with human behavior.  Both definitions are applicable to nuclear facilities, as 




technological systems are involved in the proper operation of a nuclear facility (Neyer, 
Bullinger, and Moeslein, 2009). 
Sociotechnical systems represent a type of theory regarding society, people, and the 
technical processes and organizational structures involved in complex systems (Gor an, Cooke, 
and Salas, 2010).  The term technical does not always refer to material technologies; it can also 
describe knowledge and procedures.  Sociotechnical emphasizes that an organization often 
involves goals and tasks that are both technical and social in nature.  The sociotechnical analysis 
of a system strives to achieve a joint optimization of both the social aspects and technical 
performance of the system.  This is especially helpful with nuclear facilities, which function in a 
social environment.  For example, regulatory requirements that govern nuclear facilities and 
affect the systems with which the operators must interact are highly technical but also have a 
social aspect, since they must satisfy the demands of multiple stakeholders (Neyer, Bullinger, 
and Moeslein, 2009). 
Probabilistic risk assessment, often abbreviated as PRA, is a relatively comprehensive, 
systematic methodology used to evaluate the risks associated with complex technological entities 
such as nuclear facilities (Mohaghegh, Kazemi, and Mosleh, 2009).  In these cases, the risk is 
understood as a potential detrimental outcome of an action or activity.  Two quantities are 
associated with risk: the likelihood of an occurrence and the magnitude of the adverse effects.  
These are often described as the probability of the problem and its severity.  Consequences are 
generally expressed numerically by multiplying the probability times the total risk to calculate 
the expected loss (Stamatelatos and Dezfuli, 2011). 
PRA is often used to assess nuclear facilities (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 




can occur at the facility and whether they could lead to an adverse consequence.  Second, one 
must assess the severity of the potential problem, in terms of their possible consequences for the 
facility.  The third item to be examined is the likelihood that these consequences will occur, 
typically  described as a frequency or probability.  Common methods of conducting a PRA are 
fault tree analysis and event tree analysis.  PRA generally falls under the classification of safety 
engineering (Stamatelatos and Dezfuli, 2011). 
User-centered design, a subdivision of user-interface design (Mohaghegh, Kazemi, and 
Mosleh, 2009), is a process in which attention is given to each stage in the design process to 
accommodate the limitations and needs of end users.  This is a multistage process of problem 
solving that requires designers to foresee and analyze how human users of the technology are 
likely to interact within a system.  The process involves testing in a real-world context the 
validity of assumptions with regard to users’ behavior.  This type of testing is necessary because 
it can be nearly impossible for product designers to understand the experience of a first-time user 
of the technology.  One must also consider the learning curve of people interacting within the 
system.  All these factors are crucial in the efficient, proper operation of a nuclear facility.  User-
centered design is critical for the proper organization of workstations and for other types of 
interaction between human users, and for the complex systems involved with a nuclear facility 
(U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2011). 
Human reliability assessment, or HRA (Tont et al., 2009), is concerned with evaluating 
the probability that human error will occur when a specific task is completed.  This type of 
analysis informs actions aimed at reducing the likelihood of such errors and improving the 
overall safety system.  This type of analysis is only one of many performed at nuclear facilities to 




HRA has three main goals: error reduction, quantification, and identification (Tont et al., 
2009).  Several techniques are used for these purposes, among which the Technique for Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) is one common approach.  The techniques can be categorized as 
either first- or second-generation.  First-generation techniques are based upon a dichotomy of 
either fitting or not fitting the error situation within a given context; second-generation 
techniques are based on theory and serve to quantify the errors.  HRA techniques are used in a 
number of disciplines, including business, transportation, general engineering, healthcar , and 
nuclear facilities. 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission contracted with the author of THERP to design a 
more consistent tool for determining human error rates at nuclear facilities (Tont et al., 2009).  
This resulted in the development of the Accident Sequence Evaluation Program Human 
Reliability Analysis Procedure (ASEP), which tends to be more conservative than THERP.  One 
significant advantage of the ASEP is that it does not require the user be an expert in human 
factors engineering.  Additionally, the training needed to use the ASEP is relatively minimal.  
After it became computerized, ASEP began to be referred to as Simplified Human Error 
Analysis code or SHEAN (Tont et al., 2009).   
Latent human error refers to human error due to systems or routines formed in such a way 
that humans are disposed to make th se errors (Karwowski, 2006).  This term is widely used 
throughout the aviation industry, but it is also prevalent in the safety literature for nuclear 
facilities.  When this method is used at a nuclear facility, operator error data are gathered, 
grouped, collated, and analyzed to provide information for determining whether a 
disproportionate number of errors is present in a given system piece.  If  errors at a particular 




problems identified, and changes made.  This decreases the likelihood of future errors that could 
result in nuclear incidents (Salvendy, 2012). 
 
 
1.5. RESEARCH QUESTION  
 
The research topic of this dissertation is the relationship between technological advances 
and human performance in the complex systems at nuclear f cilities.  The research question is 
whether technological advances in the complex systems of nuclear facilities increase the cost 
associated with incidents caused by human error.  This is an important question because most 
nuclear facilities continually update their technology.  This continuous technological 
improvement can create a situation in which the operators must change their routine and method 
of interacting with the complex system and the new technology. 
 
1.6. HYPOTHESES  
 
The hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Technological advances at a nuclear facility that affect how operators interact within the 
system do increase the cost of incidents caused by human error. 
 
The null hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: Technological advances at a nuclear facility that affect how operators interact within the 
system do not increase the cost of incidents caused by human error. 
 
1.7. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
 
The operational life of nuclear reactors is measured in reactor-years (Loomis, 2011).  One 




roughly 440 nuclear power plants that have been in operation for over 14,700 reactor-y rs.  
During this time, there have been 23 reactor core meltdowns, or one major nuclear accident for 
every 640 reactor years.  According to the international design requirements for nuclear 
facilities, a reactor core meltdown should only occur about once every 20,000 reactor-years.  
This means that the incidence of U.S. reactor core meltdowns is been 32 times higher than what 
theory would predict (Karakosta et al., 2013).  This significant departure from the theory 
indicates that additional unaccounted-for factors are violating the base assumptions f the model. 
Of the 23 nuclear reactor meltdowns, 17 were caused by some type of human error 
(Marques, 2011).  Instances of human error are difficult if not impossible to predict accurately, 
but these types of errors will almost certainly continue to occur.  The significance of this 
dissertation lies in its attempt todetermine whether the severity, in terms of cost, of human errors 
can be reduced through effectively and efficiently implementing necessary technological changes 
and human performance activities that directly impact how operations occur at complex nuclear 
facilities.  In this dissertation, I define severity in terms of the cost of incidents caused by human 
error as a result of technological advances, rather than trying to examine other physical and 
environmental effects associated with e incidents, such as radiation releases, on which most 
research on nuclear accidents focuses.  If the null hypothesis of this dissertation is determined to 
be statistically unlikely, then reducing the changes in procedures to be followed by nuclear 
facility staff and contractors, or improving the training and procedures associ ted with such 
changes, could ecrease the probability and severity of future incidents.  This could result in 
significant savings both economically and in avoiding adverse impacts on people and the 





1.8. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
 
This introductory chapter has provided background information on systems engineering 
and on the interactions between nuclear facility operators and complex machines and software.  
It has described nuclear facilities as elaborate systems that involve technological advances, 
human performance, and high levels of system engineering.   
Since the inception of nuclear power, many significant incidents have occurred at nuclear 
power plants.  Several of these incidents resulted in the meltdown of the nuclear eactor.  The 
purpose of this dissertation is to determine the relationship between technological advances and 
human performance in the complex systems of nuclear f cilities.  Specifically, I will explore 
whether technological changes at nuclear facilities that affect how operators interact with the 
systems have increased the cost of resulting incidents.  The study is important as there have been 
23 reactor core meltdowns in U.S. history, far more than theoretical work would have 
anticipated.  Human error is believed to be the primary contributor to the larger number of 









2.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
Each time that significant technological developments offer the promise of greatly 
assisting people’s lives, failed systems and prototypes also inevitably result to some degree 
(Proctor and Zandt, 2008).  When researchers examine the effects of changes in technology, they 
often discover unintended and unanticipated consequences.  Individuals using the new 
technologies frequently make performance errors because they must adapt to increasingly 
complex technology.  Rather than ssisting the user, these new technologies can add burdens, 
which are especially problematic during crucial phases of complex tasks (Karwowski, 2006). 
The pattern of human performance degradation when novel technologies are introduced 
occurs in a wide range of endeavors (Duffy, 2012).  For example, the impl mentation of new 
systems of airplane cockpit automation can also be an associated wi h a decline in pilots’ 
performance; their reaction times and number of errors increase.  The same is true in virtually all 
industries, including the nuclear industry, where human errors that affect system operation are 
unacceptable (Salvendy, 2012). 
Although considerable research has been conducted on the human-machine interface, a 
wide range of problems still exists (Duffy, 2012).  There remains a disparity between the 
optimism of technology developers and the real-life operational difficulties that accompany the 
introduction of these systems.  The developers nearly always claim that the new technology will 
result in performance improvements.  However, due to the operational complexities introduced, 
the technology may actually decrease the performance of those interacting with the system.  
Unfortunately, the complexities confronting operators are difficult for design teams to predict.  




human performance model must be examined and the concepts of escalation, active error, latent 
error, foreseeable error, and unexpected events should be examined. 
 
2.2. MODELING H UMAN PERFORMANCE  
 
Understanding human errors becomes possible through modeling human performance 
(Foyle and Hooey, 2008).  This section will explain one such model.  The reader should 
recognize that the explanations given for the behaviors represent an ideal situation.  Err r likely 
situations occur when the individual involved has deviated from the behaviors described by the 
model (Duffy, 2009). 
Although many heavily automated technical systems exist today, all of them rely on 
routine human interaction as an integral characteristic of normal system functioning (O’Connor 
and Cohn, 2010).  Operators must ensure that the proper conditions are present for the system to 
operate normally and must intervene when ab ormal conditions exist so as to restore the system 
to a safe configuration.  They must also account for any unforeseen problems with the system or 
compensate for anything that has been structured inappropriately due to design flaws.  Many of 
these automated systems play a vital role in society, and tragedy can result when they are not 
supported properly.  For this reason, increased attention has been devoted to human performanc 
and human error when interacting with systems (Matthews et al., 2000). 
We need to have reliable models in place that ensure the maintenance of a high level of 
human performance when people are interacting with complicated and automated systems 
(O’Connor and Cohn, 2010).  This requires the understanding of different kinds of error.  
Quantitative models have been used to do performance analysis and ystem design in vehicle 




to other types of human decision making.  One such attempt is optimal control theory.  The first 
of the vehicle control systems to be analyzed was in the field of aviation (Reiman and Manske, 
2009). 
The optimal control model is not necessary if activities by people are no longer included 
in the control task (Duffy, 2009).  In these cases, the concern is with an overall interface 
manipulation skill.  Decision models can be constructed in these cases through independent 
development and a direct approach.  Instead of a single quantitative model for predicting human 
performance, which would account for nearly any situation, it is likely that a set of models will 
be more applicable and reliable.  Each of these models can be applied to particular work 
conditions and combined with a qualitative framework that will define and describe the 
relationships involved (Matthews et al., 2000). 
When seeking to understand human performance while interacting with a complex 
system, we must remember that people are not merely deterministic devices engaged in input and 
output (Reiman and Manske, 2009).  Instead, they are often goal-oriented and will pursue 
information that they consider relevant to achieve their objectives.  People behave in a 
teleological fashion.  In other words, their behavior is frequently modified as they seek to 
achieve their goal.  Furthermore, this behavior is not always dependent on feedback received 
while the person is engaged in the activity.  The factor of experience during previous attempts 
can also have an impact.  People engage in reasoned reflection and will frequently control 
behavior systems through selection.  In this case, the selection is represented by human design 
choice when interacting with a complex system (Foyle and Hooey, 2008). 
Human movement and position within the physical environment are not always 




situations based on their previous experiences of successful patterns of behavior.  This process 
overcomes the limits of the human sensory system with regard to immediate feedback.  In other 
words, the humans interacting with the system respond too quickly for them to learn while they 
are interacting.  Instead, people rely on their memory of previous attempts to interact with a 
complicated system (O’Connor and Cohn, 2010). 
When human beings rely on a higher level of conscious planning, they usually engage in 
a complex series of activities as well as feedback correction while working on a task (Foyle and 
Hooey, 2008).  Changes to their behavior will happen due to mismatches between the outcomes 
and goals.  This is generally an inefficient process when one is working with a complex system 
functioning at a rapid pace.  Therefore, when people are engaged in familiar activities, they will 
resort to the use of a set of rules that has been successful in the past (Duffy, 2009). 
 
2.2.1. SKILL -BASED BEHAVIORS 
 
Skill-based behavior involves sensory motor performance in which one engages during 
activities that follow from a certain intention (Reiman and Manske, 2009).  These behaviors 
occur without an individual’s conscious control.  They represent highly integrated, automated, 
and smooth patterns of behavior.  Only on certain occasions is performance based on some type 
of feedback control that involves motor output in respone to the observation of error signals.  In 
many skilled sensory motor tasks, the human body becomes a type of control system with 
multiple variables that continuously s nchronize movements according to the response of the 
environment.  The performance in these cases includes feed-forward control, a command signal 
from an operator to a source elsewhere in its external environment, and is dependent upon an 




the control must be assumed to explain how coordinated movements can occur rapidly, such as
in sports or when one is operating a vehicle.  Experiments have demonstrated how the feed-
forward control takes place in complicated industrial control tasks (Matthews et al., 2000). 
Controlling voluntary movements is an immensely complex process (Reiman and 
Manske, 2009).  The success of these rapid movements will be independent of how the limbs 
were positioned initially.  The person will function according to different schemata, which are 
used to generate the complex movements.  The schemata access the individual’s dynamic 
internal map of the environment.  Sensory input is not generally involved with these types of 
movements.  In other words, the input from the environment does not realign or update the 
individual's internal information.  Performing complicated tasks such as walking on a straight 
line or drinking from a glass must be understood as an integrated whole and cannot be broken 
down into elements (Foyle and Hooey, 2008). 
Usually, the performance of skill-based behavior is continuous (O’Connor and Cohn, 
2010).  Higher levels of control are possible and will take the form of conscious intent to make 
changes in the skill, such as moving faster or more accurately.  In some cases, the performance 
will include skilled routines that can be isolated.  In these cases, the routines are sequences that 
guide the process of conscious execution.  Many human activities involve sequences of skilled 
activities, as a response to the specific situation (Duffy, 2009). 
 
2.2.2. RULE-BASED BEHAVIORS 
 
Rule-based behaviors consist of sequences of subroutines for work situations, which are 
familiar to the individual and can be controlled through the use of previously established rules 




success of previous attempts to engage in the activity.  Sometimes they are communicated from 
other people at the time of construction.  They can also be gained from the process of 
consciously solving a problem or developing a plan (Matthews et al., 2000). 
Performance is goal-oriented and structured (Foyle and Hooey, 2008).  The feed-forward 
control is based on stored rules.  Frequently, the goal will not be explicitly understood but, 
rather, is implicit in the situation and automatically results in the release of the appropriate stored 
rules.  This is a teleological type of control, as the rule has been developed through previous 
successful experiences.  This control will evolve according to the behaviors that work best.  The 
rule reflects functional properties that serve to constrain the behaviors exhibited by the 
environment.  It is usually based on properties discovered through prior empirical investigations 
(Reiman and Manske, 2009). 
In most cases, a goal will be reached only through a considerable sequence of acts during 
which direct feedback correction related to the goal is not possible.  The feedback correction that 
occurs during performance of a task requires a functional understanding as wellanalysis of the 
responses provided by the environment.  This can be considered a type of independent, 
concurrent activity that is occurring at a higher level and is knowledge-based (Reiman and 
Manske, 2009). 
The distinction between rule-based and skill-based behaviors is not always clear (Duffy, 
2009).  It can depend on the individual’s attention level as well as on his or her level of training.  
Most often, skill-based performance occurs without conscious attention.  For this reason, the 
actors will not be able to explain how they control performance or how they have used 




higher level and is usually based on some type of explicit knowledge.  In this case, the person 
will usually be able to report on the rules involved (Matthews et al., 2000). 
In an unfamiliar situation, the individual may be interacting with an environment for 
which previous experience has provided no rules by means of which to control the situation.  In 
such a context, the performance must be controlled at a higher level of conceptual understanding, 
through the application of knowledge-based behaviors (O’Connor and Cohn, 2010). 
 
2.2.3. KNOWLEDGE-BASED BEHAVIORS 
 
When a knowledge-based behavior is occurring, the goal has been explicitly formulated 
(Foyle and Hooey, 2008).  The individual develops a useful plan after careful consideration of 
multiple options.  The plans are tested according to whether they can achieve the goal.  These 
tests can take the form of physical processes, which consist essentially of trial and error.  They 
can also be performed conceptually if the individual understands the functional properties within 
the environment and can predict accurately the effects that the plan will produce.  This type of 
behavior involves functional reasoning in which the person has a mental model of the sys em 
involved (Reiman and Manske, 2009). 
 
2.2.4. SYMBOLS, SIGNS, AND SIGNALS  
 
The information gained from absorbing the environment is an important part of human 
performance.  The type of information varies according to the category of behavior (Duffy, 
2009).  Information gained through observing the environment may be perceived in a variety of 
ways.  This is also true for the interface between humans and complex machinery or systems.  A 




may cause an individual to misinterpreting information while shifting from one motor behavior 
to another and misreading the relevant cues (Matthews et al., 2000). 
During skill-based behavior, the perceptual motor system synchronizes the individual’s 
physical activity by operating as a type of continuous control system (Rei an and Manske, 
2009).  The system manipulates external objects and enables the individual’s body to navigate 
within the environment.  To accomplish this control, information taken from the environment 
must be in the form of time and space signals (Foyle and Hooey, 2008).  The signals are a type of 
quantitative indicator that is continuous and can be applied to the time-based behavior occurring 
in the environment.  The signals do not have meaning or any significance unless they are applied 
as a type of direct physical data related to time and space.  Individual performance occurs on a 
skill-based level and is released through the features that are assigned to patterns of information 
due to prior experience.  This process replaces individual participation in the environment with 
feedback from time and space control outcomes.  Instead, the information acts as a sign that can 
activate the organism (Foyle and Hooey, 2008). 
When an individual is engaging in rule-based behaviors, the information will be primarily 
perceived as a sign (O’Connor and Cohn, 2010).  In this case, the information will modify or 
activate some predetermined manipulation or action.  The signs are a reference to proper 
behaviors or situations, which are based on prior experiences.  Thy are not a reference to 
functional properties or concepts related to the environment.  The signs are often labeled with 
names that refer to the situation or to states within the environment.  They may also represent the 
individual’s task or goals.  The signs may be used only to modify or select, and thereby to 




in the generation of new actions.  They also cannot predict possible responses in the environment 
(O’Connor and Cohn, 2010). 
For information regarding the behavior occurring in the environment to be useful in 
relation to causal results, the data must be comprehended as a type of symbol (O’Connor and 
Cohn, 2010).  The signs are a reference to rules or precepts for action.  The symbols include 
concepts, which are tied to the functional properties and may be used for computation and 
reasoning through a suitable representation.  The signs can be understood as a type of ex ernal 
reference to the actions and states of the environment.  The symbols are a reference to the 
internal representation needed for planning and reasoning.  In sum, rule-based behaviors rely on 
signs whereas knowledge-based activities are dependent on symbols (Foyle and Hooey, 2008). 
The distinction as to whether perceptual information is a symbol, sign, or signal does not 
depend on the form of the information (Duffy, 2009).  Instead, it depends on the context in which 
the data have been observed.  This will be determined by the expectations and intentions of the 
individual perceiving the phenomenon.  The three levels of behavior are characterized by the use 
of information in different ways.  From the view of information processing, the distinction is 
clear (Foyle and Hooey, 2008).   
The signals are the sensory data thatrepresent variables in time and space according to 
their configuration within the environment (Reiman and Manske, 2009).  An organism can 
process this information as a type of continuous variable.  The signs represent a state within the 
environment regarding certain conventions as they apply to acts.  The signs have features present 
within the environment and are associated with connected conditions for the actions.  Generally, 
the signs are not processed directly.  They s rve merely as a method f activating the stored 




which can be processed formally.  Symbols consist of abstract concepts, which are defined by 
and related to a formal structure.  This structure is applied to the processes and rlations by 
which conventions are associated with features in the external world (Matthews et al., 2000). 
Within the context of men and machines, information functions as a type of time-space 
signal (Foyle and Hooey, 2008).  The signals are processed in a direct manner and become part 
of the dynamic control structure for motor performance.  They are separate from the information 
of signs, which can modify the actions to a higher order of abstraction (Duffy, 2009). 
 
2.2.5. ERRORS AND LIMITATIONS  
 
Within the domain of knowledge-based actions, the causal and functional properties of 
the environment may be represented in a variety of ways (Matthews et al., 2000)  A variety of 
problems can occur at the level of the human data processor when it is interacting with a 
complex physical environment.  The constraint of humans’ attention span limits the elements of 
the problem that can be processed simultaneously to only a few.  Therefore, when there exists a 
complex net of causal relations, the environment must be understood as a type of chain of mental 
operations.  This ituation gives rise to phenomena such as the point of no return and law of least 
resistance.  These are strategies that depend on sequences of relatively simple operations and 
may be preferred intuitively.  People often exhibit little tendency to pause within a certain line of 
reasoning in order to develop parallel paths or alternative explanations (Duffy, 2009).
An effective method of overcoming the limitations of our attention span may be to 
modify the data processing occurring in the mind (Matthews et al., 2000).  The mental model can 
be altered so that the causal structure better fits the specific task and optimizes a transfer of 




The human cognitive process operates efficiently only when there is an extensive use of the 
model transformations, combined with simultaneous updating of the mental models.  This is true 
for all categories of inputted information.  The type of updating that occurs is generally below 
the threshold of conscious control or attention (Reiman and Manske, 2009). 
With regard to analyzing verbal protocols, several strategies can be used for model 
transformation, which facilitates cognitive data processing (Reiman and Maske, 2009).  One of 
these is aggregation, which involves taking elements of the representation and placig or 
aggregating them into chunks or units.  Another strategy is abstraction, which involves 
representing the properties for the environment or a system by transferring them to so that they 
become a category of a higher-level model.  The use of ready-made solutions and technologies 
can also be an effective strategy.  This approach involves transferring the representation to a 
category within a model that has an lready evident solution or rules that may be available to 
generate the solution (Matthews et al., 2000). 
An abstraction hierarchy has been formed to analyze the verbal protocols of process plant 
control and computer maintenance (Foyle and Hooey, 2008).  In this hierarchy, systems’ 
functional properties are represented through concepts that belong to different levels of 
abstraction.  The lowest of these levels represents the physical form of the sys em, or its material 
configuration.  The next higher level of abstraction is represented through the functions or 
physical processes of the components in the system.  This level is presented in a l nguage 
associated with particular mechanical, chemical, or electrical properties.  Continuing to move 
upwards, the next level of abstraction includes the functional properties that are represented by 
general concepts.  At this level, there is no reference to the physical equipment or processes 




At the lower levels of abstraction, the component configuration for the physical 
implementation will match the elemental descriptions (Matthews et al., 2000).  At the next level 
of abstraction, the changes in the properties of the system are represented through removing 
details regarding the material or physical properties.  The information added at the higher 
abstraction levels governs the functioning of the elements at the lower levels (Foyle and Hooey, 
2008).  When a system is manmade, the principles of the higher levels can be derived according 
to the purpose of the system.  For a change in the level of abstraction t  occur, there must be a 
shift in the structure and concepts of the representation, along with a change regarding the 
information deemed suitable for characterizing the operation or function at the various levels.  
The observer will ask various questions regarding the environment according to the nature of his 
or her internal representation (Reiman and Manske, 2009). 
Important functions within human-machine systems are related to the correction of 
circumstances that have resulted due to faults or errors (Duffy, 2009).  The events are described 
as faults or errors only in reference to the normal function or intended state of the system.  This 
means that the functional meaning of the system must be predetermined.  The model’s
functioning at the various levels of abstraction can play a role in coping with systems that are 
plagued by errors (O’Connor and Cohn, 2010).  The reasons attached to the proper functions are 
taken from a top-down approach, beginning with the functional purpose.  A r latively clear 
difference exists between the propagation of faults and causes and the reasons for functions 
within the hierarchy.  The role that the abstraction hierarchy plays is evident in ver ical 
protocols, which are involved in the diagnostic searches of infrmation-processing systems.  In 




The person will identify the information flow as well as the functional state by approaching the 
subject from a top-down perspective (Foyle and Hooey, 2008). 
 
2.2.6. TRANSLATION FOR THE OPERATOR IN THE INDUSTRIAL SETTING  
 
An organization of the different types of information processing involved in industrial 
tasks was developed by Jens Rasmussen of Denmark.  This pattern provides a useful framework 
for identifying the types of errors likely to occur in different operational situations, or within 
different facets of the same task that may place different information-processing demands on the 
individual.  The classification system is known as the skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-
based approach.  The three classifications refer to the degree of conscious control exercised by 
the individual over his or her activities (Reason, 1990).   
In the knowledge-based mode, the ask is carried out by the human in an almost totally 
conscious fashion.  This would occur if  a beginner (e.g., an operator in training) is performing a 
task, or if an experienced individual encounters a completely novel situation.  In either of these 
circumstances, substantial mental exertion would have to be asserted to evaluate the condition, 
and his or her responses would likely be slow.  In addition, after each action, the person would 
need to evaluate its effect prior to taking additional action, which would probably further slow 
his or her responses to the situation.  Knowledge-based performance results in a nominal error 
rate of 1:2 (Reason, 1990). 
In the skill-based mode, efficient performance of well-practiced, mainly physical actions 
of which practically no conscious reasoning occurs.  Skill-based actions are normally 
commenced by an explicit occurrence, such as the requirement to operate a valve, that may arise 




opening the valve will then be executed largely without conscious thought.  The skill-ba ed 
performance mode results in a nominal error rate of 1:1,000 (Reason, 1990). 
The last category involves the use of rules, which may have been learned as a result of 
interacting with the plant, through formal training, or by working with experienced process 
workers.  The level of conscious control is midway between that of the knowledge- and skill-
based modes.  The rule-based performance mode results in a nominal error rate of 1:100
(Reason, 1990). 
Next, it is important to describe and distinguish between slips and mistakes.  Slips are 
defined as errors in which the intention is correct but a failure occurred in the actual carrying out 
of the activities required.  For example, a worker may know that a receptacle needs to b  filled 
but instead may fill a similar receptacle nearby.  This slip may occur if the receptacles are poorly 
labeled, or if the worker is confused with regard to the location of the correct recep acle.  
Mistakes, by contrast, arise from an incorrect intention, which leads to an incorrect action 
sequence that may be quite consistent with the wrong intention.  For example, a worker might 
wrongly assume that a reaction was endothermic and might apply heat, thereby causing 
overheating.  Incorrect intentions may arise from lack of knowledge or an inappropriate 
diagnosis (Norman, 1981). 
Slips can be described as due to misapplied competence because they are examples of 
errors in highly skilled, well-practiced activities that are characteristic of the skill-based mode.   
Mistakes, on the other hand, are largely confined to the rule- and knowledge-based performance 
modes. 
In the skill-based mode, the individual can function very effectively by using pre-




occasionally needed to check on progress at specific points when operative in this mode.  An
undesirable consequence accompanying this efficiency is that strong habits can take over when 
attention to checks is diverted by distractions, or when unfamiliar activities are embedded in a 
familiar context (Reason, 1990). 
With regard to mistakes, two separate mechanisms operate.  In the rule-based mode, an 
error of intention can occur if an improper diagnostic rule is utilized.   For example, a worker 
who has considerable experience in stagnant, shutdown-status power plant chemistry may have 
learned diagnostic rules that are inappropriate for operational, dynamic, and volatile power plant 
chemistry.  If he or she attempts to apply these rules to evaluate the cause of  continuous 
process disturbance, a misdiagnosis could result, leading in turn to an inappropriate action.  In 
other situations, diagnostic rules that have been successful in the pastmay be overused.  Such 
sound rules are usually applied first even if they are not necessarily appropriate (Reason, 1990). 
People often have a tendency to force a new situation into the mold of previous events.  
For example, in one incident, some modifications were made to a pump used to transfer a liquid.  
When movement of the liquid was complete, the worker pressed the stop button on the control 
panel and saw that the “pump running” light went out.  He also closed a remotely operated valve 
in the pump delivery line.  Several hours later, he high-temperature alarm on the pump sounded.  
Because the worker had stopped the pump and h d seen the “pump running” light go out, he 
assumed that the alarm was faulty and ignored it.  Shortly thereafter the pump exploded.  The 
explanation for this unwanted sequence of events is that when the pump was modified, an error 
was introduced into the circuit.  As a result, pressing the stop button did not stop the pump but 
merely switched off the running light.  The pump continued running a d overheated, and the 




the worker’s assumption that when the “pump running” light went out, the pump must have 
stopped.  That assumption prevailed even through the sounding of a high-temperature alarm, 
which would usually be associated with an operating pump.  The rule “if  Pump light is 
extinguished, then pump is stopped” was so strong that it overcame th evidence from the 
temperature alarm that the pump was still running (Reason, 1990). 
In the case of knowledge-based mistakes, other factors are important.  Most of these 
factors result from the considerable demands on information-pr cessing capabilities that become 
necessary when a situation must be evaluated in unfamiliar conditions.  Given these demands, it 
is not surprising that humans do not perform very well in high-stress, unfamiliar situations where 
they are required to “think on their feet” in the absence of rules, routines, and procedures to give 
them suitable direction.  For example, operators may only utilize th  finite information that is 
immediately available to evaluate the situation, rather than seeking more comprehensive data or 
assistance from others that are more knowledgeable.  They may also become overconfident in 
the correctness of their knowledge.  One typical behavior that occurs during knowledge-based 
problem solving is an insistence that one course of action is correct, leading a  individual or the 
operating team to become tangled in one aspect of the problem and exclude all other aspects that 
should be considered.  This behavior characterized the Three Mile Island nuclear accident i  
Pennsylvania.  The opposite form of behavior can also be observed, in which the overloaded 
worker gives his or her attention superficially to one problem after another, without solving any 
of them (Janis, 1972). 
In the skill-based mode, recovery is usually prompt and effective, because the individual 
will have familiarity with the expected outcome of his or her actions and will therefor  get timely 




This highlights the role of feedback as a significant aspect of error recovery.  In the case of 
mistakes, the mistaken intention tends to be very resistant to con rary evidence.  People tend to 
ignore feedback information that does not support their expectations of the situation (Reason, 
1990).   
 
2.3. ESCALATION  
 
To fully understand how technological advancements interact with human performance at 
nuclear plants, we should consider the principle of escalation (Karwowski, 2006), or the idea that 
problems tend to increase.  What begins as a small problem or error leads to an increase in the 
coordinating and cognitive demands required to accomplish a task.  This frequently results in 
larger errors and an increase in problems.  In general, there is a positive relationship between the 
scope of a problem and the amount of information processing necessary to cope with it.  When 
there are more problems in the underlying system, the additional information processing needed 
to resolve the situation increases.  A more complex system requires greatereffor  to deal with 
unexpected problems or errors.  As technology progresses, the complexity of the systems 
involved grows as well (Salvendy, 2012).  
  
2.4. ACTIVE ERRORS 
 
By definition, active errors have effects that are noticed immediately.  They can occur 
across the spectrum of human behavior modes but are usually associated with individuals in 
frontline operations of a system.  Examples include officers of ships, air traffic controllers, pilots, 
or control room operators in a nuclear facility.  When examining active errors, it is important to 
take into account the complexity associated with human nature (Cacciabue and Cassani, 2011), 




define people’s limitations, abilities, and tendencies (Stoop and Dekker, 2012).  An important 
aspect of human nature relevant to this study is the innate tendency toward imprecision.  
Whereas machines tend to be precise, people are usually imprecise, sp cially when under 
stresses such as time pressure.  Human fallibility can cause people to get into situations that are 
beyond their abilities.  Logically, complex systems intensify a person’s susceptibility to make 
mistakes (Stern and Stern, 2012). 
Because active errors are common and often very consequential, their most prevalent 
causes should be understood to aid in reducing them.  For example, most individuals tend to 
overestimate their abilities in order to maintain control at their work station (Cacciabue and 
Cassani, 2011).  In this instance, the maintenance of control means that the task occurs as it is 
supposed to with the person performing in the appropriate fashion.  Such overestimation can 
occur for at least two reasons.  First, consequential error is rare, and many times an error occurs 
with no adverse result.  Thus, people conclude that errors will not be caught unless they are 
inconsequential.  Second, people do not know or acknowledge their own capabilities.  For 
example, most people can function on insufficient sleep or work during times of distraction.  
They can also perform work duties during poor environmental conditions such as extreme cold, 
heat, vibration, or noise.  People can become accustomed to these conditions.  However, if the 
limits of a person’s capabilities are exceeded, the chance making errors increases.  The impact of 
physical or environmental limitations can be especially problematic when work is taking place 
within a complex system (Stoop and Dekker, 2012). 
Stress is a prominent contributor to active errors (Chang et al., 2014).  Stress is not 
always a problem; sometimes it is healthy and normal.  Stress can focus attention and can id an 




become detrimental to performance.  Stress can be understood as the body’s physical and mentl 
response to perceived threats within the environment.  The important word in this case is 
perceived, because the individual’s perception is central to adaptation in order to cope with a 
threat.  Stress tends to increase in conjunction with lack of familiarity with the situation.  
Extreme stress can lead to panic, which inhibit a person’s ability to act or to sense, recall, or 
perceive essential elements of a situation.  Fear and anxiety often follow when an individual 
believes that he or she cannot respond appropriately to a situation.  This fear and anxiety and 
frequently accompanied by a lapse of memory and an inability to perform certain actions or to 
think critically (Ramanujam and Goodman, 2011). 
Another important factor in mental errors is people’s tendency to avoid mental strain 
(Cacciabue and Cassani, 2011).  Most people engage only reluctantly in long periods of 
concentrated thinking.  They also tend to avoid situations in which they must display heighten d 
levels of attention for an extended period of time.  Thought can be a slow and laborious proces
that requires significant effort.  Therefore, people often seek familiar patterns and tend to apply 
solutions with which they are already familiar.  This shortcutting is a type of mental bias 
designed to reduce the cognitive effort required in making decisions (Ramanujam and Goodman, 
2011).  
One of these mental biases is assumptions (Goodman et al., 2011).  People frequently 
accept as true certain conditions that have not been verified.  Another bias is habit, or an 
unconscious behavior pattern acquired through frequent repetition.  Confirmation bias can also 
be problematic and is exemplified by a reluctance to abandon established solutions.  Individuals 
tend not to change their way of thinking or behaving, even when there is conflicting information 




established position and ignore blatant evidence to the contrary.  Next, frequency bias refers to a 
tendency to gamble that a familiar solution will work, or to viewing information as more 
important when it has occurred more frequently.  Finally, people often suffer from availability 
bias, the tendency to use solutions that immediately come to mind or to place greater importance 
on facts that are readily available (Stoop and Dekker, 2012). 
Limited working memory can be a factor in active errors (Rebhan, 2009).  We rely on 
short-term memory to make decisions and solve problems.  This short-term memory can be 
understood as a storeroom that demands attention and is temporary in nature.  It is used to recall 
new information and is actively involved with recall, storage, and learning.  When the limits of 
this memory are exceeded, errors can result (Chang et al., 2014).
 
2.5. LATENT ERRORS 
 
Like active errors, latent errors may also have adverse consequences, but they may lay 
dormant within a complex system for a significant period of time before they manifest (Rebhan, 
2009).  They often become evident only when combined with other factors to result in a breach 
of a system’s defenses.  Latent errors are frequently committed by individuals whose activities 
are removed in space and time from the direct human system interface.  For example, they may 
be committed by maintenance personnel, managers, construction workers, high-level decision 
makers, or system designers well befor  their manifestation (Rebhan, 2009).   
An analysis of significant nuclear accidents such as Chernobyl or Three Mile Island 
found that latent errors frequently pose the most important threat when people interact with  
complex system (Stern and Stern, 2012).  Traditionally, accident investigations and reli bility 




Goodman, 2011).  Although operators do make mistakes, such as those presented above as 
examples in the section on active errors, many of these mistakes have an underlying cause 
connected to a latent error, such as when an operator of a complex system inherits the mistakes 
made by the designers or installers (Stern and Stern, 2012). 
For these reasons, the study of latent failures may be more beneficial than a focus on 
operator mistakes (Stern and Stern, 2012).  Unfortunately, most research on human factors has 
concentrated on improving the human-machine interface, an emphasis that entails a focus on 
active errors, even though latent errors inherent within the system can be associated with a 
broader range of possible problems.  In other words, active errors may be only the outcome of 
latent problems that have long been embedded within the system (Chang et al., 2014). 
Latent human error comes into play when individuals’ propensity for error is enhanced 
by the environment in which they work and the systems with which they interact.  According to 
James Reason (2000), two adverse effects can result from latent conditions: their ability to 
provoke errors, and their impact on the long-term health and welfare of the system that created 
them.  These conditions do not necessarily contribute immediately to the possibility for error; 
rather, they can rest hidden within a system until the requisite elements align and cause the latent 
error to become activated (Reason, 2000).  
Rapid technological advances across all industries have gen rated an additional focus on 
latent error (Rebhan, 2009).  Many of today’s complex systems have operators who are remote 
and removed from the processes that they control.  As the systems have become more complex, 
they can intervene between people and the physical tasks involved.  When nucl ar technology 
was initially introduced, operators still engaged in direct manipulation and sensing of the systems 




controlled.  As technology has continued to advance, the remote manipulation of devices and 
sensing has further removed humans from the processes under their charge (Cacciabue and 
Cassani, 2011). 
The most significant changes in how humans interact with complex systems have reslted 
from the decreased cost of powerful computing (Stoop and Dekker, 2012).  Many system 
operators are now separated from their process by more than one component of a control system.  
At a lower level, the task interactive system controls the detailed parts of an oper tion. There is 
an intervention between the specialized system and the operators due to the need for a human
system interface.  The control system presents pieces of information to the operator, but the
interface allows only a prescribed degree of interaction between the person and the remote 
process.  This creates a situation of supervisory control.  The person adjusts, monitors, and 
initiates processes and systems that are also automatically controlled (Chang et al., 2014).  
Nevertheless, the stimuli contained within the operational environment are impacting these 
remote operators at all times and can still contribute to errors.  Moreover, their remoteness can 
increase the possible impact of latent errors introduced by people who designed or installed the 
system.  In fact, those nuclear manufactures, installation teams, and facility personnel who are 
considered the best in their field may be prone to making the worst mistakes (Reason, 2000).  
Although the focus in accident investigation may be placed upon the operators, another key 
source of errors arises when the systems themselves are not scrutinized for their own propensity 
to cause errors (Reason, 2000).   
The increasing complexity and automation of systems at nuclear facilities are both 
making latent errors more difficult to detect and giving them greater capability to lead to a 




system, a remote operator may not become aware of any problems until it is too late to reverse 
the process.  Or a latent error could be embedded in the design of a semi-automated control 
proces.  In this case, the operator might detect a problem with a plant parameter and might 
initiate the necessary actions to correct the problem.  However, if a latent error is p esent, the 
control processes may not respond appropriately to the operator’s actions.  As a result, 
alternative means costing more time and money may be required, or the severity of the problem 
could escalate (Goodman et al., 2011).   
The problems described in the previous paragraph are related to the design of a 
monitoring and a control system, respectively (Rebhan, 2009).  Unlike an active human error, 
such design problems could span numerous pieces of equipment and could potentially go 
undetected for years, even decades.  Not until a problem in plant operation arises would such a 
latent error become detectable.  For this reason, it is crucial for safety monitors and researchers 
to shift away from the traditional approach of concentrating on operator errors.  Although active
errors are important, latent errors can be even more catastrophic (Stoop and Dekker, 2012). 
 
2.6. FORESEEABLE ERRORS 
 
Human beings are notoriously error-prone (Chang et al., 2014).  We now know a great 
deal about the specific types of errors that people are likely to make.  These mistakes are 
frequently described as foreseeable errors.  Since they ar  expected, they can be accounted for in 
a system.  Complex modern systems can be designed to accommodate this category of human 
errors and ensure that they remain benign.  This approach is called esigning for error (Rebhan, 
2009).  As technology advances and complexity expands, the number of foreseeable errors tends 




A number of factors must be considered when designing a complex system to 
accommodate foreseeable human error (Cacciabue and Cassani, 2011).  One way to accomplish 
this is to do a human reliability assessment (HRA), which encompasses techniques for 
statistically determining the probability that a complex system will fail given certain 
circumstances.  The techniques take into account the chance that various components of the 
system, including the operators as well as mechanical components, will fail in specific ways 
(Stoop and Dekker, 2012).  In this way, the human operator is considered a part of the system 
that is fallible like any other (Ramanujam and Goodman, 2011). 
Human performance varies across individuals and situations (Goodman et al., 2011).  
Tasks require different levels of manual skills, training, and attention.  As noted above, the types 
of work in which people engage can be broken down into three general categories: knowledge-
based, rule-based, or skill-based.  Using these categories as constraints assists in the analysis of 
human behavior and error (Rasmussen, 1983).   
The probability of human error is proportional to the n cessary level of knowledge 
needed to perform the task (Goodman et al., 2011).  Tasks that require a complicated series of 
actions must frequently be done in a specific order.  For this to happen, an individual must have 
the knowledge ahead of time or must be provided with it at a key moment.  Information that 
must be maintained in the operator’s memory is sometimes known as knowledge in the head 
(KIH).  Processes that involve high levels of KIH also tend to result in a significant amount of 
errors (Stoop and Dekker, 2012). 
Along with KIH, there is knowledge in the world, or KIW (Ramanujam and Goodman, 
2011), which refers to knowledge held within the components of the task.  In a KIW situation, 




task.  For example, in the case of an assembly that involves several washers and nuts, there may 
be only one sequence that results in the proper disassembly of these components.  However, the 
disassembly sequence is contained within the elements of the task.  These types of situations 
result in fewer errors than those requiring KIH, presumably because they do not depend on the 
reliability of human memory (Goodman et al., 2011). 
Another approach to designing a system that can accommodate foreseeable human error 
is the Critical Incident Technique (Chang et al., 2014).  This method assumes that problems do 
not occur spontaneously.  Each failure is associated with critical incidents that allow the failure 
to occur.  A critical incident is a situation in which the errors nearly cause a failure or a failure is 
already occurring, but where something prevents a disaster from ensuing.  The Critical Incident 
Technique is an anonymous reporting tool (Mengolini and Debarberis, 2012).  It usually relies on 
a survey to elicit information from operators.  This approach works most efficiently when it is 
part of a continuing program and not just a single solicitation.  The people supplying information 
for a critical incident program are generally encouraged to provide sufficient identification 
information so that they can be contacted by the investigators if necessary.  However, this 
request for personal disclosure can discourage esponse.  In all cases, for proper implementation 
of this specific technique, the individuals providing information must have their identity 
removed from any reports so that other individuals at their place of employment cannot identify 
them (Ramanujam and Goodman, 2011). 
One effective way to design a system that accounts for foreseeable human errors is a fault 
tree analysis (Stern and Stern, 2012).  This approach is diagrammatic and requires that the 




components are then identified in a di gram that depicts the elements and their relationships to 
each other (Cacciabue and Cassani, 2011). 
Most fault trees have two possible outcomes: a specific type of failure or a successful 
operation.  These possibilities are represented at the top of the tree (Goodman et al., 2011).  The 
elements that result in each outcome are listed below.  The branches of the tree illustrate the 
logical relationships between the functional elements.  Some fault tree analyses will include a 
probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) that calculates the statistical probabilities associated with 
each branch of the tree.  This approach to accounting for foreseeable human errors has the 
advantage of being a top-down analysis that begins with the postulate of an outcome—for 
example, in the case of a nuclear power plant, a reactor core breach (Ramanujam and Goodman, 
2011). 
 
2.7. UNEXPECTED EVENTS  
 
Unexpected events are a type of abnormal behavior of systems (Dauer et al., 2011).  They 
are often caused by human errors and result in the loss of productivity.  Many of the more 
popular practices and methodologies applied in systems engineering do not reduce the chance of 
unexpected events.  However, engineers can reduce these operational risks if they take into 
account the limitations of human operators when interacting in a system (Lelieveld, Kunkel, and 
Lawrence, 2012).  As with foreseeable errors, as technology advances and complexity grows, the 
possibility of unexpected events will rise and will require added analysis and remediation. 
Many mishaps, though considered unavoidable, are attributable to some type of user error 
(Karakosta, Pappas, Marinakis, and Psarras, 2013).  Human limitations provide numerous 




problems, but this approach requires significant knowledge of system behavior in order to 
integrate safeguards (Mengolini and Debarberis, 2012).  The methods used to mitigate risks of 
human error must be integrated within the system through engineering practices.  This involves 
the addition of guidelines and methods to traditional system engineering to protect the system 
from unexpected events.  These guidelines are based on a study of the known failures, interviews 
with system engineers, and background research (Saey et al., 2010). 
To understand unexpected events, it is helpful to classify them (Mohan, 2011).  One 
method of classification consists of three general categories: operator confusion, intra-system 
inconsistency, and inter-system mismatches.  Operator confusion occurs when there is a 
mismatch between the operator’s perception of the state of the system and its actual state; intra-
system inconsistencies include problems that occur between units within a system; and inter-
system mismatches are problems resulting from faulty communication between different systems 
(Wehrden et al., 2012). 
During standard operations, the system units will comply with common scenarios 
(Mohan, 2011).  This is often referred to as a normal system state.  Wh n operating, the system 
units are receiving event information.  An event is considered normal if a unit is designed to 
respond properly to the specific event.  If the unit is not designed to respond to the specific event, 
then the event is described as a slip.  Many slips are caused by hardware faults or an unexpected 
action by the user (Mengolini and Debarberis, 2012).  The occurrence of a slip changes the 
system to an exceptional state.  A resilient system will contain protocols to return the system to 
its normal state.  However, when protocols do not exist to combat the exceptional state, the next 
event may result in some type of mishap or unexpected outcome.  This can then be described as 




Most systems are designed for operation according to certain scenarios (Lelieveld, 
Kunkel, and Lawrence, 2012).  The responses to an event by any of a system’s units are designed 
according to a specific operating scenario that includes various assumptions.  During normal 
operations, a system assumes a certain scenario; this is referred to as the system context.  When a 
system unit receives input indicating an exceptional event, the operating scenario may be 
different (Lelieveld, Kunkel, and Lawrence, 2012).  For example, a unit failure may result in an 
operating scenario that changes to call for unit replacement.  If the system’s units all operate 
according to the changed scenario, then the system is described as being context-compliant.  If
this does not occur and some of the system’s units are not complying with the new context, then 
the system enters a state of being context-inconsistent (Saey et al., 2010). 
Events can be understood as expected if they are in compliance with the operating 
scenario, which defines the context of operation.  For all the system units to work properly, they 
need to behave in compliance with the procedures that have been defined in the context.  This 
includes the operator.  Unexpected events result from the need for human control in exceptional 
situations such as an abnormal event, alert, or emergency.  During design, the primary scenarios 
are anticipated, but it is impossible to predict all scenarios.  To handle exceptional situations 
properly and safely, the system relies on a human operator.  In such instances, the operator will 
have unusual control over the system.  It is expected that human operators will use proper 
judgment when applying their exceptional control (Mohan, 2011). 
Exceptional events have a wide range of sources (Wehrden et al., 2012), including 
designs that do not fit operational needs, interruptions in the normal operating procedure, 
unintentional actions that are not compliant with their context, failure to comply with a changing 




2.8. TAXONOMIES   
 
A taxonomy classification method can be used to classify and code errors.  Such 
classification is essential to analyzing data and spotting error patterns within a system's design.  
However, when taxonomies are applied in a nuclear setting, no single taxonomy can cover all 
possible scenarios (Wallace and Ross, 2006).  Taxonomies are industry-specific, and the 
classifications that work for one industry may not work for another.  Even within the nucl ar 
industry, taxonomies may change due to new data.  Systems must be designed with this type of 
rapid evolution in mind.  
A traditional system design is based on the assumption that certain required specifications 
wil l be met (Dauer et al., 2011).  These specifications are based in turn on a requirement analysis 
performed in accordance with defined scenarios.  In practice, however, specification documents 
are often not well associated with conceivable scenarios (Lelieveld, Kunkel, and Lawrence, 
2012).  Furthermore, most documents on procedure specifications do not describe the 
relationships that exist within the system’s states.  They may also not describe the appropriate 
desired responses to all possible events.  As a consequence, the system design derived from this 
input does not include the necessary means for matching the system’s activity with the operating 
scenarios (Law et al., 2013). 
It is common for a system’s behavior to be properly understood only after an incident 
occurs (Christoudias and Lelieveld, 2013).  This means that during the design, the event that 
resulted in a mishap was not anticipated.  Frequently, this is due to not considering all possible 
states of the system during system design.  It is crucial to solve this problem by thoroughly 
researching the maximum number of possible scenarios to ensure that a complex system will 




operational scenarios.  There must also be a close relationship between the state of the system 
and the scenario (Lelieveld, Kunkel, and Lawrence, 2012). 
 
2.9. THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY  
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a crucial stakeholder in the global 
nuclear industry.  It was established in 1957 and still operates as an autonomous organization 
promoting the use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes (Thomson, 2011).  The IAEA also 
seeks to reduce the use of atomic energy for weapons or other military purposes.  It functions 
independently from the United Nations but reports to the U.N. General Assembly (Mengolini 
and Debarberis, 2012).   
The IAEA has three basic concerns: safeguards and verification, science and technology, 
and safety and security (Perko, Turcanu, and Carlé, 2012).  These three concepts underlie all 
missions carried out by the IAEA.  In its interaction with the U.N., the IAEA generally interfaces 
with the Security Council.  The IAEA is composed of three general bodies: th  Secretariat, the 
General Conference, and the Board of Governors (Budnitz, 2010). 
The IAEA has three primary functions (Mengolini and Debarberis, 2012).  It acts as a 
hub for the myriad fields of science, and it considers how nuclear technology can be peacefully 
applied.  It also ensures the security and safety of atomic facilities through standards and by 
providing information on the nuclear industry.  To fulfill its mission, the IAEA inspects the 
world’s nuclear facilities to ensure that they are being run properly and used in a peaceful 
manner.  As an illustration of the diversity of nuclear science activities, in 2004 the IAEA 
introduced the Program of Action for Cancer Therapy (PACT), in a response to developing 




2.9.1. THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR EVENT SCALE  
 
In 1990, the IAEA introduced the International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale
(INES) (Loomis, 2011) to provide simple and readily understandable information about nuclear 
incidents.  The scale is logarithmic and similar in concept to the scale that measures the 
magnitude of earthquakes; each new level on the scale is 10 times as severe as the previous one.  
For earthquakes, intensity can be evaluated in a quantitative fashion.  However, judgments of the 
severity of a nuclear incident are more subjective and require extensive investigation.  For this 
reason, an INES level is generally not assigned to an incident until a significant period of time 
following the event.  Unfortunately, this means that the scale is sometimes not useful for rapid 
deployment of disaster aid (Marques, 2011). 
The INES has seven levels, from the least severe to the most problematic: anomaly, 
incident, serious incident, accident with local consequences, accident with wider consequences, 
serious accident, and major accident (Law et al., 2013).  The first three levels are sometimes 
grouped together under the category of atomic incidents; the highest four categories are referred 
to as nuclear accidents.  An eighth level, referred to as  deviation of level 0, indicates an event 
with no safety significance.  For example, a reactor might need to be shut down because a 
cooling circuit leaked, but the event is not an atomic incident or accident if it does not result in 
the release of radioactive substances (Marques, 2011).  
The first level of the International Nuclear nd Radiological Event Scale, an anomaly, is 
achieved when a member of the public is exposed to radiation exceeding the yearly statutory 
limits (Loomis, 2011).  This could be a minor problem involving safety components.  However, 






Figure 1. The International Nuclear and Radiological Event Scale (NRC website, n.d.). 
 
 
in a worker being exposed to radiation beyond the yearly statutory limits (Christoudias and 
Lelieveld, 2013).  It may also involve a member of the public being exposed to a radiation level 
in excess of 10 millisieverts (mSv).  Typical problems at this level include improperly packaging 
radioactive sealed sources, the locating of an orphan source of radioactivity hat is still sealed, or 
the discovery of a significant problem with safety provisions.  The impact of level 2 problems on 
radiological barriers and controls can result in substantial contamination at the facility.  
Radiation levels in the operating area will exceed 50 mSv (Högberg, 2013). 
Level 3 is considered a serious incident (Dauer et al., 2011).  Although there may be 
severe contamination within the problem area, it is not likely that the public will be exposed to 
significant radiation.  Workers in the area may be exposed to radiation levels exceeding 10 times 




example of a Level 3incident is the delivery of a sealed, highly radioactive source without the 
observance of adequate procedures and standards (Thomson, 2011). 
The fourth level of the INES is an accident with local consequences (Dauer et al., 2011).  
Substantial amounts of radioactive material may be released, and public exposure is highly 
probable.  The fuel may be damaged, resulting in more than 0.1% of the core inventory being 
released.  The results will li kely include at least one death from radiation (Högberg, 2013). 
The fifth level is an accident with wider consequences (Loomis, 2011).  The probable 
result here is the release of significant quantities of radioactive material, with a substantial 
probability of public exposure.  Severe damage to the reactor core may also occur, along with 
multiple deaths from radiation and a limited release of radioactive material into the environment 
that may require countermeasures (Law et al., 2013). 
The sixth level of the INES is a serious nuclear accident (Dauer et al., 2011).  This 
includes a release of radioactive material into the environment that requires the use of well-
planned countermeasures (Budnitz, 2010). 
The highest level of the INES, level seven, is a major nuclear accident (Mengolini and 
Debarberis, 2012) that has a significant impact on both the environment and people.  Radioactive 
materials are released in large quantities, and both extended and well-planned countermeasures 
must be used.  Only been two events in history have reached this level (Christoudias and 
Lelieveld, 2013).  







Table 1. International Nuclear Events Scale (International Atomic Energy Agency, 2002) 
 
 




External release of a large fraction of the radioactive material in a large 
facil ity (e.g., the core of a power reactor). This would typically involve a 
mixture of short and long-lived radioactive fission products (in quantities 
radiologically equivalent to more than tens of thousands of terabecquerels 
of iodine-131). Such a release would result in the possibil ity of acute health 
effects; delayed health effects over a wide area, possibly involving more 







External release of radioactive material (in quantities radiologically 
equivalent to the order of thousands to tens of thousands of terabecquerels 
of iodine-131). Such a release would be l ikely to result in full  
implementation of countermeasures covered by local emergency plans to 
l imit serious health effects.
SIGNIFICANT 





5 ACCIDENT WITH 
WIDER 
CONSEQUENCES
External release of radioactive material (in quantities radiologically 
equivalent to the order of hundreds to thousands of terabecquerels of iodine-
131). Such a release would be l ikely to result in partial implementation of 
countermeasures covered by emergency plans to lessen the l ikelihood of 
health effects.· Severe damage to the installation. This may involve severe 
damage to a large fraction of the core of a power reactor, a major criticality 
accident or a major fire or explosion releasing large quantities of 
radioactivity within the installation.
LIMITED RELEASE: 






TO REACTOR CORE 
/ RADIOLOGICAL 
BARRIERS
4 ACCIDENT WITH 
LOCAL 
CONSEQUENCES
External release of radioactivity resulting in a dose to the critical group of 
the order of a few mill isieverts. With such a release the need for off-site 
protective actions would be generally unlikely except possibly for local food 
control.· Significant damage to the installation. Such an accident might 
include damage leading to major on-site recovery problems such as partial 
core melt in a power reactor and comparable events at non-reactor 
installations.· Irradiation of one or more workers resulting in an 
overexposure where a high probability of early death occurs.
MINOR RELEASE: 
PUBLIC EXPOSURE 







EXPOSURE OF A 
WORKER
3 SERIOUS INCIDENT
External release of radioactivity resulting in a dose to the critical group of 
the order of tenths of a mill isievert. With such a release, off-site protective 
measures may not be needed. On-site events resulting in doses to workers 
sufficient to cause acute health effects and/or an event resulting in a severe 
spread of contamination; for example a few thousand terabecquerels of 
activity released in a secondary containment where the material can be 
returned to a satisfactory storage area.· Incidents in which a further failure 
of safety systems could lead to accident conditions, or a situation in which 
safety systems would be unable to prevent an accident if certain initiators 
were to occur.
VERY SMALL RELEASE: 
PUBLIC EXPOSURE AT 
A FRACTION OF 
PRESCRIBED LIMITS
SEVERE SPREAD OF 
CONTAMINATION/
ACUTE HEALTH 
EFFECTS TO A 
WORKER




Incidents with significant failure in safety provisions but with sufficient 
defense-in-depth remaining to cope with additional failures. These include 
events where the actual failures would be rated at level 1 but which reveal 
significant additional organizational inadequacies or safety culture 
deficiencies.· An event resulting in a dose to a worker exceeding a statutory 
annual dose l imit and/or an event which leads to the presence of significant 
quantities of radioactivity in the installation in areas not expected by 








FAILURES IN SAFETY 
PROVISIONS
1 ANOMALY
Anomaly beyond the authorized regime but with significant defense-in-depth 
remaining. This may be due to equipment failure, human error or procedural 
inadequacies and may occur in any area covered by the scale, e.g. plant 
operation, transport of radioactive material, fuel handling, waste storage. 
Examples include: breaches of technical specifications or transport 
regulations, incidents without direct safety consequences that reveal 
inadequacies in the organizational system or safety culture, minor defects 






Deviations where operational l imits and conditions are not exceeded and 
which are properly managed in accordance with adequate procedures. 
Examples include: a single random failure in a redundant system discovered 
during periodic inspections or tests, a planned reactor trip proceeding 
normally, spurious initiation of protection systems without significant 
consequences, leakages within the operational l imits, minor spreads of 
contamination within controlled areas without wider implications for safety 
culture.
CRITERIA OR SAFETY ATTRIBUTES





2.9.2. SAFETY ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS  
 
The IAEA is responsible for regular safety analyses of nuclear facilities (Prasad et al, 
2011).  These analyses evaluate th  physical environment at the nuclear plants.  They are 
intended to demonstrate that the proper safety requirements have been met for all types of 
initiating events.  These requirements include creating policies for ensuring the integrity of the 
barriers preventing the release of radioactive materials.   
The IAEA conducts two basic types of analyses of nuclear plants: probabilistic and 
deterministic safety analysis (Sugiyama et al., 2012).  Deterministic safety analysis involves 
predicting the responses to possible initiating events (Sugiyama et al., 2012).  There is a precise 
set of rules and criteria for acceptance.  Usually, the criteria and rules focus on structural, 
thermo-mechanical, radiological, thermo-hydraulic, and neutronic aspects of the plant.  A variety 
of computational tools are used to do these analyses.  The computations are done for 
predetermined modes of operation and specific states of the systems.  The events include evere 
accidents with core degradation beyond the design basis, postulated accidents, and accidents that 
are anticipated and transient.  The resulting computations yield physical variables and time 
related as well as spatial dependencies.  These dependencies can include concentrations of 
radionuclides, chemical composition, tangible impacts and stresses to structural materials, nd, in 
the case of nuclear power plants, problems with coolant flow rates, temperature, pressure, 
thermal power, and neutron flux (Hashemian, 2010).  When an assessment of prospective 
radiological consequences is conducted, the dependency is the potential dose received by the 
public or plant workers.  
When a deterministic safety analysis is prepared for the purposes of plant design, it is 




be done using an iterative process within the design phase of the project.  The limiting case for 
the minimum margin of the acceptance criteria is determined for each of the several postulated 
sequences or initiating events.  To understand the specific limiting case for a given transient or 
set of transients, there must be consideration of the consequential failures that have resulted from 
the external or internal initiating event (Perkins, Bensi, Philip, and Sancakatar, 2011). 
A sufficient set of best estimates for conservative assumptions for the boundary or initial 
conditions must be used (Hashemian, 2010).  Furthermore, independent failures should be 
addressed which are both coincident and limited in number.  Operator error must also be 
included.  The frequency of accident occurrences will decrease as each of the coincident 
independent failures is considered (i.e. since some failures occur together, the overall chance of a 
failure is less than the sum of the independent failures).  Only the combinations of the transi nts 
with a frequency within the design basis should be of concern (Perkins t al., 2011). 
The time frame used for a scenario should encompass everything that occurs up to the 
moment when a plant achieves a stable and safe state of operation (Sugiyama et al., 2012).  The 
states must be defined.  In the case of nuclear reactors, it is assumed that a stable and safe state is 
present when the reactor core is properly covered and long-term heat removal has been achieved.  
Additionally, the core must be sub-critical (i.e. no fission occurring and reasonably shutdown) 
and include a given margin.  The safety analysis should include provisions for removing the fuel 
in a secure manner and storing it in another location after it has cooled (Prasad et al., 2011). 
To ensure a proper defense in depth, all the barriers and credible mechanisms of failure 
must be considered (Hashemian, 2010).  Limiting faults such as rod ejections and secondary 




prior to the break criterion from best estimate analysis can be used in the definition of 
requirements for structures, components, and systems (Hashemian, 2010). 
The second type of analysis, probabilistic safety analysis, is used to ascertain the 
probability of damage being caused by a failure of each barrier (Hashemian, 2010).  This type of 
analysis is especially useful for evaluating the risk from low-frequency sequences that can lead 
to the damaging of a barrier.  In contrast, deterministic analysis is better suited for events that 
occur frequently and are anticipated by the acceptance criteria.  Probabilistic safety analysis is 
used for evaluating whether the in-depth defenses are adequate.  This might include events such 
as a severe loss of coolant i  nuclear power plants (Sugiyama et al., 2012). 
Both deterministic and probabilistic safety analyses provide important data on ccident 
scenarios (Perkins et al., 2011).  Whereas deterministic safety analysis is used to identify 
challenges to the physical barriers or integrity of systems, probabilistic safety analysis uses data 
and codes for estimation.  These data and codes must be consistent with the objectives of the 
analysis.  The results of the probabilistic analysis can be understood as supporting the results of 
the more conservative deterministic analysis (Hashemian, 2010). 
When a probabilistic safety analysis is performed, a fault tree is often used (Hashemian, 
2010) to confirm whether the assumptions made in the deterministic alculation about the 
availability of the systems are correct.  For example, this approach might be applied in 
determining the potential for common cause failures or the establishment of minimum system 
requirements.  The probabilistic safety analysis fault tree can also be used to determine whether 
the technical specifications are adequate and to identify the most important individual potential 





2.9.3. THE UNITED STATES 
 
Although nearly all countries with a nuclear industry are regulated by the IAEA, the 
United States is an exception (Prasad et al., 2011), monitoring its nuclear facilities through an 
independent government agency, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).  This agency was 
formed following the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, as the successor agency to the U.S. 
Atomic Energy Commission (AEC).  The NRC licenses and regulates the nation’s civilian use of 
radioactive materials to protect public health and safety, promote the common defense and 
security, and protect the environment.  The NRC’s regulatory mission covers three main areas: 
• Reactors: commercial reactors for generating electric power, and research and test 
reactors used for research, testing, and training. 
• Materials: uses of nuclear materials in medical, industrial, and academic settings and 
facilities that produce nuclear fuel. 
• Waste: transportation, storage, and disposal of nuclear materials and waste, and 
decommissioning of nuclear facilities from service (NRC website, n.d.). 
For the purposes of NRC administration, the United States is divided into four regions 
(Perkins et al., 2011).  Region one i cludes the northeastern United States, region two consists of 
the southern states, region three is the Midwest, and region four covers the south central and 
western states as well as Alaska and Hawaii.  Nationally, the NRC oversees more than 100 
nuclear reactors that produce power along with several fuel cycle and waste facilities.  There are 
also 33 nuclear reactors which are permanently shut down and several new reactors under 
construction (Sugiyama et al., 2012). 
There are multiple levels of regulatory oversight of U.S. nuclear facilities.  The first of 




operations.  Resident inspectors are generally found at nuclear power plants, whereas fuel cycle 
facilities are assigned project inspectors that are responsible for the plant, but not permanently 
stationed on site.  NRC inspection teams inspect all aspects of plant operation and administration 
throughout an inspection cycle.  Special inspection teams can also be chartered to investigate 
events, violations, and possible whistleblower reports (Sugiyama et al., 2012). 
The United States currently has cooperation agreements with the IAEA (Perkins et al., 
2011).  Prior to the early 1970s, the United States had no agreement with the IAEA, causing 
concerns that the United States would have an industrial and commercial advantage over other 
countries when using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.  In response to this concern, the 
United States entered into an agreement with the IAEA for nuclear plant inspection.  The 
agreement excludes any facilities that are producing or using nuclear power for national security.  
In 1993, the United States agreed to place any nuclear material in excess of its defense needs in 
storage according to IAEA standards (Prasad et al., 2011). 
 
2.10. FLUCTUATIONS IN THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY  
 
The March 2011 disaster at the Fukushima power plant had a significant impact on public 
opinion concerning atomic policies (Law et al., 2013).  For example, the Chinese government 
stopped all its nuclear projects.  Public support for any type of atomic power in the Republic of 
Korea disappeared.  Germany and Belgium enacted legislation to eliminate nuclear power by the 
second decade of the 21st century.  Switzerland and the Netherlands also stopped any projects to 
build additional atomic power plants.  Other world governments also revisited their plans for 




The global reaction to the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident was different from 
that in proceeding accidents (Christoudias and Lelieveld, 2013).  In 2011, 19 atomic reactors 
were completely shut down, 18 of them as a consequence of the problems at Fukushima.  Only 
seven of these reactors have resumed operation since.  Germany, the first country to begin 
operating a new reactor following the Chernobyl incident, closed eight reactors after Fukushima.  
Fourteen months after that nuclear accident, Japan had only one reactor still in operation (Perko, 
Turcanu, and Carlé, 2012). 
In 1992, the World Nuclear Industry Status Report was established (Saey et al., 2010).  
This report was first designed to assess the global impact of the Chernobyl incident on the 
nuclear industry.  The report predicted that fewer atomic plants would be constructed.  During 
the first decade of the 21st century, this prediction has been confirmed with the rapid growth of 
competitors to nuclear power such as solar and wind power (Lelieveld, Kunkel, and Lawrence, 
2012).  Public concerns regarding safety are not the only disadvantages facing atomic power 
plants, as their construction frequently involves cost overruns, construction delays, and long lead 
times.  Nuclear power is increasingly viewed as a type of risky investment that many countries 
are choosing to avoid (Thomson, 2011). 
In 2012, 31 countries had nuclear fission reactors for the purposes of producing energy 
(Perko, Turcanu, and Carlé, 2012).  The only newreactor to come online between 2010 and 2012 
was the Bushehr reactor in the Islamic Republic of Iran.  In 2011, more than 2,500 kilowatt hours 
of electricity were produced at nuclear power plants, approximately equivalent to the amount 
produced in 2001 and 5% below 2006, which was the highest production year for nuclear power.  
In 1993, the proportion of all electricity produced by atomic power reached its highest level at 




In July 2012, there were 429 nuclear reactors operating in 31 countries (Sharma and 
Arora, 2011).  This was a decline from the 444 plants operating in 2002.  By July 2012, Japan 
had shut down 49 of its 50 nuclear power plants.  Conversely, in 2012, 13 countries were 
building new nuclear power plants, down slightly from the 15 countries reported in 2011.  In 
2012, the total number of nuclear reactors under construction increased to 59.  However, this was 
far below the peak of 234 nuclear construction projects in 1979 (Shultz et al, 2013). 
Even though reactors continue to be built, their dwindling numbers illustrate the 
uncertainty of the use of nuclear power for energy (Perko, Turcanu, and Carlé, 2012).  As of 
2012, nine reactors had been under construction for over 20 years.  The longest construction 
period belongs to Tennessee’s Watts Bar Nuclear Generating Station Unit 2, which began 
construction in 1973 but, due to several complications, wa  not completed until 2015 
(Christoudias and Lelieveld, 2013).  Currently, 18 nuclear power plants under construction have 
been associated with significant construction delays.  More than 70% of the plants under 
construction are located in Russia, China, and India.  These three countries have not provided
reliable information about the status of their atomic power plant construction.  Nevertheless, it is 
generally accepted that more than half of the Russian nuclear power plants under construction 
are experiencing delays of at least several years (Gang-yang, Song and Zhang, 2011). 
Ordinarily, long lead times for atomic power plants re ult from long-term planning, 
extended construction times, and lengthy licensing procedures (Sharma and Arora, 2011).  These 
projects also require extensive site preparation and complex financing.  All these obstacle  have 
reduced the number of new nuclear power plant construction projects or grid connections.  The 




about 27 years.  Some of the facilities have been operating between 40 and 60 years (Dauer et 
al., 2011). 
Whereas the United States licenses nuclear power plants to operate for 40 years, many 
countries do not place a time limit on their licenses (Law et al., 2013).  On the other hand, 
France, which first began operating an atomic reactor with pressurized water in 1977, has a 
policy of conducting an in-depth inspection of nuclear power plants once each decade and has 
permitted only two plants to operate beyond 30 years.  Those two are scheduled for permanent 
closure in 2016, before they reach their 40-year anniversary of operation (Mengolini and 
Debarberis, 2012). 
 
2.11. THE NUCLEAR DEBATE  
 
Numerous costly incidents have occurred at nuclear facilities in the United States 
(Sehgal, 2012).  Similar events have occurred worldwide and are not unique to any one particular 
country.  In nearly every incident, the cause has been isolated and steps have been taken to 
alleviate problems and prevent future incidents.  However, thousands of upgrades to various 
pieces of equipment ake place over the lifetime of a nuclear facility.  The vast majority of these 
changes do not result in difficulties.  Although there is no way to know with certainty what 
problems have been averted through technological improvements, it seems r asonable to assume 
that these upgrades have reduced the number of incidents; in other words, fewer problems have 
been created by the new technology than would have resulted without the changes (Woods et al., 
2010). However, it is also possible that the introduction of new technology increases the risk of 
human error. Since changing the technology associated with nuclear facilities is an ongoing and 




facilities decreases human performance and increases th  chance of incidents is an important 
question to investigate. 
 
2.12. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
 
This literature review has covered a wide range of topics related to the intersection 
between human performance and the operation of the complex systems present at nuclear 
facilities.  The review began by explaining skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based 
behaviors, the concept of escalation and then discussed active, latent, and foreseeable errors, 
followed by the concept of unexpected events.  The chapter then considered issues related to 
nuclear power in general.  Nuclear facilities were depicted as one of humanity’s greatest 
technological achievements, yet extremely dangerous if the facility’s operating limits are 
exceeded.  Nuclear facilities in the United States and globally were described, along with the 
regulatory functions of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the International Nuclear Event Scale used to assess the severity of 
nuclear incidents, methods of conducting safety analyses of nuclear facilities, and the ongoing 








3.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter describes how the present observational research study was conducted.  It 
begins by discussing the research design, followed by the methods used.  It then explains how 
the information for the study was obtained, covering the materials and instruments along with the 
data collection, processing, and analysis tools used.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the study’s methodological assumptions, limitations, and ethical assurances. 
 
3.2. RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The research design used in this investigation is that of an observational study (Creswell, 
2013).  An observational study draws inferences from the effect of certain variables on a 
situation.  To draw those inferences, the situations must be divided into two categories, 
representing a treatment group and a control group.  This is different from a traditional 
experiment, in which subjects are randomly assigned to a control group or to the treatment 
condition.  The observational approach is used when the investigator does not have sufficient 
control over the situation to assign subjects to various groups.  In the case of the present 
research, the nuclear facilities are grouped into those that have had accidents as a result of 
technological changes which affect the way the operator interacts with the system and those that 
have had accidents, but determined not to be caused by the introduction of technological changes 
which affect the way the operator interacts with the system (McCoy, Alamaniotis, and 
Jevremovic, 2013).  The facilities that had accidents as a result of technological changes which 
affect the way the operator interacts with the system are considered the treatment group, whereas 




of technological changes which affect the way the operator interacts with the sys em are the 
control group.  The variable affecting these plants (i.e., the treatment), is advances in technology 
that affects the way the operator interacts with the system (Mitchell and Jolley, 2013). 
It is not feasible for any researcher to conduct an experiment that would involve requiring 
nuclear facilities to use certain technologies.  Therefore, the effect of these changing 
technologies on the facility must be observed after the fact.  The observational study is an 
excellent method of collecting real-world information.  In this case, it is the most suitable way to 
assess evidence of the risks related to the introduction of new technologies at nuclear facilities.  
The observational study can be used to formulate hypotheses that can be tested in other 
experiments.  It is also a good way to generate data that can be used to formulate effective 
policies and safeguards for the nuclear industry (Creswell, 2013). 
When a randomized experiment cannot be conducte , any alternative method, including 
the observational approach, will suffer from the fact that the treatment has been applied in a 
nonrandom fashion (Mitchell and Jolley, 2013), resulting in potential experimental bias.  In the 
case of this study, the application of the treatment of new technology was not random, eaning 
that bias may have been introduced into the results (Creswell, 2013).  For example, it could be 
that the facilities that underwent technology changes were older on average, with the result that if 
these facilities had a higher prevalence of incidents, facility age could be an altrnative 
explanation rather than the introduction of the new technology.  In such situations, the bes  thing 
that a researcher can do is to examine the data carefully, anticipating potential problems and 






3.3. METHODS  
 
The INES was used to determine whether an event at a nuclear facility reached a 
sufficient level of severity to be considered in this study.  As discussed in chapter 2, the IAEA 
adopted the INES as a method of quickly and efficiently communicating the safety significance 
of incidents occurring at nuclear facilities.  Ratings on the INES are subjective.  Because nuclear 
facilities are manmade, unique, and vastly different in design, incidents occurring at these plants 
are subject to certain interpretations when one attempts to estimate he magnitude of the problem 
(McCoy, Alamaniotis, and Jevremovic, 2013).  In the present study, only incidents rated at Level
3 or higher were considered sufficiently severe to be included (Sugiyama et al., 2012). In the 
United States, the NRC, which carries responsibility for atomic safety in this country but 
cooperates with the IAEA, uses a nuclear event scale similar to the INES and transfers its ratings 
to the INES for reporting purposes (McCoy, Alamaniotis & Jevremovic, 2013). For the purposes 
of this study, ratings from the INES were used after the numbers were converted. 
The information used for this study was available on regulatory agency databases and in 
books detailing the investigation results of the incidents.  Available information on incidents at 
Level 3 or higher and plant data from the time period before the incident occurred were gathered 
to determine the level of technological advancement impacting human operators at the facility. 
 
3.4. MATERIALS AND INSTRUMENTS  
 
The IAEA and NRC both report on events that hey have investigated (Prasad et al., 
2011).  However, possibly due to the diverse nature of their cultures, policies, and relevant laws, 
the IAEA data are not as complete or detailed as those provided by the NRC.  As explained in 
chapter 2, NRC information is converted to INES levels.  This study used the event notification 




Jevremovic, 2013).  This approach provided an opportunity to use a standardized system that 
assesses the severity of each nuclear event while taking advantage of the more detailed reports 
released by the NRC. 
Only events reaching a INES Level 3 or higher were used.  Since this study began in 
2013 and the cause of the only 2 incidents that occurred between 2011 and 2012 had not been 
determined at the time of the study, the time period examined was from 1955 through 2010.  
There were two reasons for using only those events reaching Level 3 and above.  First and most 
importantly, any incident below Level 3 is relatively minor and unlikely to cause death, injury, or 
a problematic release of radioactive material.  Second, I wanted to work with a reasonable 
number of incidents.  As the incident level d creases, the occurrences increase exponentially, and 
using incidents below Level 3 would involve processing an overwhelming amount of data due to 
the excellent daily reporting criteria applied by the NRC.  In fact, most days contain multiple 
reports of events below the Level 3 threshold.   
 
3.5. DATA COLLECTION, PROCESSING, AND ANALYSIS  
 
Data collection for this tudy began with an examination of the event notification reports 
provided by the NRC (Hashemian, 2010).  I identified all events at a severity level of 3 or higher 
from 1999 to 2012.  Information on serious events prior to 1999 was obtained from books 
addressing the topic, on the basis of which I determined whether the incident would have been 
classified as Level 3or higher on the INES.   
After identifying all U.S. incidents meeting this criterion for the 55-year time frame, I 
sought information online regarding technological hanges at the plant shortly before the event.  




alterations, and control system changes.  The events were then categorized as to whether they 
followed the implementation of technological changes that may have affected how personnel 
interacted with the facility’s systems.  Changes that did not affect interaction between people 
working at the facility and its systems were discounted.  For example, changes in the speed with 
which information is passed between computers would not normally be likely to affect the 
performance of human operators.  However, if such a change modified the way in which the 
operators interacted within the system, then this would be considered a relevant technological 
change. 
The statistical analysis of the data will make use of a t-test (Rutherford, 2011).  This type 
of analysis is sensitive to the type of data being used.  If the INES level w r  used as a measure 
of the problem created by an accident, the accuracy of statistical analysis would be impaired due 
to the logarithmic nature of the scale.  Therefore, an alternative numeric measure is used to 
maintain the integrity of the t-test (Creswell, 2013). 
Data can be roughly divided into nominal, ordinal, interval, and ratio types (Mitchell and 
Jolley, 2013).  The nominal type of data is also known as qualitative.  One example of this type 
would be ethnicity.  An ordinal scale follows a rank order but does not account for the relative 
difference between the categories.  An interval scale accounts for the degree of difference 
between items, but not the ratio (e.g., temperature).  The ratio scale means that the data indicates 
the magnitude of a given continuous quantity present.  An example of this would be an electric 
charge or mass (Steinberg, 2011). 
The measure to be used for determining the deleterious effects of a nuclear incident is the 
cost of the incident in U.S. dollars.  The reports on U.S. incidents contain cost estimates; 




inflation to 2005 dollars.  A dollar amount has  zero value and is thus considered a ratio scale.  
This is an appropriate type of data for conducting a t-test (Rutherford, 2011).  
 
3.6. METHODOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS  
 
One significant methodological assumption of this study was that the reporting of events 
by the regulatory agencies i  accurate.  A report could be inaccurate if the staff of the regulatory 
agency under-report or do not correctly portray incidents that come to their attention.   
An additional methodological assumption was that I would be able to determine reliably 
whether the incidents followed technological changes.  I attempted to reduce bias in this regard 
by recruiting colleagues to assess available information on the incidents and assess whether, in 
their judgment, any relevant technological changes had occurred.  I provided my colleagues with 
all the data that I had located and invited them to do further research if necessary to either 
corroborate or refute my assessment.  There were no inconsistencies between my colleagues’ 
determinations and my own, confirming that I was not inadvertently influencing the ou come of 
the study by placing incidents in the wrong group. 
 
3.7. LIMITATIONS  
 
This research had several limitations.  One limitation was the possible inaccuracy of the 
information provided by the regulatory agencies on each incident.  As noted in the previous 
section, it is conceivable that the agency reports contained some errors.  There is no way to be 
absolutely certain that the data re correct. 
Another problem was related to the assignment of each incident to the treatment or 
control group.  Even with colleagues corroborating my work, it cannot be known with certainty 




A more basic problem with the analytical methodology was that it is not a traditional 
experiment (Mitchell and Jolley, 2013).  Of course, given the subject of the study, a traditional 
experiment is not feasible.  Nevertheless, an observational study is inherently less powerful than 
a traditional experiment in which the r searcher can manipulate ther atment hrough random 
assignment o multiple groups.  It is possible that confounding factors were present that affected 
the analysis.  For example, it is possible that the facilities with fewer technological changes were 
also those with older equipment.  Since nuclear plants have limited operational ives, their 
owners and managing entities may spend less money n technological upgrades as a plant 
increases in age.  Furthermore, the older plants would probably be more prone to experiencing 
events that must be reported to the r gulatory agencies.  If so, then the effect of technological 
changes would be artificially reduced due to the aging facilities having more problems but fewer 
technological changes.  The potential presence of confounding variables is one primary reason 
why traditional experiments are more powerful than other approaches such as observational 
studies.  This is not to say that an observational study cannot provide useful information, of 
course, but this methodological limitation is inherent in any observational study (Creswell, 
2013). 
 
3.8. ETHICAL ASSURANCES  
 
A wide range of ethical issues must be considered in research involving human affairs 
(Mitchell & Jolley, 2013).  These issues can be divided into six general categories: 
communicating the results, potential for harm, confidentiality and anonymity, informed consent, 




This study involves data previously collected by nuclear regulatory agencies.  Since the 
information is publicly available, there is no issue of voluntary participation.  Sinceno individual 
subjects involved with the research, informed consent is not an issue.  The anonymity and 
confidentiality of individuals who may be involved in the reports have already been protected 
because the reports do not mention any individuals specifically.  This protection also minimizes 
the potential for harm to specific subjects.  The remaining categories of ethical issues to address 
are the communication of the results and any other ethical issues pecific to this project. 
Appropriate communication of results is an important consideration in this study.  Every 
attempt has been made to account for all information available r levant to the study (Mitchell 
and Jolley, 2013).  This means that all information found was reported, even if it did not support 
the hypothesis.  Furthermore, the data were reported accurately without exaggeration. 
Plagiarism has been avoided by not copying any text directly.  Instead, information 
pertinent to the research has been paraphrased and appropriately referenced to give the original 
authors or researchers credit for their work (Steinberg, 2011).  This is true for both specific facts 
and general ideas or theories presented. 
One specific ethical issue potentially relevant to this study is conflict of interest 
(Steinberg, 2011), which occurs when the researcher has an interest in the outcome of the 
experiment for some extraneous reason.  For example, a physician reporting the outcome of a 
drug trial would have a conflict of interest if he or she owned significant shares in a company 
that had the rights to the drug patent.  In this instance, however, I have no ti s to regulatory 






3.9. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter covered the methods used to conduct the research.  After a brief 
introduction, the research design was explained.  This study falls into the category of 
observational research, since the treatment could not be manipulated by the researcher.  This 
treatment, or independent variable, is the presence of technological change at nuclear plant hat 
affected how the operators of the plant interfaced with complex systems.  This variable must be 
assessed by reviewing past performance history and is not within the researcher’s control.  
Therefore, there is no randomized assignment in this study.  Since the treatment was applied in a 
nonrandom fashion, bias could occur. 
Information from the IAEA and NRC was used to identify nuclear incidents.  Only 
incidents at severity Level 3 or higher on the INES were included in the study.  This limitations 
kept the amount of data to be analyzed at a reasonable level.  The faciliti s were grouped 
according to whether they had undergone technological upgrades thataffected how the plant 









4.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter describes the study’s findings.  Table 2 describes the incidents rated at Level 
3 or higher on the INES that occurred at U.S. nuclear facilities from 1955 to 2010, including the 
date of the incident, the cost, and whether the incident was due to human error after new 
technologies were installed.  See Appendix A for a description of each incident and how it was 
classified as either due or not due to human operator error when working with new technologies.  
The final section in the chapter presents the findings of the statistical analysis. 
Table 2. Incidents at United States Nuclear Reactors from 1955 until 2010 
 










Vernon, Vermont Underground pipes at the Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Plant deteriorated and leaked radioactive 






During an attempt to replace the steam generator, 
the structure was cracked, ultimately resulting in a 




Erwin, Tennessee The nuclear fuel services plant spilled 35 liters of 
highly enriched uranium.  This caused a shutdown 
of the facility for more than seven months. 





The Entergy Indian Point Nuclear Plant leaked 
strontium and tritium into an underground lake 
from 1974 until 2005.  The incident was the 




Braidwood, Illinois The Braidwood nuclear station leaked nuclear 







A fault in the primary transformer for the Donald 
C. Cook Nuclear Generating Station resulted in a 





Oak Harbor, Ohio Severe boric acid corrosion of a reactor head forced 






An NRC alert was issued after a steam tube 







A major freon leak at the Hope Creek Nuclear 
Generating Station caused a ventilation chiller to 
trip.  This resulted in a release of toxic gas that 






A steam leak in the feed-water heater caused a 
manual shutdown and damage to the control board 







Table 2. Continued 
 
Date Location Incident Description Cost (in millions of dollars) 








Cook units one and two were shut down due to a 




Seneca, Illinois The surface water systems failed and resulted in a 
closure of units one and two of the LaSalle County 





Clinton, Illinois A reactor recirculation pump failed, leading to the 






Malfunctioning equipment led to extensive repairs 




Morris, Illinois Rapidly reduced water levels at the nuclear fuel 










A leaking valve forced the shutdown of the 
Millstone Nuclear Power Plant’s units one and two, 






Creek, New Jersey 
There was a ventilation systems failure at Salem 




Wiscasset, Maine A crack in the steam generator tubes at the Main 
Yankee nuclear reactor resulted in a shutdown of 






















Bay City, Texas Two reactors shut down rapidly due to failure in 






A diesel generator failure resulted in shutdown of 




Scriba, New York Safety issues resulted in the reactor being shut 






Lusby, Maryland Cracks in the pressurized heat sleeves resulted in 




Tonopah, Arizona Failure of the atmospheric dump valves led to a 





Surry, Virginia Failure of the seal on the refueling cavity caused a 















Burlington, Kansas A safety inspector died from electrocution due to a 






A cooling malfunction resulted in two reactors 











Oak Harbor, Ohio Operator error resulted in the reactor pumps being 





Athens, Alabama A malfunction in the instrumentation resulted in 




Athens, Alabama The reactor was shut down for six years due to 






Table 2. Continued 
 
Date Location Incident Description Cost (in millions of dollars) 






Fort Pierce, Florida A core barrel support and a thermal shield were 




Forked River, New 
Jersey 
The facility failed a safety inspection and was shut 






The thermal cooling system of the reactor was 







The reactor was shut down due to the steam 




Scriba, New York The reactor was shut down for two years due to the 






Seismic readings resulted in a temporary reactor 




Ontario, New York Radioactivity was released into the environment 






A worker was electrocuted after making contact 












Surry, Virginia A reactor was shut down due to the steam 






The boiling water reactor was shut down after three 







The boiling water reactor was damaged after an 




Athens, Alabama The core cooling systems were disabled after more 






The pressurized water reactor was shut down due 




Cordova, Illinois The reactor on the Mississippi River was shut 




Monroe, Michigan A partial core meltdown occurred due to a 





Rhode Island,  











A partial core meltdown occurred at the reactor 




Idaho Falls, Idaho There was a partial core meltdown and power 
excursion at the breeder reactor. 
5 No 
Note: All monetary values were adjusted to 2005 dollar values. 
Sources: Sovacool, Benjamin K. 2009. "The Accidental Century - Prominent Energy Accidents in the 
Last 100 Years." Exploration & Production Oil & Gas Review. 7 (2): 132 and  Sovacool, Benjamin K.
2010. “A Critical Evaluation of Nuclear Power and Renewable Electricity in Asia.” Journal of 
Contemporary Asia. 40 (3): 393–400. 
 
 
Because the INES is a logarithmic scale, each level is roughly 10 times as severe as the 
previous one.  This means that an accident with local consequences (INES Level 4) will be about 




4.2. DATA ANALYSIS  
 
4.2.1. INCIDENT COST  
 
The t-test was used to determine whether a significant difference between the two groups 
(incidents determined to be caused by human error as a result of technological advances d 
those determined not to be caused by human error as a result of technological advances) existed.  
An independent samples t-test determines whether two independent groups are different from 
each other, and the two groups are not related, so an independent samples t-test can be used in 
this case.  Before conducting the t-test, since it is a parametric test and requires normally 
distributed data, the outcome variable (costs of incidents) was checked for normality and 
homoscedasticity of variance by examining the distribution of the data using histo rams and Q-Q 
plots.   
 For the 53 incidents reported in Table 2, the average cost of the incidents was 
$190,518,900 (SD = $461,511,400).  Among the 53 incidents, 22 were determined to be due to 
human error as a result of technological advances and 31 were not.  Of this latter group of 31 that 
did not include human error, the cost of the incidents ranged from $1,000,000 to $695,000,000, 
with an average of $54,274,200 (SD = $142,559,800).  For the 22 incidents due to human error 
as a result of technological advances, the cost ranged from $2,000,000 to $2,483,000,000 with an 
average of $382,500,000 (SD = $657,543,610).  See Table 3.  
 For the first assumption of the t-test, normality of data, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
was used to compare the scores in the sample to a normally distributed set of scores.  If this test 
result is significant, then the distribution of scores of this sample is significantly different from a 
normal distribution of scores.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant (p < .001).  Thus, 




 A Q-Q plot of the scores also indicated that the data were not normally distributed (see 
Figure 2).  A histogram (see Figure 3) reveals that the data were positively skewed.  Therefore, 
the data were log-transformed.  Log-transforming data can make skewed data more normally 
distributed (see Figures 4 and 5).
A Q-Q plot is a form of scatterplot created by plotting two sets of quantiles against one 
another to assess normality of the data.  Quantiles are not the same as the actual observations and 
different ranges of values can be presented relative to histograms.  When the data contain 
extreme values, as inthis study, these may not be r ndered in the graph as seen in the histogram 
(as displayed in Figures 4 and 5).  Thus, it is not expected that the exact ranges of values should 
be consistent between histograms and Q-Q plots sincethey plot different factors: quantiles for Q-
Q plots and actual values for histograms. 
 
 






Figure 3. Histogram of Cost 
 
 
Figure 4. Q-Q Plot of Log-Transformed Cost 
 
 






Figure 5. Histogram of Cost (Log-Transformed) 
 
 Using the log-transformed data, an independent samples t-t t was conducted.  Once 
again, normality of the data was checked using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  This time, the 
result was non-significant (p = .200), indicating that the distribution of the log-transformed cost 
scores was not significantly different from a normal distribution.  To test the second assumption 
of a t-test (homoscedasticity of variance), Levene’s test was u ed to see if the variances of the 
groups were equal or unequal.  The result was non-significant (p = .953), so it can be assumed 
that the variances are equal and the assumption was not violated.  On average, the log-
transformed costs of incidents determined not to be a result of human error related to 
technological advances were lower (M = .92, SD = .81) than the log-transformed costs of 
incidents determined to be caused by human error related to technological advances (M = 1.99, 




between the log-transformed means of cost between the two groups represented a large-sized 
effect, d = 1.34.  Therefore, incidents caused by human error elated to technological advances 
were more costly than incidents not meeting this criterion, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. 
 In addition, non-parametric tests were conducted.  The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is 
the non-parametric equivalent to the parametric independent samples t-test. The Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test does entail the assumptions that the data are normally distributed, the 
dependent variable is ordinal or continuous, and the independent variable consists of two 
categorical, independent groups.  The present data meet these assumptions.  
 The results from the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test suggested a statistically significant 
difference between the underlying distributions of the cost of incidents caused by human error 
related to technological advances and the cost of incidents determined to not be the result of 
human error related to technological advances, z = 4.187, p  < .001.  The average cost of 
incidents determined to be caused by human error related to technological advances w s greater 
than the average cost of incidents determined not to be the result of  human error related to 
technological advances.  
 Another possible way to deal with non-normally distributed data is to remove outliers.  
As seen in Figures 2 and 3, several outliers were present.  Removing the four outliers with low 
costs ($2,483,000, $1,850,000, $1,025,000, $1,000,000) produced a somewhat more normal 
distribution (see Figure 6).  However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was significant (p < .001).  
Thus, the first assumption of the t-test was violated and the data with the outliers removed were 
not normally distributed.  An independent samples t-test is not suggested when the data is not 
normally distributed.  Excluded outliers are values that are approximately three standard 




Since simply removing the outliers did not make the data normally distributed, the next 
alternative was to conduct a log-transformation of the data after removing the outliers.  Log-
transforming the data reduced the positive skewness of the data, as seen in Figure 7.  After the 
log-transformation, the data appeared more normally distributed (see Figure 8).  Normality of the 
transformed data with no outliers was checked using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  Th  test 
was non-significant (p = .200), indicating that the distribution of the log-transformed cost scores 
was not significantly different from a normal distribution.  Levene’s test was used to check for 
homogeneity of variance; the result was non-significant (p = .137), so it can be assumed that the 
variances are equal and that the assumption was not violated.  On average, the log-transformed 
costs of incidents determined to not be due to human error related to technological advances 
were lower (M = .91, SD = .81) than the log-transformed costs of incidents cau ed by human 
error related to technological advances (M= 1.72, SD = .59), and this difference was significant, 
t(47) = –3.69, p = .001.  The results of the non-parametric tests again indicate that incidents 
determined to be caused by human error related to technological advances were more costly than 
incidents determined to not meet this criterion, thus further reinforcing the rejection of the null 
hypothesis. 
Table 3. Average Costs for Each Incident Category 
 
Category of Incident Mean SD Median 
No human error as a result  
of technological advances (n = 31) 
$54,274,200 $142,559,800 $9,500,000 
Human error  as a result of 
technological advances (n = 22) $382,500,000 $657,543,610 $61,500,000 
   Note: All monetary values were adjusted to 2005 dollar values. 





Figure 6. Histogram of Cost (Outliers Removed) 
 
 
Figure 7. Histogram of Cost (Outliers Removed, Log-Transformed) 
 





Figure 8. Q-Q Plot of Cost (Outliers Removed, Log-Transformed) 
 
 
4.2.2. INCIDENT FREQUENCY  
As a means of further analysis regarding the frequency of incidents, the two groups of 
incidents were examined individually.  A post-hoc t-test analysis was conducted for the 22 
incidents in which human error due to technology advances was determined to be the cause. 
The median-log transformed cost (median = 4.12) was used to create two subgroups, low-
cost and high-cost, within this group of incidents.  An independent-samples t-test was conducted 
between the low-cost and high-cost subgroups.  The analysis revealed a significant difference, 
t(20) = –.293, p < .008.  More interesting was the shape of the frequency distributions for high- 
and low-cost incidents.  For lower-cost incidents, the frequency of occurrence appeared to 
approximate a normal distribution (Figure 9).  The mean cost of a lower-cost technology-induced 





approximate a normal distribution (mean = $734 million; SD = $797 million).  The frequency of 
incidents with costs over $500 million was much smaller.  The relationship appears to be non-
linear (see Figure 10). 
To analyze the cost of incidents determined to be not the result of human error related to 
technology advances, a similar median split was performed on the log-transformed cost.  An 
independent-samples t-test was conducted comparing the high- and low-c st errors in this group 
(n = 31).  The analysis revealed a significant difference, t(29) = –2.21, p < .035.  For lower-cost 
incidents determined not to be due to human error related to technological advances (n = 16), the 
frequency of occurrences did not approximate a normal distribution (Figure 11).  The average 
cost for the lower-cost incidents determined not to be due to human error related to technological 
advances was $2.70 million.  However, the cost per incident dramatically decreased after about 
$4 million.  It's not that there are necessarily less incidents with a cost of $4 million or less.   
Rather, the cost per incident vary more and there is a greater gap in cost (i.e. some were way less 
than $4 million) in low cost incidents.  Among the higher-cost incidents determined not to be due 
to human error related to technological advances (n = 15), again, the distribution did not 
approximate a normal distribution.  The higher-cost incidents averaged $109 million, but there 
were only three incidents at $200 million or more (see Figure 12). 
Finally, an independent samples t-test was conducted on lower-cost incidents, comparing 
incidents determined to be due to human error related to technological advances with incidents 
determined not to be due to human error elated to technological advances.  The analysis 
revealed a significant difference, t(25) = 6.14, p < .0001.  Human error determined to be caused 
by technology advances had significantly greater cost impact (mean = $30.73 million) than 




$2.81 million) among “low-cost” incidents.  Additionally, an independent samples t-t st revealed 
a significant difference between i cidents resulting from human error related to technology 
advances (mean = $734 million) and incidents determined not to be due to human error related to 
technological advances (mean = $109 million), t(24) = 2.94, p < .007. 
This additional analysis justifies the conclusion that incidents determined to be caused by 
human error as a result of technological advances ar  more costly than other incidents at nuclear 
facilities.  A median split of the incidents determined to be due to human error related to 
technological advances found that lower-cost incidents (with a mean cost of about $30 million) 
were more evenly distributed around the mean than higher-cost incidents determined to be due to 
human error related to technological advances (mean cost of about $734 million).  This finding 
confirms the Section 4.2.1 analysis, which indicated that incidents determined to be caused by 
human error elated to technological advances are fewer in frequency, but more costly.  Again, 
this results in a rejection of the null hypothesis. 
 
 
Figure 9. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for  Lower-





Figure 10. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for  Higher-Cost 
Technology-Induced Human Errors  
 
 
Figure 11. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for  Lower-Cost Non-








Figure 12. Histogram of Frequency Distribution of Cost per Incident for  Higher-Cost Non-





4.3. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter presented the findings of the study.  It began by summarizing U.S. nuclear 
incidents from 1955 to 2010, their probable causes, the cost associated with the incidents, and 
whether the incident was caused by human error due to advances in technology at the plant.  
Statistical analysis of the data rejected the null hypothesis of the study and indicated that 
incidents caused by human error related to technological advances were more costly than 
incidents not meeting this criterion.  An explanation of these findings, along with an analysis of 
whether organizations benefit overall by incorporating advanced technology at their facilities, is 







CHAPTER 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  TECHNOLOGICAL 
IMPROVEMENTS  AND ECONOMIC AND SAFETY FACTORS  
 
 
5.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
 
As discussed in chapter 4, the data analysis performed in this study resulted in a rjection 
of the null hypothesis.  Therefore, there is evidence that technological advances at a nuclear 
facility that affect how operators interact within the system can increase the cost of incidents 
caused by human error.  Given this finding, are organizations better off thanks to incorporating 
advanced technology at their facilities? 
 
5.2. THE ECONOMICS AND SAFETY OF TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS  
To determine the economic and safety factors involved with technological improvements, 
information on 12 nuclear facilities for the years 2008 through 2013 was collected to represent a 
reasonable number of recent events.  With regard to safety, the number of reported incidents was 
used as an independent variable (Morgan, Gliner, and Harmon, 2006); the capacity factor 
(explained in the next paragraph) was used as the indepndent variable for economic analysis.  
The cost of the upgrades was used as the dependent variable.  An analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
and a regression analysis were performed on the data.  The ANOVA was used to indica e the 
significance of the results; the regression equation indicated the extent to which the upgrades 
affected the plant’s capacity factor and the number of reported incidents (Hair, 2010).  The data 






Table 4. Economic and Safety Factors Related to Technological Improvements at 12 Nuclear Facilities, 2008–2013 
Notes: Upgrade costs are in millions of dollars from previous year; CF = capacity factor.  
Sources: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Information Digests (NUREG 1350) 2015-16, 2014-15, and 2012-13, 










































































































97 35 96 87 20 22 86 21 39 100 30 45 72 15 26 90 20 22 
Duane Arnold 
Energy Center 




86 22 56 70 14 20 94 32 93 88 19 20 100 32 34 86 15 23 
Hope Creek 
Generating 
Station, Unit 1 
80 17 26 93 29 42 103 34 95 93 25 38 95 25 38 108 38 95 
Palisades Nuclear 
Plant 
85 20 43 74 16 22 96 30 92 92 25 49 90 24 34 99 30 62 
Pilgrim Nuclear 
Power Station 
74 12 22 98 29 41 85 20 38 99 28 42 90 26 38 97 30 58 
River Bend 
Station, Unit 1 
84 21 20 91 22 30 90 20 35 98 30 92 113 39 102 82 15 20 
Seabrook Station, 
Unit 1 
100 37 48 75 17 21 77 10 23 100 31 50 81 17 22 89 21 30 
South Texas 
Project, Unit 1 
91 25 50 93 30 92 94 29 55 101 32 34 90 22 31 95 29 39 
Three Mile Island 
Nuclear Station, 
Unit 1 
78 10 24 100 33 92 92 25 52 94 28 44 86 19 27 107 31 98 
Vermont Yankee 
Nuclear Power 
Plant, Unit 1 
98 30 90 92 30 91 90 22 42 88 26 40 99 31 44 80 17 26 
Watts Bar Nuclear 
Plant, Unit 1 
90 18 22 87 17 25 84 22 43 99 33 48 94 30 46 82 14 22 
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df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 3085.7869 1542.89343 208.861884 5.35853E-30 
Residual 69 509.71314 7.38714695 
  Total 71 3595.5 
    
 





































The capacity factor for a power plant is calculated as the ratio between he observed 
output over a given period of time and the potential output if the facility were consistently 
running at its stated capacity.  The calculation of the capacity factor involves dividing the 
amount of energy produced by a plant during a certain time by the amount of energy that would 
have been produced if the facility were always running at full capacity.  The facility’s capacity 
factor depends on the type of fuel used, the facility’s design, and its age, among other factors.
Regression 
Statistics 
 Multiple R 0.926410175 
R Square 0.858235811 
Adjusted R Square 0.854126705 




There were 12 facilities in the sample and the information was collected over six years, 
yielding 72 data points for the ANOVA, which implies 71 degrees of freedom (Morgan, Gliner, 
and Harmon, 2006).  The F-test yielded an F statistic of 208.86, which was significant at the p < 
0.01 level.  The regression analysis indicated that t e regression coefficient for capacity factor 
was 0.592.  The coefficient for incidents was 0.075.  Both of these coefficients indicate that n 
increased amount of upgrades would result in a higher capacity factor for the facility (Mitchell 
and Jolley, 2013).  However, the number of incidents also increases with greater investment in 
upgrades.  The relationship of these factors is shown in Figures 13 and 14. 
 
 
Figure 13. Scatterplot Showing the Relationship between Upgrades and Capacity Factor 
 

























Figure 14. Scatterplot Showing the Relationship between Upgrades and Incidents 
 
The ANOVA procedure (Hair, 2010) was chosen rather than using multiple t- ests to 
avoid increasing the probability of a type I error.  The ANOVA does not suffer from this 
limitation.  In an ANOVA, the observed variance of a variable is partitioned (Hair, 2010).  The 
partitioning creates components that are attributable to the sources of the variation.  In so doing, 
the means of multiple groups can be tested for equality.  In essence, this creates the same result 
as that of the t-test without increasing the type I error rate beyond the 0.05 level.  In the case of 
this study, the F statistic was found to be significant at p < 0.001.  This means that there is less 
than one chance in a thousand that the results observed in this study would be found by chance. 
The study discussed here is of the random effects type (Hair, 2010), as I did not have 
control over the amount of upgrades conducted at any of the facilities but the facilities were 
chosen randomly from the population of operating nuclear facilities in the United States to 
represent a reasonable number of recent events.  The use of the ANOVA model requires several 





















assumptions regarding the data (Mitchell and Jolley, 2013): homogeneity of variance, normality, 
and independence.  Since this study used a random effects model, the homogeneity of variance 
was assumed only for the residuals that are a consequence of the unit treatment activity.  This 
means that the assumption of homogeneity relies upon the randomization involved in choosing 
the 12 facilities (Hair, 2010).  The residuals and standard residuals for the predicted upgrades are 
displayed in Table 8. 
 
5.3. INTERPRETATION OF THE OUTCOMES  
 
An examination of Figures 13 and 14 and consideration of the regression coefficients 
reveal that increasing the amount of upgrades is associated with a higher capacity factor (a 
positive outcome) and more incidents being reported (a negative outcome). 
The U.S. Energy Information Administration calculated the capacity factors for various 
types of power plants in the United States in 2009.  Oil plants had the lowest capacity factor at 
7.8%.  Other types of power-generating facilities had higher capacity factors, with hydroelectric 
at 39.8%, other renewables at 33.9%, natural gas at 42.5%, and coal at 63.8%.  In contrast, the 
capacity factor for U.S. nuclear facilities during 2009 was 90.3%.  As shown in Table 4, the 
capacity factors for the 12 facilities examined in this study from 2008 until 2013 ranged from 
70% to 113%.  Capacity factors in access of 100% can be achieved by system upgrades that 
result in capacity’s exceeding the initial plant design capacity.  Compared to other forms of fuel, 
nuclear power has a distinct advantage with regard to its capacity factor (U.S. Energy 
Information Administration, 2011). 
The number of incidents was recorded as a way of measuring the level of safety 
associated with the upgrades (Morgan, Gliner, and Harmon, 2006).  As the amount of money 
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1 31.78 3.22 1.20 
2 22.98 -0.98 -0.37 
3 22.26 -0.26 -0.10 
4 16.45 0.55 0.20 
5 20.69 -0.69 -0.26 
6 12.60 -0.60 -0.22 
7 18.37 2.63 0.98 
8 29.94 7.06 2.63 
9 24.77 0.23 0.09 
10 15.12 -5.12 -1.91 
11 31.92 -1.92 -0.72 
12 22.07 -4.07 -1.52 
13 20.29 -0.29 -0.11 
14 18.00 -1.00 -0.37 
15 10.09 3.91 1.46 
16 25.35 3.65 1.36 
17 12.60 3.40 1.27 
18 28.23 0.77 0.29 
19 23.26 -1.26 -0.47 
20 13.12 3.88 1.45 
21 29.11 0.89 0.33 
22 33.25 -0.25 -0.09 
23 28.45 1.55 0.58 
24 20.52 -3.52 -1.31 
25 20.98 0.02 0.01 
26 32.89 -1.89 -0.70 
27 29.78 2.22 0.83 
28 35.25 -1.25 -0.47 
29 30.89 -0.89 -0.33 
30 20.32 -0.32 -0.12 
31 23.05 -3.05 -1.14 
32 14.45 -4.45 -1.66 
33 26.92 2.08 0.78 
34 25.51 -0.51 -0.19 
35 23.57 -1.57 -0.59 
36 20.10 1.90 0.71 







38 21.70 -5.70 -2.13 
39 20.74 -1.74 -0.65 
40 25.05 -0.05 -0.02 
41 25.28 -0.28 -0.11 
42 28.90 -0.90 -0.34 
43 32.07 -2.07 -0.77 
44 30.09 0.91 0.34 
45 29.48 2.52 0.94 
46 26.09 1.91 0.71 
47 22.24 3.76 1.40 
48 29.35 3.65 1.36 
49 11.72 3.28 1.22 
50 24.08 -4.08 -1.52 
51 28.89 3.11 1.16 
52 26.23 -1.23 -0.46 
53 22.97 1.03 0.38 
54 23.27 2.73 1.02 
55 41.70 -2.70 -1.01 
56 16.74 0.26 0.10 
57 22.75 -0.75 -0.28 
58 20.08 -1.08 -0.40 
59 29.05 1.95 0.73 
60 26.24 3.76 1.40 
61 22.07 -2.07 -0.77 
62 32.02 3.98 1.49 
63 19.78 -4.78 -1.78 
64 38.21 -0.21 -0.08 
65 30.40 -0.40 -0.15 
66 28.92 1.08 0.40 
67 17.19 -2.19 -0.82 
68 22.08 -1.08 -0.40 
69 26.31 2.69 1.01 
70 37.85 -6.85 -2.56 
71 16.45 0.55 0.20 




spent on upgrades increased, the complexity of the system rose as well as the number of 
incidents.  However, these were only incidents which were at a severity level of 1 or 2.  None of 
the 12 facilities randomly chosen this specific analysis had a major incident during the six years 
of the data being collected. 
The data indicates that spending more money on upgrades c n increase the capacity of 
the facility as well as the potential number of incidents (Mitchell and Jolley, 2013).  However, 
the incidents that occurred at these 12 facilities over the six years studied were relatively minor.  
Given that nuclear facilities produce vast amounts of power and that the upgrades significantly 
increased the capacity factor, there appears to be a financial advantage in conducting upgrades; 
however, this should be weighed against the increased rate of level 1 and 2 incidents observed.  
Also, as we have observed previously, many incidents at Level 3 or higher (see Table 1) appear 
to have been associated with human error while working with new technological advances.  
Since it does not seem likely that nuclear power facilities can become fully automated at any 
point in the near future, engineers must continue to increase facility capacity factors with 
upgrades while minimizing human errors. 
 
5.4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has presented the results of an additional analysis beyond the primary 
statistical analysis in this observational study.  The additional analysis sought to determine 
whether organizations gain overall benefit from incorporating advanced technologies into their 
facilities.  An examination of these results was presented.  In the next chapter, the impact of 









6.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
 
Based on the information and analysis presented in chapter 4, there is evidence that  
technological advances at a nuclear facility thataffect how operators interact within the system 
can increase the cost of incidents caused by human error.  Additionally, as shown in chapter 5, 
the economic impact of incorporating advanced technologies into facilities is sufficiently great to 
outweigh the minor safety risks involved.  This chapter will discuss the impacts of human 
factors, including human error tendencies, on plant operation and on the systems engineering 
process. 
 
6.2. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN FACTORS ON PLANT OPERATION  
 
To recognize design considerations necessary to combat human error during system 
design and integration, it is important first to understand the impact of human factors on plant 
operation.  The reasons why incidents related to human error ccur at nuclear facilities are 
complex, and the degree of complexity increases as technology advances (Karwowski, 2006).  
Both the human mind and the systems with which it interacts at these facilities represent high 
levels of sophistication that can be difficult to fully understand; moreover, the complexities can 
tend to become masked as advanced technology becomes increasingly incorporated into system 
design.  However, progress has been made toward determining the root causes of these problms.  
Detailed investigation of human errors indicates that there are both micro-ergonomic and macro-
ergonomic reasons for them (Smith, 2012).  The incidents are nearly always the result, in some 
form, of the ways in which the systems operate and humans interact with them.   
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Of course, the systems themselves are designed by humans, and errors can also occur in 
the design phase.  Designers attempt to create systems in such a way that operators can work 
effectively with them and avoid errors.  However, an error at thedesign level can ultimately 
result in an operator error.  Moreover, many errors are attributable to other aspects of he 
complicated operational processes involved, such as unresponsive management systems, 
ineffective training, organizational designs that are not adaptable, poorly designed response 
systems, and environmental disturbances of a chronic nature (Proctor and Zandt, 2008). 
 
6.2.1. HUMAN BEHAVIOR MODELS  
 
To understand human error, we must first understand human behavior.  Hollnagel (1998) 
used Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis (CREAM) taxonomies to map out the possibilities 
for human error.  CREAM was among the first Human Reliability Analysis (HRA) programs to 
be used.  Hollnagel believed that human behavior could be described as a process that progresses 
from thinking to doing (Hollnagel, 1998).  CREAM is one of the more recognizable human 
behavior models within the safety community.  Hollnagel believed that the modern industrial 
complex allows more thinking in its workforce with little doing.  This presents a unique 




Human factors engineering, sometimes termed ergonomics (Smith, 2012), is concerned 
with improving the safety, health, productivity, and comfort of workers.  It is also concerned 
with enabling smooth interaction between the people using the technology and the environment 
within which they are working (often called the human-machine environment).  When this 
context is considered at the micro-ergonomic level, the focus is on the level of the human and 
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machine (Proctor and Zandt, 2008)—for example, the design of the individual control panels, 
workstations, the visual displays, and the ergonomically fitted seats on which employees such as 
nuclear facility operators spend most of their work hours sitting.  Problems that arise at this level 
may be due to improperly designed displays and workstations.  For example, many problems 
identified in the analysis of nuclear incidents resulted from the installation of new technology 
that had not been designed well in ergonomic terms.  In one incident, th  operator reported that 
the display was too bright and tha after three hours on the job, the operator could no longer view 
the display clearly.  This difficulty caused the operator not to notice that the power plant was 
operating outside its normal parameters (Woods et al., 2010). 
Also within the realm of human factors and ergonomics are considerations related to the 
operators’ body size, or anthropometrics (Perrow, 1999).  Other concerns include human 
decision making, cognitive capacity, information processing, and overall human skills.  One real-
life impact of anthropometrics involved an incident that occurred when an operator was away 
from his station.  Normally, operators remained at their station with only a few short breaks 
during an eight-hour shift.  However, new seating had recently been installed.  It was supposed 
to improve comfort, as the company that provided the seating had a long history with the nuclear 
industry and good reviews by nuclear plant operators (Krivit, 2011).  Indeed, most operators 
rated the seating as excellent with regard to comfort.  However, one particular operator, 
unusually tall at 6’7”, experienced difficulty with the new seats, which were design d for shorter 
people.  As a result, the operator began taking more frequent and longer breaks to stretch and 
avoid muscle cramps.  While the operator was away from his station, a release valve 
malfunctioned and the system continued to operate longer than should have been permitted given 
the state of the valve (Proctor and Zandt, 2008). 
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The building blocks for technological systems such as nuclear facilities nclude the 
people as well as the engineered components (Smith, 2012).  However, the organization and its 
structure can also be important.  These aspects of the workplace ar referred to as macro-
ergonomics.  In both of the cases ju t described, the operators had reported the problem to their 
supervisor.  The operator with the bright display panel had reported the problem once (Woods et 
al., 2010); the one with the uncomfortable seat had complained twice verbally and once in 
writing prior to the incident.  If either of these supervisors had followed up on these complaints, 
an adverse incident may have been avoided.  Therefore, it is crucial to have syst ms in place that 
encourage operators working with new equipment to alert their supervisor if difficulties arise.  
With regard to human factors, usually only the operators of the facility can gauge the success of 
the new system.  Often, problems related to human factors engineering are not evident until a 
complaint or concern is raised or an incident occurs (Smith, 2012). 
Performance levels and the inherent potential for mishaps in complicated technological 
systems are usually a function of the human and engineered subsystems (Perrow, 1999).  The 
engineering may include such items as workstation design and the appearance of control boards; 
human engineering encompasses organizational and personnel systems as well as operational 
matters.  Many system failures (typically about 70% at nuclear facilities) are attributed to 
operator error, but this is often an oversimplification (Smith, 2012), as it does not fully take into 
account various factors beyond the control of the operator, such as ineffective r sponse systems, 
organizational designs that are not adaptable, unresponsive manageent systems, ineffective 
training, and overly complicated operational processes. These threats can be especially 




6.3. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR ON PLANT OPERATION  
 
Reducing the negative impact of technological advances on human error entails
improving human performance (Perrow, 1999).  This type of performance improvement is a 
systematic process that seeks to analyze and discover performance gaps, monitor performance, 
determine the desired level of performance, and develop effective interventions.  Once the 
interventions have been developed, they must be implemented and continually evaluated with 
regard to their results.  The ultimate goal for human performance is to make the nuclear facility 
as close to event-free as possible.  This can be achieved through the proactive management of 
human performance.  It is also necessary to strengthen the facility defenses along with operator 
performance.  Optimization of both the organization and operating processes can reduce errors to 
a minimum level (Proctor and Zandt, 2008). 
Even the best-trained and most motivated operators of nuclear facilities will still make 
mistakes (Krivit, 2011).  No amount of training or coaching can prevent all errors, as the 
interaction between the organization, the workplace, work tasks, operating systems, and 
operators creates the potential for a wide range of err rs.  The first step in preventing further 
problems is to understand why and how problems occur (Sehgal, 2012). 
Errors at a nuclear facility can be reduced through using self-ch cks and specific tools 
(Proctor and Zandt, 2008).  Random errors can never be fully eliminated, but they can be 
reduced.  For example, a maintenance professional at the facility may be required to tighten a 
valve.  No matter how ell trained the individual is, there is always a chance of a mistake when 
this task is performed.  The valve may be too tight or not tight enough (Perrow, 1999).  The 
question to ask is why the individual has made the mistake and what can be done to prevent 
future occurrences.  In the case of such a mistake, multiple barriers should be present to prevent 
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system failure, so as to minimize the possibility of severe consequences.  There must also be an 
organizational infrastructure in place that both identifies errors and protects the operators from 
injury or death.  This creates a situation in which more significant problems can be avoided 
(Woods et al., 2010).   
Although errors are inevitable, steps can be taken to manage, predict, and prevent them 
(Krivit, 2011).  One beneficial approach is to recognize error traps and communicate them to 
others so as to proactively manage problem situations and minimize errors (Karwowski, 2006).  
The work situation can be changed to reduce, prevent, or remove conditions that lead to errors. 
Individual factors and tasks can be altered within the work environment to minimize futur 
errors.  For example, in the case of the seats that made an extremely tall oper tor uncomfortable, 
the difficulty could have been prevented if  the manufacturer had requested a physical description 
of the operators (Sehgal, 2012).   
Organizational values and processes significantly influence the behavior of an individual 
working at a nuclear facility (Woods et al., 2010).  The values and processes of an organization 
can be developed in a manner that encourages individuals to take actions that increase the 
chances of achieving the organization’s goals.  In the case of a nuclear plant, the organization’s 
values may focus on precision, accountability, and excellence for all individuals working at the 
facility (Krivit, 2011).  This would encourage safe behaviors that decrease the number and 
severity of errors.  Facility managers can guide workers’ behavior toward producing results that 
are more desirable and contain fewer errors.  Improving staff performance requires xcellence 
with regard to management systems, culture, and organizational processes.  Exploiting the social 
interactions involved in work at a nuclear facility in positive ways can significantly decrease the 
likelihood of errors (Sehgal, 2012).  
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Improvements in human performance can be achieved through taking corrective actions 
after analyzing problem reports and events (Perrow, 1999).  These corrective actions are part of 
the learning that should ensue after a problem occurs.  Though reactive rather than proactive, 
they are important for improving the systems and technology involved.  Combining reactive and 
proactive methods of learning facilitates anticipation of problematic events and the prevention of 
errors.  This is often more cost-effective than using only the reactive approach (Proctor and 
Zandt, 2008). 
The collective behaviors of people at all levels in a facility determine the performance 
outcome achieved (Perrow, 1999).  The individual’s work is a product of his or her mental 
processes, which have been influenced by a variety of factors and demands which are present in 
the work environment.  The work is also a function of the capabilities of each of the people 
involved.  When the facility achieves high performance, the individuals will nearly always be 
taking responsibility for their own behaviors (Krivit, 2011).  They will also be committed to 
personal improvement as well as to improving the work environment and their completion of 
tasks.  Individuals working in a high-performance facility will be active in confirming the 
integrity of the facility defenses, anticipating situations that are likely to precipitate errors, and 
communicating with others to create a shared understanding of the facility and the work to be 
done (Woods et al., 2010).  
 
6.4. THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR ON THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
PROCESS 
 
To understand the ways in which human error can be manifested in system design, it is 
important to grasp the key aspects of the systems engineering process and the complexity and 
potential for human error that re inherently imbedded. 
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Systems are becoming increasing complex and challenging.  Preexisting, simpler 
systems, especially those related to information, are old, incapable of meeting current demand, 
and rapidly becoming obsolete (Carayannis and Coleman, 2005).  To facilitate system upkeep, 
safety, and reliability and to ensure that innovation is consistent and ongoing to meet clients’ 
needs, the systems engineering process mu t be relatively complex.  
 The systems engineering process is composed of several progressive stages and 
encompasses a breadth of evaluations and considerations that are performed as a function o  the 
process.  To comprehend how human performance impacts this process and vice versa, a brief 
discussion of the process is necessary. 
Although there is common agreement regarding the doctrines and intentions of systems 
engineering, execution differs from one system or design team to the next.  The steps involved 
and the general methodology will depend on the background and prior experiences of the 
individuals on the design team.  The most common and widely accepted systems engineering 










The process begins with the identification of a need—for instance, the need to replace an 
obsolete system with a serviceable one, to improve a system in order to increase plant efficiency 
or capacity, or to upgrade a system due to new regulatory requirements.  Once the need has been 
identified, then the conceptual design stage commences with the creation of a project 
management plan.  During this stage, the problem is formally defined, specific system needs are 
identified, requirements are analyzed, maintenance and support are conceptualized, technology is 
evaluated, and the technical approach is selected.  Conceptual design focuses on the system as a 
whole.  At the conclusion of conceptual design, the system engineering management plan 
(SEMP) and the test and evaluation master plan (TEMP) are written, the conceptual d sign 
review (system requirements review) is conducted, and the functional baseline system 




Next comes the preliminary design stage.  During this stage a functional analysis is 
conducted, requirements allocation is performed, trade-off studies are executed, early 
prototyping may be achieved, and acquisition, contracting, and supplier activities are 
accomplished.  This stage focuses on the subsystem level.  At the conclusion of this stage, the 
system design review is conducted and the allocated baseline, development, process, prduct and 
material specifications are defined (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011).   
After preliminary design comes detail design and development.  This stage consists of 
subsystem/component design, additional trade-off studies and evaluation of alternatives, 
development of engineering and prototype models, and development test and evaluation.  This 
stage focuses on the component level.  At the conclusion of this stage, the critical design review 
takes place and the product baseline, process/product and material specifications are defined 
(Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011). 
Next comes the production/construction stage.  This stage consists of the production 
and/or construction of system components, acceptance testing, system distribution and oper tion, 
development and operation test and evaluation, and system assessment.  This stage focu es on 
modifications for improvement of the designed system.  At the conclusion of this stage, an 
updated product baseline is produced (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011). 
The last stage in the systems engineering process is the operational use and system 
support stage.  This stage consists of system operation in the user environment, sustaining 
maintenance and logistic support, operational testing, system modifications for impr vement, 
contractor support, and additional system assessment (field data collection and a alysis).  This 
stage again focuses on modifications for improvement.  At its conclusion, there exists an 
operating system that adequately fulfills its original intended purpose, meets acc ptance criteria 
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for all tests and milestones, and operates until its eventual retirement and disposal (B anchard 
and Fabrycky, 2011). 
Feedback is integral to the systems engineering process.  It i  important that the right 
information be reported and fed back to the responsible engineering and management person el 
promptly and efficiently manner.  Those responsible need to know in timely fashion exactly how 
the system is performing against specifications in the field, so that design modifications can be 
initiated.  The primary objective is to provide a good assessment of just how well the system is 
performing in the user’s operational environment; a secondary objective is to identify any 
problems and initiate the required steps leading to corrective actions and the incorporation of 
necessary design changes and system modifications (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011). 
 
6.5. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has discussed the complexities associated with why incidents associated 
with human error occur at nuclear facilities and the need to reduce the negative impact of 
technological advances on human error by improving human performance.  It has also covered 
the stages of the systems engineering process and the complexity involved fr m system design 
through deployment.  Based on this information discussed in this chapter, a way forward 
leveraging the systems engineering process will be presented and discussed in the next chapter. 
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7.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
 
The previous chapter discussed the impact of human factors, including human error, on 
plant operation and on the stages of the systems engineering process.  As technology co tinues to 
advance, these impacts will only become more complex and the risk of human error will grow. 
This chapter will discuss the impact of evolving technology on the contemporary operator and 
ways to overcome these challenges utilizing the systems engineering process. 
 
7.2. ISSUES RELATED TO ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY AND THE 21ST-CENTURY 
OPERATOR 
 
Today’s sensory and processing technologies are perceptive and precise.  They can 
discern the environment, solve complicated problems, make assessments, and learn from 
experience.  Although they do not think as humans do, they can replicate many human 
intellectual aptitudes.  Throughout the last century, for varying reasons, companies h ve 
implemented advanced technology and removed the human from many aspects of operation. 
Human reliance on technology may be demanding a high price.  Is our own 
understanding declining as we become more dependent on advancing technology and its sc le of 
influence broadens?  Computers have ventured into many different kinds of knowledge work: 
pilots rely on computers to fly planes, doctors consult them in diagnosing illnesses, and 
architects use them to design buildings.  Automation is impacting virtually every industry.  
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Computers are not taking away all the jobs performed by talented people, but they are changing 
how the work gets accomplished.  
As technology continues to develop, the people using it become less likely to refine their 
own capabilities.  Technology that offers many prompts and tips could be responsible for this 
trend; simpler, less helpful programs push operators to think harder, perform, and learn. 
Humans’ skills become sharper only through practice when we use those skills regularly to 
overcome different and difficult challenges. 
There should also be a balance between advancing technologies integrated into plants and 
the interaction between humans and these new technologies.  New technologies should be 
designed and incorporated into existing systems to keep the human operator in the decision
cycle, which consists of an ongoing process of action, feedback, and judgment.  This will en ure 
that operators remain attentive and engaged and promotes the kind of challenging activity that 
strengthens skills.  Technology should play an essential but secondary role.  It should broadcast 
warnings when parameters are exceeded, provide vital information that enhances the operator’s 
outlook, and protect against the biases that often alter human thinking.  The technology will then 
become the operator’s partner, not the operator’s replacement.  This approach to technology 
application will not stifle technological progress.  It requires only a slight shift in design 
priorities and a rekindled emphasis on human strengths and weaknesses. 
Incorporating advances in technology is, in many regards, a necessary enterprise, but 
should be properly balanced within the confines of the system.  It is easy to forget hat humans 
are a vital part of this system.  Technology is strongly suited to perform many functions, but it 
lacks the ability to rationalize.  Decisions concerning the incorporation of new technology into a 
plant must consider the human factor.  Even the smartest software lacks the common sense, 
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ingenuity, and vitality of the skilled operator.  In the control room, human experts remain 
indispensable.  Human insight, imagination, a d perception, enhanced through hard work and 
experience, cannot be replicated by the most cutting-edge technologies today and into the near 
future.  If we let our own skills fade by relying too much on the technology crutch, we will  
render ourselves less capable, less resilient and more submissive to our machines.   
Cognizance of these realities is imperative during system design.  The human, including 
the human’s propensity for error, should be considered a vital element of the system that is 
considered in design and accounted for through a rigorous systems engineering process.  
Engaged human participation is compulsory f r successful system operation, but like all systems, 
it has its failure modes.  The human’s natural susceptibility for error in system operati n should 
be addressed from multiple fronts. 
 
7.3. THE IMPROVEMENT OR UPGRADE OF EXISTING SYSTEMS  
 
Many organizations find a need for the improvement of existing systems or sy tem 
upgrade necessary for three purposes: replacing obsolete technology or equipment, regulatory 
reasons, and economic motives.  Therefore, the outcomes of the improvement or upgrade of 
existing systems can be observed as two-pronged, encompassing safety-related and economic 




7.3.1. A WAY FORWARD LEVERAGING THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS  
 
Human error eduction and system design and deployment are often treated as two 
separate subjects with their own distinct processes that commonly intersect upon the conclusion 
of design, immediately prior to operation.  This traditional approach to system design may have 
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been acceptable for the antiquated, obsolete technologies of the past, but it is problematic for 
designing today’s more complicated systems.  As the complexity of advancing technologies 
crescendos, human-system interaction warrants a more prominent role in system design and 
therefore compels early consideration, deliberation, and integration in the beginning stages of the 
systems engineering process.  Incorporation of methods of human error prevention into the
systems engineering process yields the fruit of the sound development of systems with an 
improved probability of successful operation a d reduced error frequency.   
At this juncture, it is important to discuss the difference between human performance and 
human factors as they relate to system design.  Both concepts have been discussed throughout 
this dissertation, but there are subtle differences between them.  Human factors in the context of 
the study of design, refers to the practice of designing products, systems, or processes to take 
proper account of the interaction between them and the people who use them.  In substance, it is 
the study of designing equipment and devices that fit the human body and its cognitive abilities 
(Hollnagel and Woods, 2005).  Alternatively, human factors in the context of the study of 
humans, can be described as the study of how human beings function within various work 
environments as they interact with equipment in the performance of various roles and tasks (at 
the human-machine interface) (U.S. Department of Energy, 2009).  Common human factors 
considerations include anthropometric, sensory, physiological, and psychological factors.  
Human factors, like reliability and maintainability, are an inherent consideration within and 
throughout the systems engineering process (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011).   
On the other hand, human performance is a field of study related to process improvement 
methodologies that can reduce human errors.  It focuses on improving performance at the 
societal, organizational, process, and individual levels (Rothwell, Hohne, and King, 2013).  In 
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other words, it is a series of behaviors executed to accomplish specific results (U.S. Department 
of Energy, 2009).  Human performance improvement methodologies are traditionally initiated 
after systems or plants are designed an  installed and plant operations are underway; they are not 
conventionally employed, at least explicitly, during system design. 
In essence, human factors influence human performance, but human performance does 
not necessarily influence human factors in the design of a system.  Human performance, not 
human factors, is the primary concept in view in this chapter.  Figure 16 depicts the traditional 
association between human performance and the systems engineering process. 
 
Figure 16. The Traditional Relationship of Human Performance and Human Factors 
with in the Systems Engineering Process 
 
 
As shown in chapter 4, human errors resulting in incidents at nuclear facilities can be
very expensive and potentially harmful to the employees, the public, and the environment.  In 
chapter 5, it was found that incorporating advanced technologies into nuclear facilities does 
increase capacity, but also results in an increased frequency of incidents.  These incidents affect 
the public’s perception of the company involved and the nuclear industry generally, along with 
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stock values, insurance rates, regulatory oversight, and potential civil penalties.  Following 
incidents at nuclear plants, operating experience and human performance lessons have been 
documented, disseminated to the industry, and incorporated into plant operations to ensure that 
similar situations would not occur in the future.  The incorporation of industry operating 
experience and human performance methodologies into plant operation is a routine and expected 
aspect of nuclear plant operational life that promotes continuous improvement and a constant 
striving for safe operations.  If human performance considerations have a positive impact after 
deployment, then it would be logical to consider that they could have a positive impact if taken 
into account before deployment.  The focus of this chapter is the systematic incorporati n f 
human performance into all stages of the systems engineering process. Figure 17 depicts a 
proposed integration of human performance improvement throughout the systems engineering 
process. 
 





The cultivation of human performance–enhanced system design and operation can stem 
from (1) operator involvement in the systems engineering process; (2) human performance 
association with system operational requirements and system testing, valuation, and validation; 
(3) iterative procedures and operator training development throughout all stages of the systems 
engineering process; and (4) selection and cultivation of aptly inclined operators chosen and 
groomed specifically for the systems being designed.  Figure 18 illustrates the proposed human 
performance interface with the systems engineering process.  As hown, feedback exists 
throughout the process, not only between the steps of the traditional systems engineering 
process, but between the systems engineering process and the human performance ele ents.  
The human performance feedback is represented as a solid line to articulate a more focused role 
in this context, whereas feedback in the traditional process is represented as a dashed line as it is 
more general in nature.  Feedback goes both directions in all cases, as the process iteratively 
progresses. 
 
7.3.2. OPERATOR INVOLVEMENT IN THE SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS  
 
Whether a system is being newly created or an existing system is undergoing a m or 
modification, plant operations personnel should be involved in the systems engineering process 
from the onset.  Operators are a significant system stakeholder.  Not only do they bring a unique 
yet vital perspective to the design team, but they will eventually inherit the system being 
designed.  Operators bring an essential perspective from the field, understaning he environment 
in which the system will operate, how the operator will interface with the system, and the 





Figure 18. Human Performance Interface with the Systems Engineering Process 
 
Achieving balance of innovation and practicality is often difficult, as designs are 
conceptualized, iterated, and deployed.  The process may necessitate reverting to the design 
stages for necessary alterations.  In most cases, some duplication of effort can be avoided by 
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appointing members of the operations staff to the system design team and leveraging their 
experience from initial identification of needs through system design and development. 
 
7.3.2.1. LIFE-CYCLE ENGINEERING  
 
Designing for the system lifecycle is a foundational concept of systems engineering.  The 
system lifecycle begins with the needs identification process and continues through design and 
acquisition to utilization.  Lifecycle engineering transcends thesiloed, isolated view of systems 
by embracing all aspects of the system including maintenance, support, operation, and eventually 
phase-out and disposal.  Because system utilization encompasses a large portion of the system’  
life, the participation of operations personnel in system design is vital not only for system 
operational success and support, but also f r human error reduction in the operation of new 
technologies. 
 
7.3.2.2. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS  
 
Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) is a design method that can be used to identify 
and examine potential system weaknesses.  It includes the necessary steps for examining ll the 
means by which a system failure can occur, the potential consequences of failure for system 
performance and safety, and the significance of these effects (Carlson, 2012).  FMEA can be 
used during all stages of the systems engineering process.  Operations pers nel can play a role 
in FMEA during all stages of system design.  Having operated similar systems, having been 
exposed to a breadth of systems failures, and having witnessed and responded to the resulting 
impact of these failures on the plant, operators have valuable insights that should be incorporated 




7.3.2.3. SYSTEM DESIGN EVALUATION  
 
The fulcrum of the systems engineering process lies in system design evaluation.  
Evaluation is an obligation intrinsic to the systems engineering process and must be conducted 
frequently as the design activities progress.  Likewise, the establishment of a clear set of system 
design criteria must precede evaluation.  Design criteria can and should come from a number of 
diverse sources, but those that originate from the plant operations staff should be given elevated 
attention because the operators will in effect be the primary system owners throughout the 
system’s useful life. 
Evaluation in the context of systems design requires finesse and fidelity.  System design 
should harmonize union, examination, and evaluation, and these technical ctivities should be 
integrated and employed iteratively and persistently over the system lifecycle.  The active 
engagement of operations personnel is central to all these steps.   
System evaluation in the context of human error reduction will be further developed in 
the next section. 
 
7.3.3. THE ASSOCIATION OF HUMAN PERFORMANCE WITH SYSTEM 
OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS AND SYSTEM TESTING, EVALUATION, AND 
VALIDATION  
 
The conceptual design stage is the first and most important stage of system design and 
development, because it lays the groundwork for what follows.  As discussed in chapter 6, the 
identification and definition of a need provide an effective and proper starting point for this 
stage.  Inherent to this foundational stage are the generation of operational requirements and the 
establishment and commencement of system testing, evaluation, and validation. 
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7.3.3.1. HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND SYSTEM OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS  
 
Upon designation of the need and technical approach for the system, the operational 
requirements are then defined.  Because system operational requirements should be identified 
and specified early, wisely, and as completely as possible, the identification of human 
performance requirements should occur at this point in the process.   
System operational requirements address the following elements: mission definition, 
performance and physical parameters, operational deployment, operational lifecycle, utilization 
requirements, effectiveness factors, environmental factors, and economic factors (Blanchard and 
Fabrycky, 2011).  Embedded in these elements should be specific, exclusive human performance 
system requirements that can be easily assessed and discernible in system design.  Once human 
performance system requirements have been established, specific human performance technical 
performance measures (TPMs) can be detailed. 
 
7.3.3.2. HUMAN PERFORMANCE AND SYSTEM TESTING, EVALUATION, AND 
VALIDATION  
 
System testing, evaluation, and validation are usually planned during the conceptual 
design stage and take place parallel to the definition of the overall system design requirements.  
The testing and evaluation endeavor consists of the testing of discrete components, of various 
system elements, and then of the complete system as an integrated unit.  The idea is to embrace a 
gradual and ongoing approach that will enable continuous application and enhancement as 
system design and development progress.  Testing and evaluation activities are associated 
primarily with the design activities and extend through production and construction and then to 
the system utilization and support stages.  Validation, on the other hand, refers to the process 
needed to ensure that the system configuration as designed meets all specifications.  A complete, 
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integrated method should be established for the validation of the system and its elements as an 
integrated unit.  System validation is complete when the system functions effectively and 
efficiently within its accompanying higher-level system-of-systems composition, hence meeting 
operational requirements (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011). 
Central to evaluation is the establishment of comprehensive technical performance 
measures (TPMs), which are predicted and/or estimated values of attributes or characteristics 
inherent in the design.  TPMs are assessed routinely through the stages of the systems 
engineering process (Blanchard and Fabrycky, 2011).  TPMs may comprise such quantitative 
factors as mean time between failures, utilization rate, availability, human factors, size, and 
weight.  TPMs arise primarily from the establishment of system operational requirements and the 
maintenance and support model.  They may come from various sources, a  with design criteria, 
and they cover a breadth of issues, but sufficient attention should be devoted to crating human 
performance TPMs that evaluate the integration of human error reduction tools with the 
technology necessary to achieve the functionality related to the system’s purpose.  These human 
performance TPMs should be created by and will most likely be assessed by plant operations 
personnel. 
Human performance TPMs are derived from error precursors, also referred to as 
performance-shaping factors.  Error precursors are unfavorable conditions that generate 
divergences between a task and the individual.  Error precursors hinder successful performance 
and increase the likelihood for error.  By definition, they exist before an error occurs (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2009).  Error precursors are unique to the situation, the plant, and the 
personnel involved, and therefore they require systematic evaluation, logical selection or 
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generation, and potential modification before their adaptation into human performance TPMs.  A 
comprehensive listing of error precursors can be found in Appendix B. 
By way of illustration, Table 9 presents hypothetical results from a human performance 
TPM identification and prioritization effort involving a team of individuals representing the 
designers, operations personnel, and key management personnel.  The quantitative requirement 
of human error significance levels refers to a defined severity level grouping for potential issues 
and is discussed in greater detail in Section 7.3.8. 
In this example, the performance factors of Familiarity with Task/First Time, Operator 
Knowledge of System, and Operator Proficiency and Experience are the most critical, so 
emphasis in the design process must be directed to these items with respect to human 
performance.  The method and instrument to determine the quantitative metric are discussed 
below in section 7.3.8. 
 
7.3.4. PROCEDURE AND TRAINING DEVELOPMENT IN THE SYSTEMS 
ENGINEERING PROCESS 
 
The stereotypical perception of human error is that it indicates a flaw present in the 
human and initiating an undesirable consequence.  This misconception places the obligation to 
prevent such consequences solely on the human.  Industry leaders guided by this erroneous 
understanding continually try to remediate humans incorrect actions within the system.  This 
leaves organizations and their employees struggling to achieve perfect task performance and 
always needing to be “more careful.”  Furthermore, formal corrective actions in response to th
error take the form of increased training, reinforcing management’s xpectations, and 
occasionally punishment.  If these methods are applied to a qualified and experienced employee,  
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they produce peripheral performance enhancements at best, narrowly focused and rarely long-
lasting. 
 As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, human error and error rates are a reflection of mental 
response to a task.  In chapter 2, Rasmussen’s (1983) three modes of task accomplishment based 
on the mental processing behaviors exercised at each level w re noted: skill-based, rule-based, 
and knowledge-based.  Skill-based tasks are made up of very familiar actions performed in a 
well-known environment. The human being is virtually on autopilot.  Error rates are 
approximately 1:1,000.  Rule-based tasks are known to the operator.  Upon accurate recognition 
of a situation or condition, the performer can apply a known rule to navigate toward a known end 
objective.  Tasks in this performance mode are inclined to follow “if-then” logic, and error rates 
are approximately 1:100.  Finally, knowledge-based tasks are new, unfamiliar, or unique to the 
performer.  Successful performance of a knowledge-based task depends heavily upon the 
performer’s fundamental knowledge, diagnosis, and analysis skills.  Unlike the case of rule-
based tasks, the operator is not able to navigate toward a previously known end objective.  These 
tasks are best defined as trial and error.  Error rates are generally 1:2 (Reason, 1990).  
The performer’s comprehension of the task, not just the task itself, determines how and at 
what rate errors are made.  An activity could be rule-based for one operator but knowledge-based 
for another.  Therefore, considering the human-machine interface solves only half of the 
equation; the human-task interface must also be taken into consideration.  Substantial gains in 
human performance improvement (and ultimately the bottom line) will be achieved only when 
we match machine to operator in an atmosphere in which the operator can thrive.  To fully 
understand this, it is important to distinguish between errors and events.    
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Does an organization that seeks improvements in safety initiate a program of error 
reduction or event prevention?  Preventing human error necessitates strict control over external 
and internal human factors.  This control is outside the reach of organizations and can be 
attempted only through research and precisely controlled examination.  The organization th t 
adheres to a safety-conscious work environment concept should make every effort to understand 
the factors affecting human error rates and associated liabilities, and it should strive to minimize, 
to the greatest extent possible, human error. 
Events, on the other hand are immediately apparent from an organizational perspective.   
Consequences of these events will steer organizational priorities and provide necessary 
resources.  From this outlook, error can be perceived as a symptom of an event made possible by 
procedures, processes, and training that are not suitable to protect against human imperfection.   
Processes, procedures, and training can be easily analyzed and dissected, wher as the human 
mind tends to be perplexing from an error prevention standpoint.   Moreover, events tend to b  
repeated given similar circumstances and known causes, wh reas identical errors rarely yield 
similar results.  
So the question now becomes, how do you minimize errors?  Rasmussen (1982) 
examined human error and recognized that wo aspects must be taken into consideration in this 
regard: human-machine and human-task.  The classical view of human error would contend that 
any faults in the machine or task are also present due to human error.  This is unquestio ably 
true.  In business, however, that perspective is only valid to the extent that the business has 
influence over the task and machine.  The business organization c n use the same method in 
event prevention with respect to these components irrespective of its influence, bolstering the 
benefit of undertaking event prevention tactics.  
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After a new system has been designed and installed, whether due to economic 
considerations or necessity, the plant at that point has essentially inherited the flaws intrinsic to 
that system.  Although conceivable latent human error embedded in the design or construction of 
the component can and should be addressed where appropriate, there are limited cost-effective 
avenues to proactively predict, evaluate, and address such deficiencies once they have been 
installed and prior to emergence.  Transitioning from system design and development to system 
operation launches the use of operations procedures and reliance on operator training, thereby 
shifting the focus from the physical system to the operation of that system.  This stage of the 
systems engineering process is the longest-lived and is the primary recognized motivation for the 
process (after all, the system is designed to be operated).  For this reason, operations procedures 
and training should not be an afterthought to system design, but an integral component of it.  
Examination of the human-task relationship in system design should begin at the conceptual 
design stage in the systems engineering process and evolve as th  process progresses. 
 
7.3.4.1. CAREFUL PROCEDURE WRITING  
 
Beginning with the task, the plant needs to devote considerable attention and due 
diligence to the generation of processes, programs, and procedures associated with system 
operation.  Specifically, the preparation of operation procedures, a written sequence of steps that 
establish, maintain, or restore the plant within acceptable operating limits, should begin at the 
conceptual design stage in the systems engineering process, and the procedures should befurther 
developed and refined as the process advances.  This will ensure that procedures are properly 
developed and that when system production is complete, management is in a position to 
promptly commence operations.  Proper application of human error prevention tools and 
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techniques needs to be soundly intertwined into the framework of these documents and 
programs.  Once generated, these programs, procedures, and processes must b  systematically 
verified and validated to ensure not only adequate system operation, but also that operation 
remains free of human error trips and traps through appropriate consideration of the task portion 
of the human-task relationship.   
 
7.3.4.2. KNOWLEDGE -BASED OPERATOR TRAINING  AND DRILL PROGRAM  
 
There is a limit to the amount of detail and information that can be built into procedures.  
If procedures were written for a person to operate a complex piece of equipment for which he or 
she had no prior training or background, they would be much too long, detailed, and convoluted 
for a reader to follow them sufficiently.   
For procedures, processes, and programs to be effective, the operator must possess a 
minimum level of prior knowledge.  This necessity leads to an examination of the “human” 
portion of the human-task relationship.  Applying a systems engineering approach to the 
development of a suitable mechanism enabling humans to adequately and safely operate new 
technologies is a very complicated and confounding task.  When the focus is on the operator, th  
foundation of safe operation now becomes effective and thorough operator training.   
Operator training can be divided into two general categories: skill-based and knowledge-
based.  Skill-based learning concentrates on developing and applying specific skills and 
behaviors.  Learners spend most f heir training time learning, developing, and practicing skills 
through a variety of hands-on, real-life scenarios.  Skill-based training will fall short if 
insufficient time is dedicated to application of the skills and behaviors during the training.  The 
ultimate objective of skills training is to enable the learner not just to acquire proficiency in the 
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skill, but to have the confidence to apply it competently on the job.  On the other hand, 
knowledge-based learning is designed to enable the learner to move facts, information, process 
understanding, and other knowledge from short-term to long-term memory.  Much knowledge-
based training falls short of this goal due to poor engagement.  If the learner is focused more on 
just finishing the training than on actively trying to assimilate it for further use, the learning 
impact will be minimal.  
When learning to manipulate technologically advanced, complex systems, operators 
should be trained utilizing the knowledge-based approach to ensure adherence to design 
boundaries, efficiency in operation, and an adequate safety margin.  This training should not only 
communicate the particulars of a system, its components, operation, procedures, and processes, 
but it should also teach deeper, underlying fundamentals and theory.  This ensures a thorough, 
deeply rooted understanding of not only the specific task and components manipulated, but the 
impact of that task and manipulation on the system as a whole.  Armed with this deeper 
understanding, the operator can anticipate expected plant response and quickly detect and react 
to abnormal situations that could turn into plant events.  Again, the objective of the operator 
training program should be to drive performance into the skill-based mode.  As with the 
generation of operations procedures, generation of operator training programs should begin at 
conceptual design and be further developed as the systems engineering process advances.  
A vigorous plant casualty control drill program should also be included.  A well-
developed and consistently administered drill program can effectively provide tra ning and 
evaluation of facility operating personnel in controlling abnormal and emergency operating 
situations involving the newly designed system.  To ensure that the drills are fulfilling their 
intended purpose, there should be evaluation criteria for assessing operators’ knowledge and 
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skills.  Training and evaluation of staff skills and knowledge such as component and system 
interrelationships, reasoning and judgment, team interactions, and communications can be 
accomplished through drills. 
Proper response to abnormal conditions is vital to ensure personnel safety and protect 
facility equipment and the environment.  Personnel must be able to take the immediate actions 
necessary to safely mitigate the consequences of an unexpected or abnormal and potentially 
dangerous condition involving the newly designed system.  Drills focus on the actions neces ary 
to respond to these abnormal conditions. 
The primary objective of a drill program is to train and qualify personnel.  To 
successfully achieve this goal, drill participation should be integrated into initial and continuing 
training.  An effective drill program is one of the best means available to ensure that the 
operating staff can safely deal with unplanned and potentially hazardous situations.  As with the 
development of procedures and training, the drill program involving the system in design should 
be developed during the conceptual design stage and revised iteratively as the systems 
engineering process progresses.  In addition to training operations staff in casualty control with 
respect to the new system, drill scenario development provides another avenue for system design 
review and evaluation by having additional set of eyes vi w the process from an alternative 
perspective.  This early deliberation of system casualties and necessary operator response not 
only guides the development of the drill program, but also provides necessary feedback to 
system designers on desirable improvements and cultivates the continued development of 
operator training and procedures.  Again, the earlier this activity is initiated in the systems 
engineering process, the better the results will be for system design and operator training. 
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The rigor and detail of a drill program will differ with facility intricacy and hazard 
potential.  For example, a drill conducted at a reactor facility may involve several people and 
require a high level of detail, whereas a drill at a site support facility may comprise only a few 
people and necessitate less detail.  Drills on safety-related systems or components at high-hazard 
facilities may require a large drill team using a detailed drill scenario; drills conducted on safety 
systems at a low-hazard facility may require a drill team of only a few persons. 
To ensure proper implementation of a drill program, the duties, roles, and responsibilities 
of personnel involved and the mechanics for conducting the drill should be delineated.  This 
ensures consistency of development, conduct, evaluations, critiques, and feedback into the 
training and drill programs.  Alternative methods of conducting drills should be included as an 
integral part of the drill program to ensure that it is fulfilling  its intended mission of training 
facility operating personnel.  Facility management should determine the appropriate level of 
effort and resources to implement each element of the drill program, consistent with the risk and 
complexity of the facility. 
Regardless of the size, complexity, and risks of a facility, an effective drill program 
should include the following essential elements: developed drill scenarios, t ained drill team 
personnel, protocol for drill conduct, criteria for drill evaluation, drill critiques, incorporated 
feedback from drills, and alternative methods of conducting drills. 
 
7.3.5. OPERATOR ATTRIBUTE DETERMINATION  
 
The determination and development of necessary operator skills and training 
requirements hould begin at the conceptual design stage in the systems engineering process and 
be refined as the process advances.  These operator attributes can even manifest as syst m 
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requirements determined during requirements analysis.  At the conclusion of each stage, in 
addition to adjusting operations procedures and training, employee critical skills, knowledge, and 
education requirements should be examined and, if necessary, improved.  Workforce planning 
should be built into all stages of the systems engineering process to ensure that personnel with 
the necessary attributes are available when needed.  Human development should be considered 
as important as ystem design.  Workforce design is too often considered late in the systems 
engineering process and the initial plant startup and early operations suffer due to inadequate 
workforce planning or excessive costs associated with accelerated operator training and 
qualification.  
Embedded in the determination and development of the required workforce are 
population studies to canvass the local population for demographics such as industry expertise, 
education levels, and education ability.  With this baseline assessment of the population, training 
programs can be efficiently developed in view of the general strengths and weaknesses of the 
available workforce, and specific needed skill sets can be assessed, targ ted, and fostered if 
necessary.  Nonetheless, as discussed above, this needs to happen early and ite ativelyso that 
issues can be addressed and corrected during design. 
Another important subtlety in workforce development is the development of leaders.  As 
the systems engineering process proceeds and, more generally, asthe speed of business increases 
and the complexity of technical advances rises, it i  easy to focus only on immediate needs and 
pay less attention to the systemic issues that ultimately drive long-term success.  As the process 
progresses, management needs to be constantly assessing the connection between leadership 
practices, employee work passion, customer devotion, and the bottom line.  There is a clear 
connection between the quality of an organization’s leadership practices, as perceived by 
 
119 
employees, and employees’ intentions to stay with an organization, perform at a high level, and 
apply discretionary effort. 
 
7.3.6. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING INFRASTRUCTURE  
 
The design and development of an in ovative system necessitate an adaptive and equally 
unique and innovative systems engineering infrastructure.  One should not fall into the trap of 
developing a 21st-century product in the framework of 20th-century systems and processes.  It is 
important to remain apprised of and consistent with industry standards and best practices with 
respect to organizational design, management processes, software development and 
functionality, and administrative methods—not ecessarily with the techniques that everyone has 
used in the past and is comfortable with.  Business is always evolving and striving to reach new 
heights; the infrastructure should stay in lock step with this evolution to ensure the development 
of the best product or system using the best available resources.  
As the systems engineering process for product or system development is lau ched, the 
proper infrastructure should be established to support it efficiently.  The infrastructure design 
should be a formal, guided process of integrating the people, information, and technology of an 
organization.  It is used to match the form of the organization as closely as possible to the 
purpose that the organization seeks to achieve.  Through this design process, organizations act to 
improve the probability that the collective efforts of their members will be successful.   
 
7.3.7. THE FINAL PRODUCT  
Operator involvement in the systems engineering process; human performance 
integration with system operational requirements and system testing, evaluation, and validation; 
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the implementation of a strong knowledge-based operator-t aining program, including a drill 
program; the generation of well-written and validated procedures; and the selection and 
cultivation of personnel aptly prepared for system operation—all these actions are connected 
with a common theme: the development of a well-qualified, capable, and equipped human 
operator for the given system.  As a clear illustration, we can recall the swift, logical, reasoning 
used by an officer in the Soviet Air Defense System to save the United States from nuclear war.  
On September 26, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov of the Soviet Air Defense 
Forces was on duty at the command center of the Soviet early warning satellites.  Petrov's duties 
included monitoring the satellite early warning system and informing his chain of command of 
any nuclear attack.  If the early warning system indicated an attack, he Soviet Union's response 
would be an immediate counterattack.  Close to midnight, the early warning system indicated 
five inbound intercontinental ballistic missiles from the United States.  Petrov deemed the 
detection to be an error, since a first-strike nuclear attack by the United States, should one be 
mounted, was expected to involve hundreds of concurrent missile launches with the intention to 
incapacitate any counterattack.  Additionally, the early warning system had been newly designed 
and installed.  In his estimation, the system was not yet entirely reliable.  Petrov also observed 
that the ground radar had failed to corroborate the indications of the early warning system.  
Petrov ultimately rejected the warning and classified it as a false alarm.  It was later determined 
that the false alarm had been produced by an atypical orientation of sunlight on high-altitude 
clouds and the arly warning systems satellites' orbits (Hoffman, 1999). 
Imagine if the Soviet Air Defense System had been designed with little to no human 
interaction and had automatically initiated a counterattack based on the indication received by 
the system received and the Soviet Union’s established response strategy!  This dramatic 
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example emphasizes the importance of the human being within a system who is well trained and 
knowledgeable of the system that he or she operates. 
 
7.3.8. WAYS TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT OF HUMAN ERROR THROUGHOUT THE 
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING PROCESS 
 
As this study has emphasized repeatedly, human error cannot be entirely prevented, but if  
proper tools and techniques are implemented early in the systems engineering process, it can be 
reasonably minimized.  With this goal in mind, it is also important to establish a system to 
minimize the impact or potential impact of errors.  Along with the steps discussed previously in 
this chapter, a human performance improvement (HPI) process should be established not only to 
remain cognizant of human performance during system design, but also to provide a means to 
evaluate human performance in operating the system at its various stages.  This process 
incorporates HPI logic into system design and subsequent system operation and provides a 
mechanism to assess and mitigate potential impacts of human error during system design.  This 
process should be established early in the systems engineering process to identify how human 
error affects plant systems and equipment; this information in turn will provide necessary 
feedback into system design process.  This process is displayed by means of a use case model in 
Figure 19.  The nucleus of this model is converging the efforts of all project entities on meeting 




Figure 19. Use Case Model of the Human Performance Improvement Process 
 
To institute this process in a manageable fashion, organizations should determine human 
error severity criteria and establish a tracking system to capture these pot ntial human error–
induced issues for consideration in developing engineered and administrative component 
features, human error prevention training and reinforcement, and lessons learned.  These 
potential issues and incidents can be discovered at any stage of the systems engineering process, 
during the development of procedures for system operation, during training development, during 
FMEA, and during the design reviews conducted at the conclusion of each stage.  Additionally, 
this information can be used to determine trend data and thereby predict negative behaviors 
before potential errors or adverse events can occur.  These data can also provide a multitude of 
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information to be used for other purposes across the company, industry, and systems engineering 
discipline.  For example, they can be used to track and document trends in potential human errors 
during system design and actual human errors during system utilization, to provide feedback into 
the operator training program (for either continuing training or the qualification process), to 
generate reports for project and organizational management, to determine organizational goals, 
or to compare plant performance to that of other plants in a similar industry.   
First, organizations should create a formal process to examine incidents and perceived 
vulnerabilities that occur throughout system development during the systems engineering process 
and, later, during plant operation.  A methodical approach should be established to systematically 
examine the potential incident or vulnerability through a series of questions so as to determine 
regulatory impact and safety significance, determine which organization will perform the 
corrective action or causal analysis, and ultimately correct the deficiency.  Figure 20 displays an 
example of a process chart exhibiting the progression from problem reporting to problem 
correction.   
As displayed at the top of Figure 20, a determination of the significance level should be 
made.  An example of the classification of severity criteria tailored for a nuclear facility is 
presented in Table 10 below where level 1 events are the most severe and level 3 are the least 
severe. 
With the human error severity criteria determined, a tracking database established, and a 
formal process to collect and analyze the information, organizations now need to determine 
acceptable quantities of error within the established levels, so that this information can be fed 




Figure 20. Human Performance Flowchart  
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Table 10. Severity Criteria Matrix  
 
Incident 
Category Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Plant 
Transients 
• Repeat occurrences of 
organizational or programmatic 
breakdowns that affect nuclear 
safety.  (Level 1, 2, or  3) 
• Significant event requiring use of 
safety features 
• Multiple equipment malfunctions 
or human errors occurred that 
significantly increased the 
severity of the transient. 
• Significant operating/design 
violations of safety analysis  
• Failures that could affect multiple 
safety systems or components 
• Misvalving operation or 
maintenance error on wrong 
equipment causing tripping or 
transient on operating equipment 
• NRC reportable event requiring a 
written response 
• Significant program weakness in 
design, analysis, operation, 
maintenance, testing, procedures, 
or training. 
• Minor program weaknesses in 
design, analysis, operation, 
maintenance, testing, procedures, or 
training identified by independent or 
management assessors 
• An auxiliary plant transient  
• M&TE that fails calibration but does 
not cause operational impact to 
safety-related equipment 
• Safeguards/ecurity issues that do 
not meet the regulatory criteria. 
Incident 
Category Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Personnel 
Safety 
• Death not due to natural causes 
• Major disability injury 
• Injury or near miss with fatality 
potential 
• Work-related injury requiring 
inpatient hospitalization  
• Individual exceeds regulatory 
dose limits 
• Multiple or other substantial 
personnel contamination 
instances 
• Personnel contamination events 
occurring from procedural violations 
or poor radiation worker practice. 
• Personnel contaminations due to 
human error and which result in 
dose assignment  
• Defeated or missing LOTO with no 
potential for exposure to hazardous 
energy 
Incident 
Category Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 
Environment
al Impact 
• Releases resulting in significant 
threat to human health or 
environment 
• EPA violation or OSHA citation 
that results in enforcement action 
• Release in excess of radiological 
limits with actual or potential for 
off-site impact 
• Immediately reportable spills with 
potential to harm environment 
• Release in excess of radiological 
limits with no potential for off-site 
impact 
• Repeated failures such as spills of 
chemicals or oil, improper storage, 
failed secondary containments. 
• Permit criteria threatened by a 
discharge 
• Failure to maintain secondary 
containment for chemical/oil spills 
• Isolated nonreportable failures such 
as spills of chemicals or oil, 








• Missing business commitment 
 
• Extensive equipment damage 
(e.g., required replacement or 
substantial repairs) 
• Conditions resulting in substantial 
outage delays or extensions 
• Lengthy unplanned outage or 
operation at substantially reduced 
production 
• Repeated failures to implement or 
maintain commitments to 
regulatory agencies 
• Fire protection equipment 
unavailable when it was needed 
• Conditions detected by independent 
or management assessors that do not 
represent a substantial 
organizational or programmatic 
barrier breakdown 
• Adverse trends in equipment, 
programmatic, or human 
performance that do not directly 
challenge safety, regulatory 
compliance, or reliability 
 
should be to keep otential errors at the lowest significance level.  So how is this done?  The 
answer is straightforward, but requires consistent attention.  Due diligence, constant emphasis, 
and management support must be devoted to the identification and reporting of potential human 
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errors and the corrective action processing of the problems as they are report d ( er Figure 20).  
This processing will determine the significance level of the error and therefore the required 
amount of staff attention.  Deployment of sufficient corrective actions will not only fix the 
immediate problem but will also prevent similar potential errors from occurring later in the 
systems engineering process.  Depending on the significance level, a generic implications review 
could be conducted to determine the extent of the condition, the extent to which the actual 
condition or similar conditions exist in other plant processes, equipment, or human performance, 
and the extent to which the root cause and contributing causes of an identified problem could 
impact the same or similar plant processes, equipment, or human performance (both irrespective 
of severity level).  Based on this review, the organization could put additional preventative 
actions in place to inhibit erro-likely situations.  This process, if effectively performed, will 
constantly reinforce good human performance practice, r duce human error in system design and 
potential human errors during operation, proportionally decrease the volume of potential 
problems at all levels, and continually drive errors to the least significant level.  This concept is 
displayed visually in Figure 21. 
In conjunction with a sound human performance improvement program, a management 
team should be established to ensure that the program is effectively and consistently 
implemented with a particular emphasis on evaluating significant issues, adverse trends 
identified, and ineffective corrective actions that were applied to conditions adverse to safety and 






Figure 21. Human Performance Significance Level Triangle 
 
Specifically, management oversight is required to ensure the following: 
• Proper disposition of issues 
• Application of the Proper significance level 
• Proper trend identification 
• Greater management intervention in certain issues 
• Identification of issues that should be disseminated as lessons learned 
• Proper application of corrective actions 
• Periodic review of performance indicators 
• Differentiation between corrective actions and process improvements 




• Review of root cause investigation results 
The reporting of human errors should aim to produce a ulture focused on safety and 
operational excellence.  Employees should be not only encouraged but xpected to make error 
incident reports.  This should be a living part of the organizational DNA and “business as u ual” 
for plant employees.  Most importantly, employees must know that they will not experience 
retaliation for making reports.  The generation of a positive nuclear safety culture and a sfety-
conscious work environment is a delicate and complex task, but once it has been established, it 
will improve morale, breed content employees, strengthen plant safety, and ultimately boost 
productivity.  
 
7.4. DESIGN OF NEW SYSTEMS 
While the focus of the previous section discusses human error reduction while improving 
or upgrading existing systems, technologically advanced systems and facilities of the future 
nuclear fleet need to keep a steady press to keep human error as low as possible.  As the 
evolution of systems progress, the role of the humans within the system inevitably will continue 
to evolve as well.  This evolution necessitates the continued drum beat of human performance 
improvement while keeping sights set on system efficiency and safety.  Within this context, as 
new future systems are designed and the role of the human is transformed, human error should 
be architected for substantial reduction as compared to predecessor systems with an increase in 
system stability and safety.  This necessitates a different focus appropriate for a new set of 
nuclear facility technology with new automation types and the roles of humans modified 
accordingly to accommodate.  This focus should compel the optimization of human-machine 
roles to reduce human error and increase inherent stability of the system. 
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As new systems are designed, systems engineers must view the system with an open
mind and must give consideration to various technology options, affordability, accept the fact 
that human interaction is inevitable, account for human limitations, and, ultimately, establish 
appropriate requirements for the system and for the human.  The incorporation of these elem nts 
will appropriately balance the next-generation system and lead to an optimized human-machine 
system.   
 
7.4.1. HUMAN -MACHINE SYSTEM OPTIMIZATION  
Human-machine interaction is the boundary where interactions between humans and 
machines transpire.  The objective of this interaction is to facilitate safe and ffective operation 
and efficient control of the machine from the human end as the machine simultaneously fed  
back information that aids the operators' decision-making processes.  Generally, the intent of 
human-machine interface design is to produce a user interface that makes it straightforward, 
efficient, and manageable to operate a machine so as to attain adesired outcome.  This generally 
means that the operator needs to provide a specific input to achieve a desired output, and also 
that the machine minimizes undesired outputs to the human.  To achieve safe and reliable 
operation, this interface requires a practical balance between the human and the machin .  The 
purpose of this section is to propose a methodology that optimizes the balance between the 
human and machine sides of the human-machine interface of a system at a nuclear facility.  
 
7.4.1.1. BACKGROUND  
The very detailed interaction between machines and humans in nuclear facilities is a 
changing technical matrix that is addressed by means of a human-machine interface.  Studies of 
the interactions between machines and humans have been conducted for more than half a 
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century.  Effective models of human-machine interaction and matrices for numerous products 
can be found in the nuclear industry (Johannsen, 2009). 
The interactions between humans and machines at nuclear facilities have been recognized 
as significant due to their safety implications; as a result, these interactions are handled with a 
high level of care.  The entire system of the human-mechanical interface, the machine and the 
human user are described as the human mechanical system (HMS) and may include distinct user 
categories, such as managers, maintenance personnel, and operators, all of whom have distinct 
needs regarding information and control (Johannsen, 2009). 
The term mechanical in HMS refers to any category of changing technical system, which 
can include the software and automation components as well as the mechanical components.  
The technical system’s automation components are described as the administrative and control 
systems.  These systems interact in a direct manner with the tchnical machine interface.  The 
power generation process at a nuclear power facility is an appropriate exampl  (Johannsen, 
2009). 
 In a nuclear facility, the decision support systems are state-of-the-art, and the component 
machines are programmed with substantial knowledge and can provide advice to the user.  The 
application domains of the human mechanical system include human users, the human-machine 
interface, and the mechanical components (Johannsen, 2009). 
 The context of automation in the administration of changing technical matrices has been
significantly enhanced over the last several years.  This statement is true for all the technical 
systems associated with nuclear facilities and products.  Elevated levels of efficiency have been 
attained by means of the enhanced application of automatic administration.  The requir m nt for 
communication between machines and humans increased with the augmented context of 
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automation.  Usually, enhanced automation does not replace the human’s interaction with the 
machinery; rather, it transforms the location of the interface between the two (Rogers, 2011). 
 
7.4.1.2. THE HUMAN -MACHINE INTERFACE  
The bread and butter of nuclear facility operation is safety and efficiency.  I  the
fulfillment of these essential elements, there is a recurrent concern for efficient human 
interaction with the machines being operated.  Enhancement of this human-machine link is a 
necessary enterprise within the process management not only for the organizational overview, 
but also for the schematic placement of roles and specific defining variables for maintaining the 
interaction.  The effort to reach a level of optimization where this human-machine synergy takes 
into account the human-machine interaction as part of routine operations during production, 
maintenance evolutions, and off-normal operations requiring emergency mitigation, such as the 
impact of natural phenomena or unexpected failures within the system.  To operate effectively, 
each human-machine link must be well defined and specifically engineered utilizing the 
requirements established to fulfill the system purpose, which necessitates appropriate design 
decisions that meet this purpose and design that accounts for specific roles and processes 
remaining integrated and strong.  This implies not only considering all the decisions, 
manipulations, and potential errors that can be made in the system under design, but also lessons 
learned from other similar systems.  
To achieve safety and efficiency in operations, the human- chine interaction should be 
a focal point during system design.   This interaction has many facets and factors to n ider.  An 
integrated approach to seeking further process dynamics remains defined by interaction and does 
not leave processes on their own to facilitate operations independently.  Within the human-
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machine link, the machine is designed and installed to fulfill a specific purpose and, in doing so, 
must provide a mechanism to exhibit required system parameters so that the human can intervene 
to ensure that the machine is operating at the necessary capacity for efficient functionality and 
take necessary actions if an unsafe condition arises.   Furthermore, conditional models for both 
emergency and nominal routines aimed at meeting safety and operating standards see a network 
of knowledge centered upon creating processes that diminish uncertainty and strive to define 
every contingency.  Systems should be designed with machine monitoring in mind that allows 
the human activity to be fixed and defined by routine hat eliminates much uncertainty in 
operation.   
 
7.4.1.3. HUMAN ERROR AND THE HUMAN -MACHINE INTERFACE  
This dissertation has repeatedly emphasized the considerable potential for human eror, 
and this is especially true within the context of the human-machine interface.  Specifically, there 
is a greater potential for errors in the case of information interpretation that requires both humans 
and machines to collaborate.  The error emerges when erroneous information defines the process.   
Without the correct, most relevant system information, errors can arise both from the action of 
internal machine control mechanisms or human analysis and from the resulting actions based on 
wrong information.  It is important to design the system for a stronger human-machine 
interaction with less censoring of human behavior and more mining of information for evaluation 
of processes; this allows the human to incorporate change in ways that the machine cannot.  One 
must be wary, however, of too much ingenuity and flexible decisions as a means of deviating 
from the original purpose of operation.  To redefine safety for the wrong needs also suggests that 
the wrong values are applied, which can result in human error; the resulting consequences, in the 
context of nuclear facility operation, can be detrimental.   
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Some errors happen because humans interact at a cognitive, rational level but also have 
emotion and conflict to consider when making choi es. In some contexts, errors take place out 
of complacency or boredom regarding one’s role in the system.  For evaluation and redesign to 
take place, not only is it important for each member of the team to be cross-trained in some 
defined functions, information needs to be shared and new knowledge circulated to inspire new 
ideas for solving core capabilities of safety and efficiency.   Roles are alignd with integration 
because knowledge is open, a d this leads to systems that have flexibility and tolerance of the 
human factor of emotion.  Design of the system should not be dependent upon freedom or 
correct roles but on how the process is defined to carry out the purpose.  Roles fit into the 
process and so do human personalities for specific roles. 
 
7.4.1.4. DECISIONS AND THE HUMAN -MACHINE INTERFACE  
 Decisions can be challenging for the human even if machines monitoring for system 
reliability show little change in data or information about the system.  Decisions can be made for 
the wrong reasons based on limited information.  The data may not match the task, or the 
outcomes may have limited validity.  Data should reflect what the operator understands about the 
activity, behaviors, and resources that define the process.  Unfortunately, at times incorrect 
observations, missing information, or misinterpretations of information can result in poor 
decisions.  Additionally, operators may evaluate the data from the interface differently from each 
other, creating a lack of collaboration in optimizing the links in the system.  The machine may 
offer valid knowledge, but its translation into human knowledge is uncertain, potentially 
reducing the information’s value for making decisions.  So even if there may be adequate 
monitoring systems, backup data systems, cameras, institutionalized protocols for data 
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management, and suitable storage and handling, the information can be interpreted incorrectly, 
leading to poor decision making and reflecting weakness in design.  
 Taking into account the human element will permit use of decision-making systems to 
consider operational scenarios.  Deterministic functions are not flexible and allow for the same 
variable to be inputted only to return the same outcomes.  Non-deterministic functions allow for 
some flexibility in the sense that they can return different outcomes even with the same input.  
This allows for further dimensionality in modeling the various operational scenarios within the 
process to aid in redefining the human-machine interface, based on additional data that support 
the desired, optimal process outcome.  Within the framework of safety, serious consideration 
must be given to situations where d cisions are made quickly, under pressure, and with 
uncertainty.  These operational scenarios exist for all industries, but from the perspective of 
nuclear operation, where the consequences of errors can be extremely severe, these scenarios 
should be identified in detail and the human-machine links to be analyzed should be defined. 
Understanding how system capabilities can define risks to the system related to safety 
and performance involves a recognition that operators can and must learn from mistakes made 
and that designers must perceive opportunities from errors.  Continued reassessment and a  
approach to redesigning human-machine links can create system resilience.  Errors can be less 
costly in this context of specific redesign architecture.  L arning from past errors can enhance 
anticipation and expectations with regard to future events in terms of technology control strategy, 
unleashing its full power usefully to address factors that create conflict or uncertainty.  This is an 
avenue for innovation because it drives the forces of uncertainty away and allows for technology 




7.4.2. CONSIDERATION S IN OPTIMIZATION  
7.4.2.1. HUMAN INTERACTION IS INEVITABLE  
Although it might seem that the best way to engineer fault-tolerant systems is to eliminate 
any potential for human error, this assumption could lead to the conclusion that anything that can 
be automated should be automated.  An intrinsic flaw in that argument is that no matter how 
complex the system, humans still need to interact with it.  As discussed previously, when human 
interaction with a system is reduced, degradation of human skills can result.  As a clear example, 
consider the decline in children’s handwriting skills.  In the past, all elementary students learned 
cursive writing.  Today, the emphasis has shifted toward computers, keyboarding skills have 
become more valued, and children are spending less time on handwriting, with a corresponding 
decrease in skill level.  From a systems perspective, we can look at the Air Force as a model.  
When pilots started flying jets with increasing degrees of automation, researchers found that their 
overall flying proficiency was increasing but hat they were losing their manual flight abilities 
(Orellana and Madni, 2012).  As a result, pilot advisory boards started suggesting that pilo s 
should fly more manual hours in order not to lose those skills.  
The main focus of this dissertation has been on human error as a result of technological 
advancement associated with the upgrade of existing systems in existing nuclear facilities.  
Technological upgrades are unavoidable, so consistent efforts must be devoted toward keeping 
human error as low as possible amidst those changes.  As the evolution of systems progres es, 
the role of humans within the system will inevitably continue to evolve as well.  This evolution 
necessitates a continued emphasis on human performance improvement as part of maximizing 
system efficiency and safety.  Within this context, as new systems are designed and the role of 
the human is transformed, human error should be targeted for substantial reduction relative to 
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predecessor systems, with a corresponding increase in system stability and safety.  For this 
purpose, the roles of humans and machines must be optimized in the design and implementation 
of new types of automation, but it must be understood that human interaction with systems is 
compulsory and of major importance. 
 
7.4.2.2. THE ROLE OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND HUMAN ACTORS  
 From a systems engineering perspective, it is important to understand the precise role of 
complex systems in the interactions between human actors.  In the past, computing and 
cybernetics systems were focused on extending the physical attributes of humans and doing 
things that humans could not safely do, such as interacting directly with highly radioactive 
materials.  However, as computing power has increased as a natural result of Moore’s Law, now 
systems are advancing into the realm of enhancing cognitive and mental capacities (Orellana and 
Madni, 2012).  Reducing human error through system architecture is a very important goal, as 
was revealed by tragic failures in the use of Patriot missiles in 2003 during the Iraq war.  The 
Patriot radar systems were engineered in such a way as to record false hits and fal e alarms 
without displaying any uncertainty regarding the target (Madni, 2009).  The human tendency 
when working with automated systems is to trust the accuracy of the information provided.  
Unfortunately, because the systems were poorly engineered, the humans interacting with such 
systems took the blame for shooting down a British Tornado and a U.S. Navy F18/A, which 
were incorrectly identified as targets by the automated systems (Madni, 2009). 
 As this example illustrates, one crucial prt of engineering human error out of systems 
designs is to make certain that the systems do not introduce their own errors.  If humans 
interacting with engineered solutions are to be expected to operate consistently, th  systems must 
provide sufficient information to the humans involved so that they can use their unique 
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characteristics in analyzing the situation and making the proper decisions.  A crucial 
responsibility of the system engineer in designing a human-machine interface system, therefore, 
is to properly articulate who makes the final call in crucial decisions.  In some situations, the 
automated systems should never be overridden by the human operator—for instance, if doing so
would expose the humans involved to unacceptable amounts of radiation exposure or automatic 
shutdowns due to low or high system pressure.  Conversely, in other situations, such as normal 
or controlled operations, an automated system should not be able to override the human’s 
judgment.  A good human-machine interface achieves an appropriate balance between the skills 
of the operators involved in the particular situation and the inherent strengths of the systems 
involved.   
 Some areas where human errors can occur in integration with automation systems refl ct 
a lack of knowledge in the area of human cognition and cognitive processes.  Humans have 
amazing but still limited cognitive abilities, and systems designers must take those limitations 
into consideration.  For example, it is known that excessive use of multi-windowed syst m  for 
monitoring can result in degraded human performance, because these systems overtax the 
operator’s attentional capacity (Madni, 2009).  Important alerts could be missed due to exceeding 
the human’s cognitive processing abilities.  Whereas an initial alarm can seize an operator’s 
attention, repeated alarms (or so-called nuisance alarms) inevitably cause the operator to become 
habituated to them (like the classic fable about crying wolf too often).  Thus, when a truly 
important alarm is sounded, the operator may tune it out and not attend to it.  Excessive 
flexibility also presents a problem for human operators.  A classic example is the smartphone: 
most users take advantage of only a small fraction of its functions, because most of them are too 
complex or take too much time to figure out.  Therefore, for systems engineers to liminate 
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human error factors, they must fully understand the cognitive limitations of the users of such 
systems and compensate for them by designing systems that augment human capabilities of 
flexible thinking, while at the same time not presenting such an overwhelming variety of options 
that crucial indicators or tools are ignored because they overwhelm the humans whom they are 
designed to assist. 
 
7.4.2.3. ACCOUNT FOR HUMAN LIMITATIONS  
 As technology advances, it becomes increasingly apparent that from a systems 
engineering perspective, systems have a (nearly) unlimited capacity whereas humans do not.  
Therefore, to create systems that reduce human error as much as possible, a respect for the 
limitations of the human brain and its processing capacity is necessary.  As was mentioned 
earlier, the human brain has a limited processing capacity, because its processing activity occurs 
in the area referred to commonly as short-te m memory (Richardson et al., 1996).  The short-
term memory circuit consists of sensory memory, which can contain a few seconds of data at 
most, and the short-term memory store.  The complexity of designing with respect for this 
system lies in the fact that the attention capacities of short-term memory are divided betwen 
data just taken in, data retrieved from long-term memory for processing, coding procedures, and 
search strategies (Richardson et al., 1996).  Therefore, when designing complex systems with 
many things that must be attended to, systems engineers must find a way to narrow the 
information presented to the most essential elements, so that the crucial information that must 
have the human operator’s attention is front and center at all times. 
 An analogous system in which visual displays play an essential safety role is visual 
control systems for automobiles.  Indeed, the so-called instrument cluster is a crucial part of the 
safe operation of a motor vehicle because it relays safety-r lated signals to the driver (Bellotti et 
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al., 2004).  As automobile safety systems become increasingly advanced, with more c mponents 
designed to assist the driver in safe automobile operation (including collision detection, parking 
assistance, night vision assistance, adaptive cruise control, and more), the space available for 
displaying this information becomes a key limitation that must be overcome (Bellotti et al., 
2004).  To deal with the space limitations of automobiles, designers have turned to the novel 
solution of creating configurable dashboards.  One of the salient points arising from this research 
is that all this additional information must be provided to the driver of the automobile without 
simultaneously distracting him or her from the primary goal, which is to safely operate the 
automobile.  This is why human-machine interfaces in cars must be designed in a way such as to 
prevent human error (Bellotti et al., 2004).  Research on automobile interfaces has found that 
customizable dashboard interfaces increased passive safety, as the ability to tailor the interfaces 
was correlated with significant improvements in users’ attention and reaction capabilities (Lim, 
Benbasat, and Todd, 1996).  One reason posited for this improvement in attention is that 
customized interfaces are closer to the real-world systems that they are supposed to support.  
Because the end user is directly involved in the customization, Lim et al. (1996) posited a 
reduction of the psychological distance between the user and the system, making it easier for the 
user to execute the needed tasks.   
This insight can be directly applied to the arrangement and composition of nuclear 
facility control interfaces.  Vital operational information should be maintained at the forefront 
(reactor power, core temperature and pressure, etc.), but other information can be managd and 
displayed at the operator’s discretion or according to plant procedures.  This arrangement 
combines the availability of vital information with operator knowledge, based on training and 
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experience, as to what displays are necessary at different times without overwhelming the 
operator’s cognitive capacity. 
 
7.4.2.4. APPLICATION OF THE DASHBOARD CONCEPT IN NUCLEAR 
OPERATION S 
Considerable data suggest that the use of a dashboard concept holds promise in the area 
of human-machine interface design.  One of the most valuable aspects of dashboards is that they 
can improve decision making (or prevent errors) by amplifying cognition as well as making the 
most of humans’ limited perceptual capacity (Yigitbasioglu and Velcu, 2012).  As Lim et al. 
(1996) suggested, flexibility in selection of dashboard formats aids in user respons  as well as in 
accurate use of the information.  Additionally, dashboards can be an effective answer to the 
problem of memory overload, a key limiting factor that can contribute to human error in using 
human-machine interfaces.  
Several elements of dashboard design must be taken into account when one is designing 
dashboard human-machine interface.  The first factor is visualization.  The information 
visualized within a dashboard design must actually amplify cognition.  The visualization of data 
can be considered correct if the end users consistently decode the information presented 
properly.  Again, respecting the limited cognitive capacity of short-term or processing memory, 
an effective dashboard design will  strike an appropriate balance between visual complexity and 
the information utility required for the particular situation. 
Other functions can be built into dashboards to reduce errors.  For example, automated 
alerts (in limited fashion, because of the aforementioned problem of habituation) can be included 
in the dashboard design, along with theory-guided format selections that can help to lead an 
operator to the correct selections for a given scenario.  Limiting the dashboard to a single page 
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and a simple color scheme, along with links and grid lines for 2D/3D data graphs, is another 
research-supported way to improve the visual clarity of dashboard designs (Yigitbasioglu and 
Velcu, 2012). 
 Another important aspect of human-machine interface design is the affordance of 
information in a way that is consistent with the desired results.  Affordance, in the context of 
human-machine interface design, refers to the features provided to the user (Hartson, 2003).  One 
way in which affordance can reduce human error is in the proper presentation of choices or 
options.  For example, shading a button or menu item in gray and making that choice 
inaccessible because it is a contextually inappropriate choice can guide the user toward making 
correct choices in the situation.  There is, however, an accompanying danger that affordances can 
also misinform or misdirect a user into an incorrect choice or option.  For example, a horizontal 
line on a scrolling page could lead the user into thinking that the page has ended when actually 
there is more content “below the fold.”  Improper or misunderstood instructions can introduce or 
increase the opportunity for human error in human-machine interface use. 
 
7.5. CONFIDENCE IN PROPOSED APPROACHES 
 
To assess experts’ confidence in the proposed methods described in this chapter, a Likert-
style survey was designed and a ministered to a group of systems engineers to gain their 
impressions of the methods proposed, whether the methods would be successful in reducing 
human error, whether the experts would be likely to use these methods, and issues affecting the 
implementation of these methods within the systems engineering process in the industry setting.  
The survey sample consisted of 40 system design engineers (age 25 to 65) of various 
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backgrounds, locations, and disciplines (nuclear engineers, electrical engineers, mechanical 
engineers, etc.) who were knowledgeable regarding the systems engine ring and design process. 
The statements contained in the survey were extracted directly from the sections of this 
chapter.  The respondents were provided with the chapter content and the questions and 
statements along with the five-point Likert scale.  Depending on the question, the potential 
responses were labeled in one of two ways: (1) “never,” “occasionally,” “regularly,” 
“frequently,” and “always,” or (2) “strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neith r agree or disagree,” 
“agree,” and “strongly agree.” 
The examination of the Likert-style quantitative rating questions indicated the following 


































As shown above, the totals are weighted to “always” or “strongly agree” with no 
responses indicating “never”, “strongly disagree”, “occasionally”, or “disagree”, therefore, the 
responses are largely favorable for the methods proposed in this chapter. 
Additional analysis is shown in Table 11 below. 
Table 11. Results of Survey Analysis 
 
Analysis Results 
Percent Agree 96.6% 
Top Box 63.1% 
Net Top Box 63.1% 
Z-Score to % 86% 
Coefficient of Variation 12% 
 
 
The percentage agreeing represents those who indicated “strongly agree” or “agree” (or 
“frequently” or “always,” depending on how the question was worded) on the 5-point Likert 
scale in response to each item.  The top box represents only those responses of “strongly agree” 
or “always.”  The net top box is found by counting the number of respondents who elected the 
top choice and subtracting the number who selected the bottom choice.  The z-score to percentile 
rank converts the raw score into a normal score due to the fact that the rating scale means often 
follow a normal or close to normal distribution.  The coefficient of variation is a measure of 
variability, unlike the first four which are measures of the central tendency (Sauro, 2011). 
The quantitative results show that the respondents were strongly favorable regarding the 
value, usability, and likely industry acceptance of the concepts presented in this chapter.   
In addition, the respondents were given the opportunity to offer open-ended comments on 
each section of the survey.  All remarks expressed an appreciation of the concepts, an 
acknowledgment of the benefits of implementing such concepts, and expectations that future 
implementation would receive a positive industry reception.  See Appendix C for a 
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comprehensive explanation of the survey and additional details associated with the results and 
analysis. 
 
7.6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has examined the impact of technology on present-day plant operators and 
discussed a way forward for industry to involve operations personnel involvement in the systems 
engineering process and maximize performance excellence.  It entails the integration of human 
performance considerations into system operational requirements and system testing, evaluation, 
and validation; proper generation of procedures, processes, and programs; the i plementation of 
a sound, knowledge-based operator training program; the creation of a robust plant casualty 
control drill program; the development of human error significance criteria; he establishment of 
a tracking database; the creation of a formal process to sort the information; and a method to 
keep errors minimized and at low safety significance.  The final chapter will discuss the 
conclusions drawn from this dissertation and recommendations for further research. 
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8.1. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION  
 
The systems associated with nuclear facilities are some of the most complex ever 
developed.  As a result, it is important to consider whether the complexity and changing 
technologies used at nuclear facilities may exacerbate he cost of incidents caused by human 
error.  This dissertation has investigated the relationship between human performance, 
technological advances, and the complex systems involved with nuclear facilities. 
The primary research question driving this study was whether technological advances in 
the complex systems of nuclear facilities increase the severity, in terms of cost, of incidents 
caused by human error.  This is an important question because most nuclear facilities continually 
update their technology for varying reasons.  This continuous technological improvement can 
frequently require operators to change their routines and their method of interacting with the 
complex system and the new technology. 
To answer this question, hypotheses were established and a study was conducted to 
determine whether technological advances affect the interaction between operators and the 
systems that they operate, resulting in an increased costof incidents related to human error.  The 
hypothesis was stated as follows: 
H1: Technological advances at a nuclear facility that affect how operators interact within 
the system do increase the cost of incidents caused by human error.  
The null hypothesis was stated as follows: 
H0: Technological advances at a nuclear facility that affect how operators interact within 






The t-test was used to determine whether there was a statistical difference in the costs of 
nuclear incidents related to operator error when interacting with a system where recent 
technological advances have been installed, r lative to other incidents.  The t-test indicated a 
statistically significant difference between the two groups; therefore, the null hypothesis was 
rejected.  The evidence indicated that, indeed, technological advances at a nuclear f cility that 
affect how operators interact within the system do increase the cost of incidents caused by 
human error. 
As a follow-up study, the question of whether organizations benefit overall by 
incorporating advanced technology at their facilities was analyzed.  The data from this analysis 
indicated that spending more money on upgrades will increase a facility’s capacity factor (i.e., 
the ratio between observed output and potential output if the facility were consistently running at 
its full capacity) as well as the number of incidents reported.  However, the incidents in the 
randomly selected facilities for this study were relatively minor.  Given that the nuclear facilities 
produce vast amounts of power and the upgrades significantly increase the capacity f ctor, there 
appears to be a financial advantage in conducting upgrades, but this benefit should be weighed 
against the increased rate of level 1 and 2 incidents observed.  
Based on the information and analysis discussed above, ther  is evidence that  
technological advances at a nuclear facility are worth the risk, even though they may increase the 
cost of resulting incidents due to human error.  Due to these findings, additional study was 
conducted on the impact of human factors (including human error) on plant operation and the
phases of the systems engineering process.  This was followed by a discussion of the impact of 
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evolving technology on today’s facility operators and ways to overcome these challenges by 
utilizing the systems engineering process. 
 
8.3. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS DISSERTATION  
 
The primary contributions of this research are as follows: 
• Discovered quantitative evidence that technological advances at a nuclear facility 
that affect how operators interact within the system can increase the cost of 
incidents caused by human error. 
• Discovered quantitative evidence that spending more money on the incorporation 
of advanced technology into existing nuclear facilities can increase the capacity of 
the facility as well as the potential number of incidents. 
• Performed an extensive examination of the impact of human performance on 
plant operation and the systems engineering process. 
• Established a model to cultivate human performance–nhanced system design and 
operation via: 
o operator involvement in all stages of the systems engineering process,  
o iterative procedures and operator training development throughout all 
stages of the systems engineering process, and  
o early selection and cultivation of suitable operators chosen and groomed 
specifically for the systems being designed.   
• Explored a methodology to optimize the balance between the human and machine 
sides of the human-machine interface in a system.  
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• Developed a novel method of incorporating human performance characteristics 
into the system design and development stages of the systems engineering 
process.  Specifically, the study proposes the incorporation of human performance 
attributes into system operational requirements, TPMs, and system testing, 
evaluation, and validation. 
 
8.4. RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
This study resulted in a rejection of the null hypothesis.  Therefore, there is evidence that 
changing the technology with which operators interact increases the cost of incidents resulting 
from human error.  As a result of this conclusion, three recommendations are offered. 
 
8.4.1. RECOMMENDATION 1: A DDITIONAL RESEARCH ON THIS TOPIC 
 
Additional research on this topic is recommended.  Specifically, a study could be 
conducted on the rate of small-scale incidents (i.e., those at level 1 or 2 of the INES).  Many of 
these incidents are not as intricately studied as those that reach a higher level of severity.  Instead 
of an in-depth analysis of each incident, a simple count could be made of the minor incidents that 
follow changes in technology.  A similar procedure to the one used in this study could be used 
for data analysis.  Instead of using the cost of the incident as the quantitative measure, the 
number of minor incidents could be used.  This approach would eliminate the need to search for 
cost information on each incident or the details of the incident report other than the INES rating. 




8.4.2. RECOMMENDATION 2:  INTEGRATION OF OPERATOR PERSPECTIVES IN 
EARLY STAGES OF SYSTEM DESIGN 
 
As broached in Chapter 7, the operator has a unique perspective relevant to the successful 
operation of the system or component, therefore, their input can result in appreciably less 
complication after a system or component is installed and operational.  It is recomm nded that 
systems engineering process programmatic enhancements be considered to tap this resource 
more effectively and efficiently.  Additionally, it is recommended that research be done to 
quantifiably determine the impact from harnessing operator perspectives in th early stages of 
the systems engineering process. 
 
8.4.3. RECOMMENDATION 3: I MPROVE TRAINING , PROCEDURES, AND HUMAN 
PERFORMANCE AT FACILITIES IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE DEVELOPMENT 
AND INSTALLATION OF NEW TECHNOLOGY  
 
Lastly, as examined in Chapter 7, it is recommended that the systematic and continuous 
improvement of training, procedures, and human performance be further researched, refin  and 
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Each of the nuclear incidents that occurred in the United States from 1955 until 2012 is 
briefly discussed below, with an attempt to determine whether new technology had been 
introduced shortly before the incident.  The NRC was founded in 1974, and the IAEA scales 
came into existence in 1990.  Most of the information on the older incidents comes from books 
on the topic.  From this information, an estimate was made as to whether the incident warranted 
rating of 3 of greater on the IAEA scale.  All monetary values listed in the table in chapter 4 
were adjusted to 2005 dollar values. 
 
November 29, 1955: Idaho Falls, Idaho 
The experimental breeder reactor at Idaho Falls, Idaho is now decommissioned (Perrow 
2011) and is now a national historic landmark.  A wide range of experiments was conducted at 
this facility by the U.S. government as well as state governments and national laboratories.  
Several universities also conducted research at the facility.  The area has been home to more than 
50 reactors (Rogers, 2013). 
In November 1955, a reactor entered into a partial meltdown during a test of the coolant 
flow (Sovacool, 2011).  The use of a nuclear reactor to produce electricity was still relatively 
novel at this time.  The construction of the breeder reactor had begun in 1949, and it was 
installed and began to produce power in 1951.  Therefore, assuming normal staff turnover, the 
individuals working with the reactor had up to four years of experience with the equipment rior 
to the meltdown.  For this reason, the incident is not categorized as not occurring due to human 
error related to novel technological advances (Krivit, 2011). 
 
159 
July 26, 1959: Simi Valley, California  
The reactor in Simi Valley, California experienced a partial core meltdown in 1959 
(Sovacool, 2011).  The entire facility was an experiment in using a sodium reactor to produce 
electricity through nuclear power.  The reactor was in use from 1957 until 1964 and is 
considered the first nuclear reactor to provide electricity within the United States (Rogers, 2013). 
The 1959 meltdown involved 13 of 43 fuel elements melting, with the release of 
radioactive gas (Sovacool, 2011).  The experimental facility’s purpose was to construct a facility 
that would produce electricity from nuclear energy, allowing workers to gain experience with 
running this type of power plant.  Therefore, throughout the facility’s operation, new instruments 
and technologies were being introduced.  One reason for the partial meltdown is that the 
individuals working at the facility were using new equipment and gauges with which they were 
not familiar (Perrow, 2011).  Therefore, this incident is judged as attributable to human error 
when working with new technology. 
 
January 3, 1961: Idaho Falls, Idaho  
The experimental reactor at Idaho Falls was the site of fatalities due to an incident 
associated with the reactor core (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  The primary nuclear control rod 
had been removed from the reactor.  As a result, the reactor became supercritical and had a 
power excursion.  Three people in the reactor room died due to exposure to radiation.  In fact, 
500 R per hour were still being emitted from the bodies when the rescue workers arrived.  A rod 
ejection caused one body to be lodged in the ceiling of the reactor room, held there by the control 
rod that was launched during the reactor super-criticality.  The individuals in the control room 
were so irradiated that they had to be buried in coffins made of lead (Perrow, 2011). 
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The investigation of this incident revealed that new equipment had been installed in the 
control room (Sovacool, 2011), including the gauges that indicated whether the control rods were 
in their proper location and orientation (Rogers, 2013).  Therefore, this incident is deemed to 
have been due to human error when working with new technology. 
 
July 24, 1964: Charlestown, Rhode Island 
The facility in Charlestown, Rhode Island reprocessed highly enriched uranium in the 
form of scrap materials produced from fuel elements (Rogers, 2013).  A worker was stirring up a 
tank that contained uranium within a sodium carbonate solution.  This person was supposed to 
add trichloroethane to enable the removal of organic compounds.  Instead, the worker added a 
uranium solution.  This resulted in a criticality excursion as well as a bright flash of light.  
Roughly 20 percent of the contents of the tank, or 10 liters, splashed out of the container.  The 
worker was exposed to an excessive amount of radiation and died two days later (Perrow, 2011). 
The worker who made the error had done this procedure on several occasions (Sovacool, 
2011).  The labeling of the bottles had not been changed, and the individual was familiar with all 
the technology involved (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  Therefore, this incident is not judged to 
have been due to human error when working with new technologies. 
 
October 5, 1966: Monroe, Michigan  
The Enrico Fermi nuclear power plant in Monroe, Michigan is operated by DTE Energy 
(Sovacool, 2011).  Its first unit was constructed in 1963; a second unit was built in 1988 (Rogers, 
2013). 
The reactor unit, which was of the fast breeder type, suffered a partial fuel meltdown in 
October 1966 (Sovacool, 2011).  The primary cause of the increase in temperature was 
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determined to be blockage of a spigot needed for the liquid sodium coolant to enter the reactor.  
The blockage prevented sufficient coolant from entering the reactor, causing its temperature of 
rise slowly over several hours (Perrow, 2011). 
The incident at he Fermi reactor could have been avoided if the operators had noticed 
that the reactor temperatures were rising (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  However, they did not 
become aware of the problem until alarms sounded regarding the elevated core tempera ure. By 
this time, a partial fuel meltdown had already occurred.  A number of the subassemblies for the 
rods reached temperatures over 700°F, causing the fuel to melt.  It was later discovered that new 
gauges for reading the core temperature had been recently installed, and unfamiliarity with the 
instruments is likely to have led to the temperature change being overlooked (Rogers, 2013).  
Therefore, this incident is deemed to have been due to human error when working with new 
equipment. 
 
July 16, 1971: Cordova, Illinois 
An electrician died after coming into contact with a live cable at the reactor in Cordova, 
Illinois (Perrow, 2011).  The electrician would not have been unfamiliar with the wiring or 
equipment.  In fact, the electrician was doing routine maintenance of equipment on which he had 
worked previously (Sovacool, 2011).  Therefore, this incident is not judged as due to human 
error associated with new technology. 
 
March 22, 1975: Athens, Alabama  
Both nuclear reactor units at the Brown’s Ferry facility in Alabama experienced a nuclear 
emergency in 1975 (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  The problem began when two electricians were 
repairing ceiling air leaks within the room for cable spreading.  Electrical cables controlling the 
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reactors are routed to different tunnels of the two reactor buildings in this area.  The electricians 
were using a spongy type of foam rubber to seal any leaks.  They were using candles to 
determine whether the leaks had been plugged; if there was a remaining leak, the candle flame 
would flicker.  One of the electricians placed a candle too close to the foam rubber and it ignited 
(Sovacool, 2011). 
The resulting fire caused a number of the facility’s safety systems to be disabled 
(Sovacool, 2011), including the emergency cooling system for unit one.  This incident resulted 
from the misuse of candles, an outdated technology (Perrow, 2011).  Therefore, it is not judged 
to be due to human error when working with new technology. 
 
November 5, 1975: Brownville, Nebraska  
The Cooper Nuclear Station is located near Brownville, Nebraska (Rogers, 2013).  This 
facility is a boiling water reactor and the largest generator of electricity within Nebraska.  It is 
owned and operated by the N braska Public Power District, a division of the state government, 
with support from Entergy Nuclear (Sovacool, 2011). 
The Cooper Nuclear Station became operational in July 1974 (Perrow, 2011).  The 
station is still in operation and provides roughly 800 MW of electrical power.  The facility is 
outfitted with a Mark One containment system.  In 1998, it became the first site within the 
United States to use nuclear fuel consisting of uranium taken from decommissioned nuclear
weapons from the Soviet Union.  The uranium from these nuclear weapons was down-blended to 
a uranium enrichment level for use as fuel (Sovacool, 2011). 
In November 1975, a hydrogen gas explosion damaged an auxiliary building and the 
reactor (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  The evidence for the cause of the hydrogen gas explosion is 
inconclusive.  However, there is no indication that human error was involved (Perrow, 2011). 
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June 10, 1977: Waterford, Connecticut  
The Millstone Nuclear Power Station i  Waterford, Connecticut is the state’s only 
nuclear power plant (Krivit, 2011).  The first unit, which this incident r fers, is no longer in 
operation, having ceased operations in 1998.  The second and third units are still in operation, 
licensed until 2035 and 2045, respectively, with a combined power output of 2020 MW.  This 
makes the facility the largest generator of electricity in New England (Perrow, 2011).  The plant 
has a relatively good safety record; in 2004, it earned the top award from the U.S. Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for a high level of workplace safety (Sehgal, 2012). 
The 1977 incident involved an explosion of hydrogen gas (Rogers, 2013) that damaged 
three buildings on the premises and led to the shutdown of the Unit 1 reactor (Smith, 2012).  
Investigation into this incident led to the conclusion that it was not due to human error. 
 
February 4, 1979: Surry, Virginia  
An incident occurred in February 1979 at the nuclear power station in Surry County, 
Virginia (Perrow, 1999).  This facility consists of two pressurized water reactors that became 
operational during 1972 and 1973.  Each reactor can produce 800 MW of electricity.  The 
condenser cycle uses the James River as a heat sink.  This eliminates the necessity of cooling 
towers.  Both reactors remain in operation (Krivit, 2011). 
The 1979 incident involved a shutdown of the second reactor (Rogers, 2013), which was 
necessary because two tube bundles failed within the steam generator coupled to this reactor.  
The cause was determined to be due to faulty manufacturing of the materials involved (Smith, 





March 28, 1979: Middletown, Pennsylvania 
In March 1979, the most expensive nuclear accident in U.S. history occurred at the Three 
Mile Island nuclear plant near Middletown, Pennsylvania (Krivit, 2011).  The incident is also 
distinguished because it attained a rating of 5 on the INES (Perrow, 1999). 
The problem began with a pilot-operated relief valve that became stuck open within the 
primary system, allowing a significant amount of coolant from the reactor to escape.  The initial 
problem was a mechanical failure, but it was exacerbated by the plant operators’ failure to 
recognize that the coolant was leaking.  Control room indicators had recently been added to a 
new user interface for which the operators did not have adequate training.  In fact, one of the 
operators was unaware of the placement of an indicator light and overrode the automatically 
operated emergency cooling system.  The operator believed that an excess of coolant water 
within the reactor was causing the release of steam pressure (Perrow, 1999). 
The incident at Three Mile Island led to an increase in U.S. government regulation of the 
nuclear industry (Krivit, 2011).  The partial meltdown that resulted from the incident released 
radioactive iodine and gases of unknown quantities into the environment.  S veral epidemiologic 
studies have been conducted r garding the rates of cancer and other illnesses related to radiation 
in the area near the facility; no statistically significant increase in problems has been noted.  The 
cleanup of the area began in 1979 and lasted for 14 years (Rogers, 2013). 
The Three Mile Island disaster is especially important for this study as it had such a high 
cost and multiple in-depth investigations of the accident took place (Harrison and Hester, 2011), 
along with studies from the perspectives of human factors and user interface engineering.  
Essentially, the relief valve was stuck in the open position (Smith, 2012).  Thefacility operators 
believed that a light on their control panels was indicating a closed valve.  This was a 
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misreading, as the light was indicating only the solenoid status and had nothing to do with the 
valve position.  This relatively new control panel configuration had not been explained properly 
to the operators.  Therefore, several hours passed before the operators could properly identify the 
problem (Marques, 2011).  Accordingly, this incident is judged to be due to human error when 
working with new technology. 
  
November 22, 1980: San Clemente, California 
The San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station in San Diego County, California (Rogers, 
2013) became operational in January 1968.  It has been permanently shut down and will be 
decommissioned (Smith, 2012).  
The incident that occurred at this facility in 1980 resulted in a worker’s death by 
electrocution (Krivit, 2011).  The worker was cleaning the breaker cubicles.  This is a routine 
maintenance procedure that the worker had performed previously, and he wasfamiliar with the 
equipment.  He came into contact with an energized electrical line (Marques, 2011).  Although 
this was a human error, it was not due to working with a new type of technology. 
 
January 25, 1982: Ontario, New York  
The Ginna Nuclear Generating Station s located in Ontario, New York.  As a result of 
the rupture of a steam generator tube, radioactive steam was released into the atmosphere 
(Harrison and Hester, 2011).  The leak continued for more than 90 minutes, and more than 480 
curies of radioactive gas were released as well as one millicurie of iodine-131.  Additionally, 
nearly 1,700 gallons of contaminated water were lost from the reactor.  This incident was due to 
a flaw in the design of the steam generator, s  no employee error was involved.  In fact, the 
steam generator tube design was based on an older design (Rogers, 2013).  
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February 26, 1982: San Clemente, California  
In February 1982, San Onofre’s reactor one was shutdown due to the possibility of an 
earthquake (Marques, 2011).  This was a planned shutdown and not due to any type of human 
error. 
 
March 20, 1982: Scriba, New York  
The Nine Mile Point Nuclear Generating Station in Scriba, New York, has two units, o 
which unit one became operational in December 1969 and unit two in July 1987.  This is one of 
the oldest reactors still operating within the United States.  Unit one has a capacity of slightly 
over 620 MW; unit two can produce 1140 MW.  The units are licensed until 2029 and 2046, 
respectively (Krivit, 2011). 
In March 1982, the system piping failed in the recirculation system of unit one.  As a 
result, the unit was closed for two years.  The failure of the recirculation piping was due to 
human error when engineering the facility.  The technology used in the plant was relatively new, 
and the engineers were unfamiliar with all of the systems.  Additionally, they needed to use new 
types of equipment in facility design (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  Therefore, this is judged to be 
an instance of human error when working with new technologies. 
 
March 25, 1982: Buchanan, New York 
Indian Point Energy Center is a nuclear power plant with three units in Buchanan, New 
York, approximately 38 miles from New York City (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  The plant has 
an operational capacity of more than 2,000 MW.  It supplies roughly one-third of the electricity 
needed for New York City and is operated by Entergy Nuclear Northeast,  subsidiary of the 
Entergy Corporation.  The plant has two pressurized water reactors built by Westinghouse.  Unit 
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one of the two at the facility has been permanently shut down.  Unit two was commissioned in 
1974 and Unit three was commissioned in 1976 (Krivit, 2011). 
Unit three was shut down in 1982 because of damage sustained by the main and steam 
generators (Marques, 2011).  The steam generator tubes were damaged when the facility 
operators failed to notice warnings that it was not safe to use the section of the reactor that relied 
on these tubes.  The interface that they were using had been installed only a few weeks before 
the incident occurred and the reactor personnel were not yet trained in their operation (Rogers, 
2013).  Therefore, this incident is judged to have been due to human error when working with 
new technology. 
 
June 18, 1982: Seneca, South Carolina  
The Oconee Nuclear Station is located on Lake Keowee near Seneca, South Carolina 
(Harrison and Hester, 2011).  The plant has a capacity of 2,500 MW and is only the second 
nuclear facility within the United States to have had its operating license extended for an extra 20 
years by the NRC.  This facility has three pressurized water reactors designed by Babcock and 
Wilcox and is run by Duke Energy.  According to the operating company, the facility has 
produced more than half a bill ion megawatt hours of electricity since itbegan operation in July 
1973 (Marques, 2011). 
In June 1982, the Oconee pressurized water reactor had a f ilure in a heat extraction line, 
causing damage to the thermal cooling system (Rogers, 2013).  This failure was due to 
manufacturing problems with the materials used.  No human error associated with the use of new 





February 12, 1983: Forked River, New Jersey  
The Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station is located in Ocean County, New Jers y.  
Detection of a failure during a safety inspection resulted in the reactor being shut down for 
significant repairs (Salvendy, 2012).  The Oyster Creek facility consists of one boiling water 
reactor capable of producing more than 630 MW of electricity.  The facility has 800 acres 
dedicated to its operations.  Oyster Creek, one of the oldest operating nuclear power plants in the 
United States, began operation i  1969 and has a license through the end of December 2019, at 
which point the plant is slated for permanent deactivation. The water to cool the plant is taken 
from a brackish estuary nearby, known as Barnegat Bay (Marques, 2011). 
Although the shutdown due to the failed safety inspection carried an economic ost in 
excess of $30 million, it did not result in any damage to the facility or danger to those living near 
the plant (Smith, 2012).  It was due to human error related to insufficient maintenance 
procedures, but not due to working with new technologies (Salvendy, 2012). 
 
February 26, 1983: Fort Pierce, Florida  
The St. Lucie Nuclear Plant has two pressurized water reactors of the combustion 
engineering type.  The plant, operated by Florida Power and Light, began operations in 1976.  Its 
first reactor unit’s operating license has been extended to March 2036; the second reactor unit is 
licensed until April 2043 (Salvendy, 2012). 
The St. Lucie unit one reactor was shut down for 13 months due to damage to the core 
barrel support and thermal shield (Krivit, 2011).  This damage was judged to be secondary to a 
design flaw (Smith, 2012).  There was no human error at the facility level, and the design 
engineers were not using new technologies (Marques, 2011).  Therefore, the incidentwas no  
due to human error when working with new technology. 
 
169 
September 15, 1984: Athens, Alabama  
The Browns Ferry unit two in Athens, Alabama was shut down in 1984 for a variety of 
safety violations, design problems, and operator errors (Smith, 2012) and remained out of 
operation for about six years, at a cost of more than $100 million.  Although operator errors were 
involved in the events leading to the shutdown of unit two, these errors were not due to the use of 
new technology (Salvendy, 2012). 
 
March 9, 1985: Athens, Alabama  
A problem occurred during the 1985 startup of a reactor at the Browns Ferry plant in 
Alabama, due to a malfunction in the instrumentation system (Marques, 2011).  Ultimately, the 
problem led to the suspension of operation of all three units.  The instrument malfunction was 
due to an error in the manufacturing of the instruments and did not involve any type of mistake 
due to new technology (Salvendy, 2012).  There were also problems with facility management, 
but these two were unrelated to new technologies. 
 
June 9, 1985: Oak Harbor, Ohio  
The Davis-Besse facility in Oak Harbor, Ohio (Krivit, 2011) has one pressurized water 
reactor that became operational in 1978 and has a license scheduled to expire in 2017.   The 
owners of the facility are Toledo Edison and Cleveland Electric.  The plant is operated by 
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company, a subsidiary of FirstEnergy Corporation (Harrison and 
Hester, 2011).  The reactor has a capacity of 889 MW and was designed by Babcock and Wilcox 
(Marques, 2011).  
An incident in summer 1985 involved a shutdown of the primary feedwater pumps, 
which supply water for the reactor’s team generators (Smith, 2012).  After the feedwater pumps 
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had shut down, an operator in the control room tried to start the emergency feedwater pumps, but 
the emergency pumps entered an over-speed condition because of operator error.  The human 
interface had been upgraded only one month prior to the incident (Salvendy, 2012).  Therefore, 
this incident is judged to be due to human error when working with new technology. 
 
April 11, 1986: Plymouth, Massachusetts 
Boston Edison’s Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plant is located in Plymouth, Massachusetts on 
Cape Cod Bay.  It has a boiling water reactor produced by General Electric.  The facility 
generates almost 15% of the electricity used in Massachusetts, or more than 5,100 GW per hour 
(Marques, 2011).  This power plant has a capacity of 685 MW and is the sole nuclear power 
facility operating within Massachusetts.  It commenced operations in December 1972 (Smith, 
2012) and is licensed to operate until 2032 (Salvendy, 2012). 
The plant experienced aseries of equipment problems in 1986 that resulted in an 
emergency shutdown costing more than $1 billion (Marques, 2011).  An investigation 
determined that the problem was not human error, but a design failure not associated with he use 
of new technologies (Krivit, 2011).  Therefore, this problem was not due to a mistake when 
interacting with new technology. 
  
March 31, 1987: Delta, Pennsylvania 
The Peach Bottom Nuclear Generating Station is located in York County, Pennsylvania 
on the Susquehanna River.  Its initial unit, one of the first active reactors in the United States, 
was commissioned in 1966 and decommissioned in 1974.  Units two and three were 
commissioned in 1974 and are still in operation (Salvendy, 2012). 
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In 1987, the station experienced equipment difficulties and cooling malfunctions that 
resulted in an NRC-ordered shutdown of both units two and three (Marques, 2011).  The reasons 
for the shutdown included corporate malfeasance, operator misconduct, and a general disregard 
for the safety and health of individuals living near the facility.  The NRC found that the security 
guards were so overworked that they were often asleep on the job, and that 36,000 gallons of 
radioactive water had been released into the Susquehanna River.  None of the errors that 
necessitated the 1987 shutdown were lated to human error when working with new 
technologies.  Poor management was the root of the problem (Smith, 2012). 
 
July 15, 1987: Burlington, Kansas 
The Wolf Creek Generating Station in Burlington, Kansas was commissioned in 1985 at 
a cost of over $3 billion (Salvendy, 2012).  Construction began in 1977.  The facility consists of 
a single Westinghouse pressurized water reactor that is r ted for 1,170 MW.  Installation of a 
new rotor in 2011 increased the electrical capacity to 1250 MW.  The facility’s license has been 
extended to 2037 (Krivit, 2011). 
Tragedy hit this facility in July 1987 when a safety inspector made contact with a 
mislabeled wire, was inadvertently electrocuted, and died (Smith, 2012).  The electrical system 
in this part of the facility had recently been upgraded, and the worker doing the labeling had not 
been properly advised of the new wiring system (Marques, 2011).  Therefore, this incident is 
judged as due to human error when working with new technology. 
  
December 19, 1987: Scriba, New York 
In 1987, Nine Mile Point’s unit one was shut down due to system malfunctions (Marques, 
2011; Salvendy, 2012).  An investigation revealed no human error related to new technologies.  
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The system malfunctions were due to design errors and lack of appropriate maintenance (Smith, 
2012). 
  
March 29, 1988: Burlington, Kansas 
In 1988, the Wolf Creek Generating Station experienced its second fatality in less than a 
year (Sehgal, 2012).  A worker fell into an unmarked manhole and was electrocuted while trying 
to escape.  An investigation revealed that the manhole had recently been added as part of a 
facility update and renovations that were necessary due to new technologies associated with the 
power plant.  During the renovations, the workers failed to label the manhole properly.  
Additionally, they were not familiar enough with the new system to understand the necessary 
safety measures to ensure that someone entering the manhole would not be electrocuted 
(Salvendy, 2012).  Therefore, this incident is judged as due to human error when working with 
new technologies. 
  
September 10, 1988: Surry, Virginia  
Surry’s unit two was shut down for 12 months (Krivit, 2011) because of the failure of a 
seal on a refueling cavity, which resulted in the destruction of an internal pipe system.  An 
investigation revealed that both the internal pipe system and the cavity seal had been recently 
upgraded, but that the maintenance and inspection personnel at the facility were not familiar with 
the new systems (Salvendy, 2012).  Therefore, this incident is judged to have been due to human 






March 5, 1989: Tonopah, Arizona 
The Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station is located near Tonopah, Arizona, about 50 
miles west of Phoenix (Sehgal, 2012).  This facility, commissioned in 1988, has three 
pressurized water reactors that c n generate a total of 3,875 MW, making it the largest power 
generation source in the United States.  This nuclear facility is the only one in the world not 
located near a significant body of water.  The plant uses a unique system for evaporating the 
water associated with treated sewage from towns and cities nearby (Harrison and Hester, 2011). 
A 1989 incident at Palo Verde resulted from a failure of the atmospheric dump valves 
(Sehgal, 2012).  Many of the maintenance and inspection personnel were not yet familiar with 
the unique cooling system associated with this facility.  This unfamiliarity appears to have 
contributed to the valves’ failure, an associated transformer fire, and an emergency shutdown of 
the facility (Krivit, 2011).  Therefore, this incident is judged as having been due to human error 
associated with new technology. 
  
March 17, 1989: Lusby, Maryland 
The Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant ear Lusby, Maryland was commissioned in 
1975 and remains operational.  In 1989, the facility was shut down after inspectors found cracks 
in the pressurized heat sleeves for units one and two (Sehgal, 2012).  The cracks were attributed 
to design flaws and were not associated with the introduction of new technologies (Sehgal, 
2012). 
 
November 17, 1991: Scriba, New York 
The FitzPatrick Nuclear Reactor was shut down for more than 12 months due to fire and 
safety problems (Krivit, 2011).  This facility, commissioned in July 1975, consists of a single 
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boiling water reactor supplied by General Electric, with a power generating capacity of 838 MW.  
The shutdown occurred after a discovery that several safety and fire procedures were not being 
followed.  An investigation revealed that the fire and safety systems had recently been upgraded, 
but that the associated staff at the facility had not been properly trained on the new equipment 
(Harrison and Hester, 2011).  Therefore, this incident is judged as having been due to human 
error when working with new technology. 
  
April 21, 1992: Southport, North Carolina  
Both units one and two of the Brunswick reactor in Southport, North Carolina were shut 
down in 1992 after a failure in the emergency diesel generators (Sehgal, 2012).  The monitoring 
equipment used to ensure that the diesel generators were operating properly had recently been 
upgrade.  The facility personnel working with this new equipment stated that they did not
understand how to properly interpret some of the readings (Sehgal, 2012).  Therefore, this 
incident can be attributed to human error when working with new technology. 
 
February 3, 1993: Bay City, Texas 
The auxiliary feedwater pumps at the South Texas Project’s units one and two in Bay 
City failed, causing both reactors to be shut down (Sehgal, 2012).  The problem was associated 
with maintenance personnel not having proper training related to the newly upgraded reactor 







February 27, 1993: Buchanan, New York 
The New York Power Authority (NYPA) voluntarily shut down Indian Point ui three to 
address problems with its AMSAC, or anticipated transient without scram mitigation system 
actuation circuitry.  On March 26, the NYPA submitted its action plan for correcting conditions 
at unit three to the NRC.  Plant workers and NRC inspectors identified numerous surveillance 
testing deficiencies, fire protection progam deficiencies, and design errors.  On June 17, 1993, 
the NRC issued a Confirmatory Action Letter, documenting the agreed-upon tasks for restart.  It 
took the NYPA nearly two years to complete those items and restart unit hree on July 2, 1995.  
Because the shutdown was controlled and voluntary, this incident is determined not to be due to 
human error when interacting with new technology (Cahill, 1995). 
 
March 2, 1993: Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee 
The Sequoyah Nuclear Plant, located near Soddy-Daisy, Tennessee (Harrison and Hester, 
2011), is owned and operated by the Tennessee Valley Authority.  The plant consists of two 
Westinghouse pressurized water reactors.  In 1993, multiple equipment failures and broken pipes 
led to the shutdown of unit one.  The problem was found to be caused by equipment failures 
resulting from improper maintenance as well as operator error when readig the instruments.  
Both the equipment and the instrument had recently been installed (Krivit, 2011).  Therefore, this 
incident can be classified as due to human error associated with new technology. 
  
December 25, 1993: Newport, Michigan 
On Christmas day of 1993, Fermi unit two at the nuclear facility in Newport, Michigan 
was shut down due to a major failure in the main turbine (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  It was 
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later discovered that the turbine failure was caused by improperly p rformed maintenance.  This 
was a case of human error, but no new technology was involved (Sehgal, 2012). 
 
January 14, 1995: Wiscasset, Maine  
The Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant in Wiscasset, Maine (Sehgal, 2012) was in 
operation from 1972 until 1996, when it was closed due to costly repairs.  The plant was 
decommissioned and then dismantled from 1997 to 2005.  Only stored nuclear waste now 
remains at the site (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). 
The plant was shut down for 12 months in 1995 due to a crack in the steam generator 
tubes (Smith, 2012).  This shutdown was followed by an NRC investigation, which identified 
multiple problems too costly to repair.  The problems at this plant were not due to technological 
advances; in fact, failure to update the facility led to its decommissioning (Krivit, 2011). 
 
May 16, 1995: Lower Alloways Creek, New Jersey  
The Salem Nuclear Power Plant is located in the Lower Alloways Creek area of Nw 
Jersey (Smith, 2012).  The plant consists of two pressurized water reactors (Harrison and Hester,
2011), licensed until 2036 and 2040, respectively.  It is owned by Exelon Generation, LLC and 
PSEG Nuclear, LLC.   
In 1995, both reactors were shut down for 24 months due to unreliable controls and a 
leaky generator (Krivit, 2011).  Neither of these problems was due to problems with an operator 





February 20, 1996: Waterford, Connecticut 
In 1996, a leaking valve was found in Waterford’s units one and two (Krivit, 2011), along 
with other equipment failures as well.  As a result, both units were temporarily shut down.  No 
human error or technology enhancements were involved. 
 
May 15, 1996: Morris, Illinois  
The Dresden Generating Station, located near Morris, Illinois (Sovacool and Valentine, 
2012), is the first privately financed nuclear power plant in the United States. It is owned and 
operated by Exelon Generation, LLC.  There have been three boiling water reac o units within 
the facility.  Unit one became operational in 1960 and was decommissioned in 1978.  Unit two 
was made operational in 1970 and is licensed to operate until 2029.  Unit three was 
commissioned in 1971 and has a license to operate until 2031.  Both operating re ctors have a 
maximum capacity of 867 MW.  The facility provides power for Chicago and roughly one-
quarter of the state of Illinois.  It generates enough electricity for approximately one million 
homes (Sovacool, 2011). 
This facility has had a problematic operating history (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  From 
1970 to 1996, it accumulated fines of more than $1.5 million.  In May 1996, the wat r levels 
surrounding the reactor core dropped to an unacceptably low level, forcing a temporary 
shutdown of the facility.  Frequent changes were made at the facility prior to 1996 in response to 
the numerous NRC sanctions.  It is likely that multiple changes in the technology prior to the 
1996 incident contributed to the operators’ inability to determine that the water levels were too 
low, but due to the lack of information about the specific event, this event was not included in 
the statistical categorization (Krivit, 2011). 
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September 2, 1996: Crystal River, Florida  
The Crystal River Three Nuclear Power Plant in Crystal River, Florida was closed in 
2009 (Sehgal, 2012).  The plant was a pressurized water reactor owned and operated by Duke 
Energy.  It was the third nuclear power plant located in the Crystal River Energy Complex, 
which also has four fossil-fuel plants in this complex.  The plant was commissioned in 1977 and 
cost $400 million.  It was capable of producing 860 MW (Perrow, 1999). 
In 1996, equipment malfunctions at unit three led to the temporary shutdown of the 
facility for repairs (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  There is no indication that this incident was the 
result of operators working on new technologies thatadversely affected their interaction with the 
system. 
 
September 5, 1996: Clinton, Illinois  
The Clinton Nuclear Generating Station located near Clinton, Illinois (Smith, 2012), was 
commissioned in 1987 and has a license to operate until 2026.  The cost of the facility was over 
$2.6 billion.  It is operated by the Exelon Corporation and has a second-generation boiling water 
reactor produced by General Electric.  The operational reactor has a capacity of 1,043 MW.  The 
original owner of the plant was Illinois Power (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012). 
In 1996, Illinois Power shut down the facility because a reactor recirculation pump failed 
(Sovacool, 2011).  Although it was not generally made public at the time, Illinois Power 
suspected that many of the problems were due to operators’ unfamiliarity with how to run the 
facility and their general inability to use and understand the readings provided by the recently 
updated user interface.  In fact, following the incident in 1996, Illinois Power sold the facility to 
Exelon Corporation at a substantial loss.  The estimated loss for the temporary shutdown in 1996 
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was $36 million, the original construction cost of the facility exceeded $2.6 billion, and the 
facility was sold to Exelon for only $40 million (Perrow, 1999).  Therefore, this incident can be 
classified as due to human error associated with new technology. 
 
September 20, 1996: Seneca, Illinois 
The LaSalle County Nuclear Generating Station near Ottawa, Illinois (Sovacool, 2011)  
provides power for Chicago and much of northern Illinois.  The facility consists of two General 
Electric boiling water reactors. The first unit has an operational capacity of 1,138 MW; the 
second unit can produce up to 1,150 MW.  Both units were commissioned in 1984, and they are 
licensed until 2022 and 2023, respectively.  Exelon Corporation handles the operations at this 
plant.  Overall, the facility has operated well.  In fact, the two units set a world record for 
continuous boiling water reactors when they both operated for more than 700 successive days 
(Sehgal, 2012).  In 1996, however, a failure of the surface water systems forced both units to be 
shut down for more than two years (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  There is no indication that 
operator error related to technological changes was involved in the problem. 
 
September 9, 1997: Bridgman, Michigan 
The Donald C. Cook Nuclear Generating Station near Bridgman, Michigan (Krivit, 2011) 
is operated by Indiana Michigan Power, a subsidiary of American Electric Power (AEP), which 
owns the plant.  The site sits on 650 acres and has two nuclear reactors.  The plant was 
constructed for $3.3 billion and is licensed to continue operating unit one until 2034 and unit two 
until 2037 (Perrow, 1999).  
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On September 9, 1997, as a result of a NRC inspection in the engineering area, both units 
were shut down for approximately 3 years due to legal problems with licensing and design.  
Specifically, the NRC determined that it was unclear whether emergency core cooling systems 
could perform their intended functions in the event of a design basis accident (Harrison nd 
Hester, 2011).  No operator error was involved in this difficulty. 
 
May 25, 1999: Waterford, Connecticut 
In May 1999, a steam leak was detected in the feed water heater, resulting in a manual 
shutdown of the power plant (Sovacool & Valentine, 2012).  The problem did not involve 
operators working with an updated interface. 
 
September 29, 1999: Lower Alloways Creek Township, New Jersey  
The Hope Creek Nuclear Generating Station is located on the same site as the Salem 
Nuclear Power Plant, in Lower Alloways Creek Township of New Jersey (Perrow, 1999).  The 
Hope Creek facility has a single boiling water reactor, manufactured by General Electric and 
operated by PSEG Nuclear, LLC.  It has a capacity of 1268 MW and took 12 years to construct.  
The plant was finished and commissioned in 1986 and is licensed to operate until 2046 (Sehgal, 
2012). 
In 1999, a major Freon leak led to the tripping of the ventilation train chiller (Smith, 
2012), which caused toxic gas to be released into the cooling system and inflicted substantial 





February 15, 2000: Buchanan, New York 
The Buchanan plant experienced a shutdown in 2000.  It appears that the operators at the 
Indian Point Energy Center failed to read the system feedback properly and that a Freon leak was 
allowed to continue for a significant amount of time before it caused the ventilation train chiller 
to trip (Perrow, 1999).  Furthermore, the plant had recently undergone changes to its computer 
system in anticipation of the new millennium, probably contributing to the operators’ failure to 
fully understand the readings (Sovaco l, 2011).  This can be considered an example of 
technological advances negatively affecting operators’ interaction with the system. 
 
February 16, 2002: Oak Harbor, Ohio 
In March 2002, the facility maintenance workers at the Davis-Be se nuclear plant 
discovered a football-sized hole located near the reactor vessel head (Sovacool and Valentine, 
2012).  No adverse incident resulted from this hole, but the NRC required the plant to close for 
two years while FirstEnergy completed necessary maintenance.  The corrosion of the reactor 
head was attributable to boric acid.  Abundant readings should have caused the operators to 
suspect hat something was wrong.  However, the facility had recently undergone numerous 
technological enhancements of the user interface in its main control center.  When questioned, 
the operators admitted that they did not feel fully confident with the new equipment (Krivit, 







January 15, 2003: Bridgman, Michigan 
Unit two of the Donald C. Cook Nuclear Generating Station shut down automatically in 
January 2003 due to a failure of the DC power supplies for the reactor control and 
instrumentation system.  This failure resulted in an automatic trip of the main transformer which 
resulted in the rupture of the transformer oil tank and resulting fire.  The loss of the main 
transformer precipitated an automatic trip of the main generator and an immediate turbine and 
reactor trip.  The main transformer fire was extinguished within 35 minutes with one minor 
reflash (Krivit, 2011).  Accordingly, human error related to technological changes was 
determined not to be a factor in this incident. 
 
June 16, 2005: Braidwood, Illinois 
The Braidwood Generating Station near Braidwood, Illinois (Sovacool and Valentine, 
2012) was constructed by Commonwealth Edison and later transferred to its parent company, the 
Exelon Corporation.  This facility was under construction from 1976 until 1988 and cost over $5 
billion.  The plant uses two pressurized water reactors, both commissioned in 1988 and licensed 
until 2026 and 2027, respectively.  The facility has an operational capacity of 2,330 MW 
(Sovacool, 2011). 
During January 2003, a fault in the primary transformer at the station resulted in a fire 
that damaged the main generator and backup turbines (Smith, 2012).  There is no indication that 
human error when dealing with new technologies was responsible for the problem.  As a result of 





August 4, 2005: Buchanan, New York  
In 2005, at the Indian Point Energy Center, workers digging at the facility discovered a 
leak in one of the spent fuel pools.  Water containing strontium 90 and tritium had been leaking 
through a crack inside the pool building.  There was also a report of strontium and radioactive 
nickel-63 in groundwater samples from the site.  The operators at the plant were accused of 
allowing this leakage to occur from 1974 to 2005 (Sovacool, 2011). 
The pool buildings used for storage are not directly connected to the everyday operational 
systems for the nuclear site (Harrison and Hester, 2011).  Although staff can be blamed for not 
reporting the incident or checking the pools more frequently, there were no significant changes 
to the technology prior to this incident. 
 
March 6, 2006: Erwin, Tennessee 
Nuclear Fuel Services has been responsible for supplying fuel for the U.S. Navy’s 
nuclear-powered vessels for roughly 50 years (Smith, 2012).  The company, a subsidiary of the 
Babcock and Wilcox Corporation (Perrow, 1999), is also involved in the reprocessing of 
weapons-grade uranium into a form that can be used as fuel for nuclear reactors.  This process is 
often referred to as down blending (Sovacool and Valentine, 2012).  The company’s gated 
complex of 65 acres i  located in Erwin, Tennessee.   
In March 2006, Nuclear Fuel Services was responsible for aspill of approximately 35 
liters of highly enriched uranium (Krivit, 2011), which required a seven-month shutdown of the 
facility.  The cost of this incident was reported at $95 million, but due to the sensitive nature of 
the company’s business relationship with the U.S. government, little information can be obtained 
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on the specifics of this problem (Perrow, 1999).  Therefore, due to the lack of information about 
the specific event, this event was not included in the statistical categorization. 
 
September 10, 2009: Crystal River, Florida 
The Crystal River Nuclear Power Plant’s unit three has been closed since September 
2009 (Sovacool, 2011).  The facility was initially brought offline so that its outdated steam 
generators could be replaced.  Progress Energy determined that it could save $15 million if it 
managed the project on its own rather than having outside experts manage the replacement.  This 
approach had previously never been attempted by any utility company.  A subsequent 
investigation revealed that the company found that it did not have the proper expertise or 
experience to undertake the task.  As of this time, the reactor remains shut down due to cost 
overruns in the renovation.  Although this shutdown has exhibited seriously deficient program 
planning and management, the problems were not due to any technological changes or 
interactions by operators within the system (Sehgal, 2012). 
 
February 1, 2010: Vernon, Vermont 
The Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Plant was a boiling water reactor manufactured by 
General Electric is located in Vernon, Vermont (Sovacool, 2011).  The facility was 
commissioned in 1972 and ceased operations in 2014.  It had a capacity of 620 MW and was 
operated by Entergy (Sehgal, 2012).  In 2008, the facility generated more than one-third of all 
electricity used by the state.   
In February 2010, it was discovered that groundwater samples taken from the site of a 
newly dug well contained an amount of tritium 37 times higher than the permitted federal limit 
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(Sovacool and Valentine, 2012).  The source of this tritium was traced to a leak in the steam 
pipes within the Advanced Off -Gas pipe tunnel.  The pipes were repaired and the leak was 










This listing of error precursors is extracted from DOE-HDBK-1028-2009, DOE Standard 
Human Performance Improvement Handbook, Volume 1: Concepts and Principles (U.S. 
Department of Energy, 2009), pages 2–35 to 2–37. 
 
 
Task Demands • Time pressure (in a hurry) • High workload (memory 
requirements) • Simultaneous, multiple tasks • Repetitive actions / monotony • Irreversible acts • Interpretation of requirements  • Unclear goals, roles, or 
responsibilities • Lack of or unclear standards  • Confusing procedure / vague 
guidance • Excessive communication 




Individual Capabilities • Unfamiliarity with task / First time • Lack of knowledge (faulty mental 
model) • New technique not used before • Imprecise communication habits • Lack of proficiency / inexperience • Indistinct problem-solving skills • “Unsafe” attitudes for critical task • Illness / fatigue / injury (general 
health) • Unawareness of critical parameters • Inappropriate values • Major life event: medical, financial, 
and emotional • Poor manual dexterity • Low self-esteem; moody • Questionable ethics (bends the rules) • Sense of control / learned 
































Work Environment  • Distractions / interruptions • Changes / departure from routine • Confusing displays / controls • Work-arounds / out of specification 
instrumentation • Hidden system response  • Unexpected equipment conditions  • Lack of alternative indication  • Personality conflicts  • Back shift or recent shift change  • Excessive group cohesiveness / peer 
pressure • Production overemphasis  • Adverse physical climate 
(habitability) • No accounting of performance.  • Conflicting conventions; stereotypes  • Poor equipment layout; poor access  • Fear of consequences of error  • Mistrust among work groups  • Meaningless rules  • Nuisance alarms  • Unavailable parts or tools  • Acceptability of “cookbooking” 
practices • “Rulebook” culture • Equipment sensitivity (inadvertent 
actions) • Lack of clear strategic vision or 
goals • Identical and adjacent displays or 




Human Nature • Stress (limits attention) • Habit patterns • Assumptions (inaccurate mental 
picture) • Complacency / overconfidence • Mind-set • Inaccurate risk perception  • Mental shortcuts (biases) • Limited short-term memory • Pollyanna effect • Limited perspective (bounded 
rationality) • Avoidance of mental strain • First day back from vacation / days 
off • Sugar cycle (after a meal) • Fatigue (sleep deprivation and 
biorhythms) • Tunnel vision (lack of big picture) • “Something is not right” (gut 
feeling) • Pattern-matching bias • Social deference (excessive 
professional courtesy) • Easily bored • Close-in-time cause-effect 












Survey Delivery Method 
Interviews and questionnaires were used in combination as the survey delivery method.  
This approach not only obtains quantitative data, but also gives respondents the opportunity to 
express their qualitative thoughts, reactions, and feedback on the subject matter, which will help 
in assessing the confidence that experts in the engineering field have regarding the proposals in 
chapter 7. 
 
Question Type Employed 
To develop the question set for the survey, chapter 7 was parceled into subsets by discrete 
subject matter, and questions were written in such a manner as to determine a level of confidence 
that the concepts would be successful and that implementation would be feasible.  Once the 
questions had been generated, they were revised based on several relevant concepts fundamental 
to survey design methodology.  Both closed- and open-ended questions were used to ensure that 
the entire breadth of responses could be collected and to provide evidence of expert confiden e 
regarding the concepts proposed in chapter 7.  For the closed-ended questions, a Likert-type scale 
from 1 to 5 was employed to quantify results on a portion of the survey.  Open-ended questions 
(including the opportunity to comment on answers to closed-ended questions) gave respondents 
the ability to elaborate on their numerical responses, with the purpose of obtaining evidenc  that 






Design Biases Considered 
As indicated above, the initial set of survey questions and iterations thereafter were 
reviewed relative to several common design biases: leading or loaded questions, overlapping 
response options, unbalanced response options (including floor and ceiling effects), and framing 
effects.  The survey contained no emotionally charged questions, and the use of Likert-type 
questions with a neutral response option, along with permitting respondents to elaborate on their 
answers, made it easier to avoid most of these biases.  To avoid framing effects, benchmarking 
was utilized to compare the present questions to those from a similar survey.  
The respondents were advised that anonymity of all information provided on the survey 
would be maintained. 
A pilot study was conducted with three individuals to gauge whether the questions were 
understandable, consistent, and reliable and that the concepts made sense, as well as to obtain 
opinions on specific wording and phrasing used. 
 
Additional Considerations 
Additional factors taken into consideration in question development were the avoidance 
of jargon, slang, and abbreviations in question content; ensuring that questions were written in 
such a way as to test hypotheses (not questions written about hypotheses); maintenance of 
realistic expectations as torespondent capabilities; and avoidance of negatively phrased 
questions. 
Lastly, question ordering was accomplished by taking into consideration organizational 
concerns (e.g., choice of opening and closing questions, and smooth survey flow) and order 
effects (content relationships, contextual effects, and rating dependencies).  Parceling the chapter 
content into manageable sections enabled the respondent to read the information on each specific 
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topic and then answer a series of survey questions on that topic.  This ensured that the respondent 
would not have to presume what the question was referring to and prevented frustration by not 
compelling the respondent to reread sections. 
 
Survey Population and Personnel Selection 
The survey sample consisted of 40 system design engineers (age 25 to 65) of various 
backgrounds and disciplines (nuclear engineers, electrical engineers, mechanical engineers, etc.) 
who were knowledgeable regarding the systems engineering and design process.   
To select the personnel for the study, the engineering staff roster of my place of 
employment was first filtered to exclude staff who did not hold an engineering degree and those 
who had not been involved in systems engineering or design for at least five years.  From this 
reduced listing, random selection occurred using a random number generator on Microsoft Excel. 
Thirty individuals were selected using this method, and then additional individuals who had 
expressed interest were added to the final sample.  The solicitation letter, disseminated by email, 
included a brief explanation of the study, the estimated time required to complete the survey 
interview, and how the information would be handled and addressed within the dissertation.  
 
Survey Administration 
The statements contained in the survey were extracted directly from sections f chapter 7.  
The respondents were provided with the chapter content and the questions and statements alo g 
with the five-point Likert scale.  Depending on the question, the potential responses were label d 
in one of two ways: (1) “never,” “occasionally,” “regularly,” “frequently,” and “always,” or (2) 
“strongly disagree,” “disagree,” “neither agree or disagree,” “agree,” and “strongly agree.”  Using 
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two different scales not only allows for flexibility in questioning but also offers survey range and 
depth instead of repetition.   
Additionally, as discussed above, the respondents could make open-ended comments on 
any of the closed-ended questions, and those comments were recorded in the appropriate box on 
the survey. 
 
Human Subject Protections 
 The Colorado State University Institutional Review Board (IRB) coordinator declared the 
study exempt from the requirements of the human subject protections regulations wih conditions 
as described in 45 CFR 46.101(b): 
Category 2 - Research involving the use of educational tests (cognitive, diagnostic, 
aptitude, achievement), survey procedures, interview procedures or observation of public 
behavior, unless: (i) information obtained is recorded in such manner that human subjects 
can be identified, directly or through identifiers linked to the subjects; and (ii) any 
disclosure of the human subjects’ responses outside the research could reasonably place 
the subjects at risk of criminal or civil liability or be damaging to the subjects’ financial 
standing, employability, or reputation. 
 
This determination is documented via IRB ID: 205-17H with a review date of September 
26, 2016.  The study authorization was valid from three years from the review date, nd the study 
was completed within that time period. 
All research participants signed a written consent form explaining their rights as a 
volunteer, the ability to withdraw their consent at any time during the study, the fact that no 
identifying information was collected or used in the analysis of the results, and re sonable 
assurance that the researchers had taken reasonable safeguards to minimize any known or 






Table 12. Operator Involvement in the Systems Engineering Process 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree or Disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree), please 
indicate your agreement with the following concepts: 








Operations personnel should be involved in the 
systems engineering process from the onset. 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 
Because system utilization encompasses a large 
portion of the systems life, operations personnel 
participation in system design is necessary not only 
for system operational success and support, but also 
for human error reduction in the operation of new 
technologies. 
1 2 3 4 5 
3 
FMEA can and should be used during all stages of the 
systems engineering process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
4 
Operations personnel should play a role in FMEA 
during the design stages. 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 
Design criteria can come and should come from a 
number of diverse sources, but those that originate 
from the plant operations staff should be given 
elevated deliberation because they will become the 
system owner through the utilization phase of the 
systems life. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Regularly, 4=Frequently, 5=Always), please indicate your likelihood to 
implement or support the following concepts: 
# Statement Never Occasionally Regularly Frequently Always 
6 
Involve operations personnel in the systems 
engineering process from the onset. 
1 2 3 4 5 
7 
Utilize FMEA techniques during all stages of the 
systems engineering process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
8 
Involve operations personnel in FMEA during the 
design stages of the systems engineering process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
9 
Give design criteria that originate from operations 
personnel elevated deliberation in system design. 





Table 13. Human Performance Association with System Operational Requirements and 
System Test, Evaluation, and Validation 
 








Embedded within the elements of system 
operational requirements should be specific, 
exclusive human performance system requirements 
that can be easily assessed and discernable in 
system design.   
1 2 3 4 5 
11 
The creation of human performance TPMs that 
evaluate the integration of the human error 
reduction tools with the technology necessary to 
achieve functionality required for system purpose 
should be given sufficient attention.   
1 2 3 4 5 
12 
Error precursors require systematic evaluation, 
logical selection or generation, and potential 
modification before adaptation into human 
performance TPMs.   
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Regularly, 4=Frequently, 5=Always), please indicate your likelihood to 
implement or support the following concepts: 
# Statement Never Occasionally Regularly Frequently Always 
13 
Establish and incorporate human performance 
system operational requirements into system design. 
1 2 3 4 5 
14 
Establish and incorporate human performance TPMs 
that evaluate the integration of the human error 
reduction tools with the technology necessary to 
achieve functionality required for system purpose. 





Table 14. Procedure and Training Development in the Systems Engineering Process 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree or Disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree), please 
indicate your agreement with the following concepts: 







The generation of operations procedures should begin 
at the conceptual design stage in the systems 
engineering process and then further developed and 
refined as the systems engineering process advances. 
1 2 3 4 5 
16 
Proper application of human error prevention tools and 
techniques should be soundly intertwined into the 
framework of the operations procedures.   
1 2 3 4 5 
17 
In the generation of operations procedures, every 
effort should be made to drive human performance 
into the skill-based mode.   
1 2 3 4 5 
18 
When manipulating technologically advanced, 
complex systems, operators should be trained utilizing 
the knowledge-based training approach to ensure 
adherence to design boundaries, efficiency in 
operation, and an adequate margin to safety.  
1 2 3 4 5 
19 
Operator training generation should begin at 
conceptual design and be further developed as the 
systems engineering process advances. 
1 2 3 4 5 
20 
Included in a robust knowledge-based training 
program should be a vigorous plant casualty control 
drill program.   
1 2 3 4 5 
21 
The drill program involving the system in design 
should be developed during the conceptual design 
stage and iterated as the systems engineering process 
progresses.   
1 2 3 4 5 
22 
Drill scenario development can provide another 
avenue for system design review and evaluation by, 
potentially, an additional set of eyes viewing it from 
an alternant perspective.   
1 2 3 4 5 
23 
The development of the drill program during the 
conceptual design stage and iteration through the 
remainder of the systems engineering process could 
provide feedback to system designers for desirable 
improvements and cultivates the continued 
development of operator training and procedures.   
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Regularly, 4=Frequently, 5=Always), please indicate your likelihood to 
implement or support the following concepts: 
# Statement Never Occasionally Regularly Frequently Always 
24 
Generate operations procedures during the conceptual 
design stage in the systems engineering process further 
develop and refine the procedures as the systems 
engineering process advances. 
1 2 3 4 5 
25 
Intertwine human error prevention tools and techniques 
into the framework of operations procedures.   
1 2 3 4 5 
26 
Train operators utilizing the knowledge-based training 
approach to ensure adherence to design boundaries, 
efficiency in operation, and an adequate margin to 
safety. 
1 2 3 4 5 
27 
Generate operator training during the conceptual 
design stage and further develop the training as the 
systems engineering process advances. 





Table 14. Continued 
 
28 
Include a vigorous plant casualty control drill program 
within a robust knowledge-based training program. 
1 2 3 4 5 
29 
Generate a drill program during the conceptual design 
stage and further develop the training as the systems 
engineering process advances. 





Table 15. Operator Attribute Determination  
 








The determination and development of necessary 
operator skills and training requirements should 
begin at the conceptual design stage in the systems 
engineering process and be refined as the systems 
engineering process advances. 
1 2 3 4 5 
31 
Determined operator attributes can manifest as 
system requirements determined during 
requirements analysis.   
1 2 3 4 5 
32 
Workforce planning should be built in all stages of 
the systems engineering process to ensure 
personnel with the necessary attributes are 
available when the system is deployed.   
1 2 3 4 5 
33 
The development of the human should be as 
important as the design of the system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
34 
As the systems engineering process progresses, 
management needs to be constantly assessing the 
connection between leadership practices, employee 
work passion, customer devotion, and the bottom 
line. 
1 2 3 4 5 
35 
There is a clear connection between the quality of 
an organization’s leadership practices, as perceived 
by employees, and subsequent intentions by 
personnel to stay with an organization, perform at a 
high level, and apply discretionary effort. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Regularly, 4=Frequently, 5=Always), please indicate your likelihood to 
implement or support the following concepts: 
# Statement Never Occasionally Regularly Frequently Always 
36 
Determine and develop necessary operator skills 
and training requirements at the conceptual design 
stage in the systems engineering process and refine 
them as the systems engineering process advances. 
1 2 3 4 5 
37 
Build workforce planning into all stages of the 
systems engineering process to ensure personnel 
with the necessary attributes are available when the 
system is deployed.   
1 2 3 4 5 
38 
Develop the human operator with the same rigor 
and attention as the design of the system. 
1 2 3 4 5 
39 
Constantly assessing the connection between 
leadership practices, employee work passion, 
customer devotion, and the bottom line as the 
systems engineering process progresses. 





Table 16. Systems Engineering Infrastructure 
 








The design and development of a system necessitates 
an adaptive and unique systems engineering 
infrastructure. 
1 2 3 4 5 
41 
With respect to systems engineering infrastructure, it 
is important to remain apprised and parallel to the 
industry standard and best practices regarding 
utilization of organizational design, management 
processes, software development and functionality, 
and administrative methods. 
1 2 3 4 5 
42 
As the systems engineering process for product or 
system development is launched, the proper 
infrastructure should be established to efficiently 
support the system development. 
1 2 3 4 5 
43 
The infrastructure design should be a formal, guided 
process for integrating the people, information, and 
technology of an organization. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Regularly, 4=Frequently, 5=Always), please indicate your likelihood to 
implement or support the following concepts: 
# Statement Never Occasional
ly 
Regularly Frequently Always 
44 
Establish the proper infrastructure to efficiently 
support the system development as the systems 
engineering process for product or system 
development is launched. 





Table 17. Means to Minimize Human Error Impact throughout the Systems Engineering 
Process 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Strongly Disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither Agree or Disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree), please 
indicate your agreement with the following concepts: 







A human performance improvement (HPI) process 
should be established not only to remain cognizant 
of human performance during system design, but to 
provide a means to evaluate human performance of 
the system at the various stages. 
1 2 3 4 5 
46 
The HPI process can and should be established 
early in the systems engineering process to identify 
the impact and extent to which human error affects 
plant systems and equipment, which will provide 
necessary feedback into system design process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
47 
To institute the HPI process in a manageable 
fashion, organizations should determine human 
error severity criteria and establish a tracking 
system to capture these human error induced 
potential issues for engineered and administrative 
component features, human error prevention 
training and reinforcement, and lessons learned.   
1 2 3 4 5 
48 
These potential issues and incidents can be 
discovered during the many steps of each stage of 
the systems engineering process, during the 
development of procedures for system operation, 
during training development, during FMEA, and 
during the design reviews conducted at the 
conclusion of the conceptual, preliminary, and 
detail design and development stages of the systems 
engineering process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
49 
As a part of the HPI process, organizations should 
create a formal process to examine incidents and 
perceived vulnerabilities that occur throughout the 
development of the system during the systems 
engineering process and, later, during plant 
operation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
50 
As a part of the HPI process, a methodical approach 
should be established to systematically direct the 
potential incident or vulnerability through a series 
of questions and facilitators to determine regulatory 
impact, safety significance, determine which 
organization will perform the corrective action or 
causal analysis, and ultimately correct the 
deficiency. 
1 2 3 4 5 
51 
Due diligence, attention, constant emphasis, and 
management support needs to be given to the 
identification and reporting of the potential human 
errors and the corrective action processing of the 
problems as they are reported 
1 2 3 4 5 
52 
This process, if effectively performed, will 
constantly reinforce good human performance 
practice, the reduction of human error in system 
design and potential human errors during operation, 
proportionally decrease the volume of potential 
problems at all levels, and continually drive errors 
to the least significant level. 




Table 17. Continued 
 
53 
A management team should be established to help 
ensure that the HPI program is effectively and 
consistently implemented with particular emphasis 
on evaluating significant issues, adverse trends 
identified, and ineffective corrective actions that 
were applied to conditions adverse to safety and 
security.  
1 2 3 4 5 
54 
Management should promote a culture focused on 
safety and operational excellence where employees 
should be not only encouraged to make error 
incident reports, but expected to make these r ports 
in a retaliation free atmosphere. 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Using a scale of 1-5 (1=Never, 2=Occasionally, 3=Regularly, 4=Frequently, 5=Always), please indicate your likelihood to 
implement or support the following concepts: 
# Statement Never Occasionally Regularly Frequently Always 
55 
Establish a human performance improvement (HPI) 
process to not only to remain cognizant of human 
performance during system design, but to provide a 
means to evaluate human performance of the 
system at the various stages. 
1 2 3 4 5 
56 
Establish an HPI process early in the systems 
engineering process to identify the impact and 
extent to which human error affects plant systems 
and equipment, which will provide necessary 
feedback into system design process. 
1 2 3 4 5 
57 
Determine human error severity criteria and 
establish a tracking system to capture these human 
error induced potential issues for engineered and 
administrative component features, human error 
prevention training and reinforcement, and lessons 
learned.  
1 2 3 4 5 
58 
Create a formal process to examine incidents and 
perceived vulnerabilities that occur throughout the 
development of the system during the systems 
engineering process and, later, during plant 
operation.  
1 2 3 4 5 
59 
Establish a methodical approach to systematically 
direct the potential incident or vulnerability through 
a series of questions and facilitators to determine 
regulatory impact, safety significance, determine 
which organization will perform the corrective 
action or causal analysis, and ultimately correct the 
deficiency. 
1 2 3 4 5 
60 
Establish a management team to help ensure that 
the HPI program is effectively and consistently 
implemented with particular emphasis on 
evaluating significant issues, adverse trends 
identified, and ineffective corrective actions that 
were applied to conditions adverse to safety and 
security.  
1 2 3 4 5 
61 
Promote a culture focused on safety and operational 
excellence where employees should be not only 
encouraged to make error incident reports, but 
expected to make these reports in a retaliation free 
atmosphere. 









Table 18. Survey Data 
 





Overall Analysis of Survey Results  
Quantitative Analysis 
Ideally, responses can be compared to an industry benchmark, a competitor, or even a 
similar question from a prior survey.  In most cases, however, such data do not exist because they 
Q\N 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
1 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5
2 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 5
3 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4
4 4 4 5 3 4 4 5 5 4 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4
5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 3 5 4 5
6 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4
7 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 5 5 3 5 4 5 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 4
8 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5
9 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 4
10 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 3 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5
11 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5
12 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 3 5 4 4
13 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 3 5 5 5 4 4 5 3 5 4
14 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 5
15 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4
16 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5
17 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4
18 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 5 5
19 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 3 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 3 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4
20 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5
21 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 3 5 4 4 5 4
22 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5
23 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 3 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4
24 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4
25 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 3 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 4
26 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5
27 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 3 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5
28 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 5 3 3 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5
29 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4
30 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 3 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5
31 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4
32 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 3 4 4
33 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 3 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 3 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 3 4
34 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5
35 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4
36 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4
37 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 3 5 4 4 5 3 5 5 5
38 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 3 5 4 5 5 3 4 4
39 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 3 3 5 5 4 4 5 5
40 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4
41 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 4
42 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 5 5 4 5
43 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 4 4 4 5 4
44 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 4
45 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4
46 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 5
47 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4
48 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 3 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 4 4 4
49 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 5 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5
50 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 5 5 4
51 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 5
52 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 3 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 4 3 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4
53 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4
54 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 3 4 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 3 5 5 5 5
55 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 3 4 5 4
56 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 4 3 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5
57 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 4 4 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5 4 3 4 5 5 3 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 5 3 5 4
58 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 4 5 3 4 4 5 5 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 4 5 5
59 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5
60 5 5 4 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 5 4 5 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 4 5 5 5 3 5 5 5 5 4 5 4 4
61 5 3 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 4 5 4 5 5
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are too expensive or too difficult to obtain.  Because the questions in this survey wer  original to 
this study, there are no historical or comparative data.  The following quantitative analyses were 
performed: 
1. Percentage Agreeing: The percentage of respondents who indicated “agree” or “strongly 
agree” (or “frequently” or “always”) on an item. 
a. Analysis yielded a score of 96.% for percentage agreeing 
 
2. Top box and top two box scoring:  The top box refers to responses of “strongly agree” 
or “always.”  In this case of this data set and analysis, the top two box score is the same as 
the score reported in result 1 above.  
a. Analysis yielded a score of 96.% for Top Two Box 
b. Analysis yielded a score of 63.1% for Top-Box 
 
3. Net top box:  Found by counting the number of respondents selecting the top choice and 
subtracting the number who selected the bottom choice.   
a. Analysis yielded a score of 63.1% for Net Top Box 
 
4. Z-Score to Percentile Rank:  This converts the raw score into a normal score, because 
rating scale means often follow a normal or close to normal distribution.  Eighty percent 
of the number of points in a scale is a reasonable benchmark to compare the mean to.  For 
this analysis, 4 is used (5 x .80 = 4).  First, subtract the benchmark from the mean.  Next, 
divide the difference by the standard deviation.  This is called a z-score (or normal score) 
and shows by how many standard deviations a score falls above or below the benchmark.  
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Lastly, convert the z-score to a percentile rank by using the properties of the normal 
curve. 
a. Analysis yielded a score of 86% for Z-Score to Percentile Rank 
 
5. Coefficient of Variation (CV): The standard deviation is the most universal w y to 
communicate variability, but it is hard to translate. The CV makes inferring easier by 
dividing the standard deviation by the mean.  Higher values indicate higher variability.  
The CV is a measure of vari bility, unlike the first four results which are measures of the 
central tendency, so it can be used in addition to the other approaches. 
a. Analysis yielded a score of 12% for Coefficient of Variation 
 
Based on the results of the general analysis above, it is apparent hat the respondents were 
favorable toward the concepts presented in Chapter 7, indicating a high level of confidence in 




In addition to the quantitative analysis above, the respondents were given the opportunity 
to comment on the survey questions as a means of giving additional context to the confidence 
judgments made.  As shown in the comments presented below, all remarks made during survey 
administration expressed an appreciation of the concepts, an acknowledgment of the benefits of 
implementing them, and belief in a strong likelihood of future implementation and industry 




• Most respondents indicated that, prior to this survey; they did not make a distinction 
between human performance and human factors in system or component design.  Most 
found it rather novel to separate the wo concepts and provide a design focus on each one 
separately as comprising separate elements with different emphases.  
• All respondents considered it prudent to involve operations personnel in systems design 
early in the systems engineering process to reduce errors during the operation of new 
technologies. 
• All respondents expressed a high level of interest and support for incorporating human 
performance TPMs that evaluate the integration of human error reduction tools with the 
technology necessary to achieve th intended functionality.  Most had never thought of 
incorporating human error reduction techniques into system design in such a way. 
• Most respondents commentd that it would be practical and worthwhile to begin 
procedural and training development early in the systems engineering process, but ome 
respondents expressed concern that the development of training modules may be difficult 
due to the limited amount of detailed information available early in system design.  As a 
result, I provided the clarification that training and enabling objectives could be 
determined early in design and that specifics would flow from these objectives once 
further details became available later in the design process.  All respondents seemed to be 
satisfied with this amplification. 
• Most respondents agreed that operator attribute determination should be conducted early 
in system design and that these attributes are cultivated throughout system design to 
ensure that operators are capable of safety and efficiently operating the system upon 
deployment.  Some respondents indicated that this had been a significant problem in their 
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past experience, and that needing to get operators up to speed following the system design 
completion and installation had a significant schedule and cost impact. 
• All respondents commented favorably on the idea of establishing a robust Human 
Performance Improvement process to be utilized during system design and operations.  
They supported this process not only for the system design period and for those that 
would operate the system, but also for the staff as a whole and as an improvement of the 
system design and engineering process.  Many respondents commented that assigning 
severity levels to issues is an effective way to appropriately allocate resources.  A few 
respondents remarked that within the nuclear industry, where raising issues is part of the 
culture, this process would fit well, but that it may be less effective in other industries 








This appendix is a follow-up to the recommendation made in chapter 8 that the rate of 
small incidents at nuclear power plants should be investigated.  These are incidents that would be 
rated as level 1 or 2 on the INES.  November 2013 was chosen as the reporting date, since this 
was the most recent month with complete information at the time of this tudy.  The table below 
illustrates the number of events that occurred on each day.  They are divided into those associated 
with technological advances (TA) and those not associated with TA. 
Table 19. Minor Events on Each Day during November 2013 
 
Day of Month (November 2013) TA no TA Total # of 
Events 
1 2 1 3 
4 4 1 5 
5 1 2 3 
6 3 3 6 
7 1 3 4 
8 4 1 5 
12 3 2 5 
13 1 0 1 
14 1 1 2 
15 3 1 4 
18 3 2 5 
19 4 2 6 
20 3 0 3 
21 2 1 3 
22 1 2 3 
25 2 1 3 
26 0 0 0 
27 2 1 3 
29 1 3 4 




The data were subjected to a one-tailed t-test (Steinberg, 2011) with the assumption that 
the number of minor events associated with TA would be higher than that not associated with 
TA.  The test was run with both assumptions of equal variance and of unequal variance.  The 
results were as follows: 
 
T-test, equal variance 0.022634 
T-test, unequal variance 0.019539 
 
The hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Technological advances at a nuclear facility that affect how operators interact within 
the system do increase the number of incidents caused by human error. 
The null hypothesis is as follows: 
H0: Technological advances at a nuclear facility that affect how operators interact within 
the system do not increase the number of incidents caused by human error. 
 
Conclusions of the Follow-Up Study 
The results of the t-test mean that the null hypothesis can be rejected at the p < 0.05 level 
(Steinberg, 2011).  Ther fore, technological advances at nuclear power plants are associated with 
a higher likelihood of minor incidents at level 1 or 2 on the INES.  It should be noted that the 
results for this section were obtained simply by counting the number of incidents reported and
determining if any significant technological advances were installed at these facilities in the three 
months preceding the incident.  The incidents were not screened by type and by whether they 
would be obviously due to operator error.  For example, one of the incidents involved the 
presence of an alcoholic beverage inside the plant near the operations center.  Some would argue 
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that this could have nothing to do with technological chnges; others might assert that the 
additional anxiety created by having to deal with technological changes led to the aberrant 
behavior.  Since the hypothesis is that advances increase the likelihood of incidents occurring, 
this is probably not an important consideration. 
It appears that changes to the technology increase the number of minor incidents at level  
1 or 2 on the INES.  However, they do not significantly increase the probability of more severe 
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Today’s sensory and processing technologies are perceptive and precise. They can discern 
the environment, solve complicated problems, make assessments and learn from experience.  
Although, they don’t think the way humans do, they can replicate many human intellectual 
aptitudes.  Throughout the last several decades, companies have implemented advanced 
technology and increasingly removed the human from many aspects of nuclear operation.  There 
are many advantages to this transition, but, like any system modification, failures inevitably 
manifest.  In the instance of this article, human errors have resulted and have accounted for 
several accidents at nuclear facilities in the United States due to this transition.  The accidents at 
these facilities due to human error often result in plant shutdowns, unnecessary expenses, and 
have the capacity to be problematic for people, the facilities, and environments.  This article 
explores the context surrounding the complexity of changing technologies at the nuclear fa ilities 
and the potential exacerbation of problems caused by human error when technology 
advancements concerning operator interaction with control systems are implemented.  To 
understand the complexity surrounding the human interaction with advancing technologies, the 
concepts of human performance and human factors will be examined and then the impact of these 
concepts within the framework of advancing technology will be applied to the operatin of 
nuclear facilities.  This review will draw attention to the vulnerabilities due to human error at 
nuclear facilities within the context of continually advancing technology and shed insight on the 
role human performance and human factors has on system design and the resulting outcome.   





1.0 INTRODUCTION  
Each time there are significant technological developments promised to assist people, to 
some degree, failed systems and prototypes inevitably result [1].  When researchers examine the 
effects that the changes in technology have made, there are often effects which are subst ntially 
different from those expected.  Individuals using these technologies frequently make performance 
errors because they must adapt to increasingly complex technology.  When this occurs instead of 
assisting the user, these new technologies may add burdens, which are especially problematic 
during crucial phases of tasks [2]. 
The pattern of human performance degradation when novel technologies are introduced 
has been found to occur in a wide range of endeavors [3].  For example, when there are systms 
developed for airplane cockpit automation, there can also be an associated decline in the pilot 
performance; their reaction times and numbers of errors increase.  The same istrue for virtually 
all industries including that of nuclear operation.  When one contemplates human errors 
occurring at nuclear facilities, there are, by the nature of the power generatio means, a number 
of unacceptable outcomes [4]. 
Nuclear facilities represent some of the most complex systems which have ever be n 
designed [5].  Most of these plants also use state-of-the-art technology and continually update 
their systems.  Unfortunately, like any complex system, the systems of nuclear facilities are not 
immune to failure.  This is particularly true with regard to human error.  Since thes systems are 
astoundingly complex, any changes made in the technology has the potential to confuse human 
operators and result in a reduction in performance when they interact with machinery or software 
[6]. 
Despite significant research being done on human-chine interface, a wide range of 
problems still exist [3].  There remains a disparity between the optimism of technology 
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developers and of the realistic operational difficulties as these systems ar  being introduced.  The 
developers nearly always claim that the new technology will result in performance 
improvements.  However, due to the operational complexities introduced, the technology may 
actually decrease the performance of those interacting with the system.  Unfortunately, more 
often than not, the complexities are difficult to predict for the design teams.   
To understand the complexity surrounding the human interaction with advancing 
technologies, the concepts of human performance and human factors will be examined and then
the impact of these concepts will be applied to the operation of nuclear facilities.  This review 
will draw attention to the vulnerabilities due to human error at nuclear facilities within the 
context of continually advancing technology and shed insight on the role human performance and 
human factors has on system design and the resulting outcome.   
 
2.0  HUMAN PERFORMANCE 
Human performance is a field of study related to process improvement methodologies to 
reduce human errors.  It is focused on improving performance at the societal, organizational, 
process, and individual performer levels [7].  In other words, it is a series of behaviors executed 
to accomplish specific results [8].   
Human performance failures inevitably result in human error.  Consequently, human error 
is an unfortunate, but realistic aspect of any engineered system operated by humans.  The number 
of human errors can be minimized and affects caused by human error can be reduced, but human 
error can never be completely eliminated and must continue to be a design consideration and an 
anticipation during system operation.  Human error manifests in many forms, but the mos 
prevalent and most easily classified categories are active error and latent error.  To understand the 
impact advancing technology has on human error, a review of human behavior models and the 
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human error classifications of active and latent are necessary to frame the problem and chart a 
course to overcome these challenges. 
 
2.1 HUMAN BEHAVIOR MODELS  
In order to understand human performance, there must be a basic understanding of human 
behavior.  An organization of the different types of information processing involved in industrial 
tasks was developed by Jens Rasmussen of Denmark.  This pattern provides a useful framework 
for identifying the types of errors likely to occur in different operational situations, or within 
different aspects of the same task where different types of information processing demands on the 
individual may occur.  The classification system is known as the Skill, Rule, Knowledge based 
approach.  The terms skill, rule and knowledge based information processing refer to the degree 
of conscious control exercised by the individual over his or her activities [9].   
In the knowledge-based mode, the task is carried out by the human in an almost totally 
conscious fashion.  This would occur if a beginner (e.g., an operator in training) is performing a 
task, or if an experienced individual encounters a completely novel situation.  In either of these 
circumstances, substantial mental exertion would have to be asserted to evaluate the condition, 
and his or her responses would likely be slow.  In addition, after each action, the person would 
need to evaluate its effect prior to taking additional action, which would probably further slow his 
or her responses to the situation.  Knowledge-based performance results in a nominal error rate of 
1:2 [9]. 
In the skill-based mode, efficient performance of well-practiced, mainly physical actions 
of which practically no conscious reasoning occurs.  Skill-based actions are normally commenced 
by an explicit occurrence, such as the requirement to operate a valve, that may arise from an 
alarm, a procedure, or an indication from another individual.  The well-practiced task of opening 
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the valve will then be executed largely without conscious thought.  The skill-based performance 
mode results in a nominal error rate of 1:1,000 [9]. 
The last category involves the use of rules.  These rules may have been learned as  result 
of interacting with the plant, through formal training, or by working with experienced process 
workers.  The level of conscious control is midway between that of the knowledge and skill based 
modes.  The rule-based performance mode results in a nominal error rate of 1:100 [9]. 
Next, it is important to describe and distinguish between slips and mistakes.  Slips are 
defined as errors in which the intention is correct, but a failure occurred when carryi g out the 
activities required.  For example, a worker may know that a receptacle needs to be filled but 
instead fills a similar receptacle nearby.  This may occur if the receptacles are poorly labeled, or 
if the worker is confused with regard to the location of the correct receptacle.  Mistakes, by 
contrast, arise from an incorrect intention, which leads to an incorrect action sequence, although 
this may be quite consistent with the wrong intention.  An example here would be if a worker 
wrongly assumed that a reaction was endothermic and applied heat, thereby causing overheating.   
Incorrect intentions may arise from lack of knowledge or an inappropriate diagnosis [10]. 
Slips can be described as being due to misemployed aptitude because they are examples 
of the highly skilled, well-practiced activities that are characteristic of the skill-based mode.   
Mistakes, on the other hand, are largely confined to the rule and knowledge based performance 
modes. 
In the skill-based mode, the individual is able to function very effectively by using pre-
programmed sequences of behavior that do not require much conscious control.  It is only 
occasionally needed to check on progress at specific points when operative in this mode.  The 
consequence for this efficiency is that strong habits can take over when attention to checks is 
diverted by distractions, and when unfamiliar activities are embedded in a familiar context [9]. 
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With regard to mistakes, two separate mechanisms operate.  In the rule-based mode, an 
error of intention can occur if an improper diagnostic rule is utilized.  For example, a worker who 
has considerable experience in shutdown, stagnate power plant chemistry may have learned 
diagnostic rules which are inappropriate for operational, dynamic, and volatile power lant 
chemistry.  If he or she attempts to apply these rules to evaluate the cause of  continuous process 
disturbance, a misdiagnosis could result, which could then lead to an inappropriate action.  In 
other situations, there is a tendency to overuse diagnostic rules that have been successful in the 
past.  Such sound rules are usually applied first, even if they are not necessarily appropri te [9]. 
In the instance of knowledge-based mistakes, other factors are important.  Most of these 
factors result from the substantial demands on the information processing abilities of the 
individual that are needed when a situation has to be assessed from conditions he or she is 
unaccustomed too.  Given these demands, it is not a surprise that humans do not execute tasks 
very well in high stress, unfamiliar situations where they are required to “think on their feet” in 
the absence of rules, routines, and procedures to manage the situation.  For example, operators 
may only utilize information, which is readily available for evaluation of the situation.  Operators 
may also become over-confident in the correctness of their knowledge.  A typical behavior that 
occurs during knowledge-based problem solving is insisting that one course of action is orrect 
where the individual or the operating team become tangled in one aspect of the problem and 
exclude all other aspects that should be considered (the Three Mile Island accident is a prominent 
example).  The opposite form of behavior is also observed, where the burdened worker gives his 
attention hastily to one problem after another, without solving any of them [11]. 
In the skill-based mode, recovery is usually prompt and effective, because the individual 
will have familiarity with the expected outcome of his or her actions and will therefor  get timely 
feedback with respect to any slips that have occurred which may have prevented this outcome 
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from being reached.  This highlights the role of feedback as a significant aspect of error recovery.  
In the case of mistakes, the mistaken intention tends to be very resistant to non-endorsing 
evidence.  People tend to ignore feedback information that does not support their expectations of 
the situation [9].   
 
2.2 ACTIVE ERRORS 
Simply by the nature of this error type, active errors have effects which are noticed 
immediately and can occur across the spectrum of human behavior modes.  Active errors ar  
usually associated with individuals in frontline operations of a system.  Examples include officers 
of ships, air traffic controllers, pilots, or control room operators in a nuclear facility.  When 
examining active errors, it is important to take into account the complexity associ ted with 
human nature [12]. 
Human nature includes all the emotional, mental, social, biological and physical 
characteristics which define the limitations, abilities, and tendencies of people [13].  An 
important aspect of human nature relevant to this study is the innate tendency toward 
imprecision.  While machines tend to be precise, people are usually imprecise.  This can be 
especially true in certain situations.  For example, people tend to make more mistakes when they 
are under time pressures or in stre sful situations.  Due to the fallibility of people, they can get 
into situations which are beyond their abilities.  Logically, complex systems intens fy a person’s 
susceptibility to make mistakes [14]. 
 
2.2.1 CAUSES OF ACTIVE ERRORS 
Because active errors are all too common in the realm of human error, the most prevalent 
causes of active errors should be understood in order to reduce them.  One tendency of most 
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individuals is to overestimate their abilities to maintain control at their work station [12].  In this 
instance, the maintenance of control means that the task occurs as it is supposed to with the 
person performing in the appropriate fashion.  There are at least two reasons that thi
overestimation occurs.  Consequential error is rare and many times an error occurs with no 
adverse result.  This means that people conclude that errors will be caught unless they are 
inconsequential.  The second factor is that people don’t know or acknowledge their own 
capabilities.  For example, most people can function on insufficient sleep or work during times of 
distraction.  They can also perform work duties during poor environmental conditions such as 
extreme cold, heat, vibration, or noise.  People can become accustomed to these conditions.  
However, if the limits of the person’s capabilities are exceeded, the chance of them making errors 
increases.  There are a number of factors related to human nature, which can be especially 
problematic when work is being performed within a complex system [13]. 
One important factor for active errors is stress [15].  Stress is not always a problem.  
Sometimes it is healthy and normal.  Stress can focus attention and can aid an individual’s 
performance.  However, elevated stress can overpower an individual.  When this occurs, stres is 
detrimental to performance.  Stress can be understood as the body’s physical and mental response 
to perceived threats within the environment.  The important word in this case is “perceived.”  It is 
the perception of the individual which leads to their adaptation to cope with a threat.  Stress tends 
to increase according to a lack of familiarity with the situation.  Extreme stresscan lead to panic.  
This will inhibit the ability of the person to act, sense, recall, and perceive essential elements of a 
situation.  Fear and anxiety often follow when an individual believes he or she is unable to 
respond appropriately to a situation.  Along with this fear and anxiety, there is frequently a lapse 




Another factor which is important to consider when looking at active errors is the 
tendency for people to avoid mental strain [12].  Most people will only reluctantly engag  in long 
periods of concentrated thinking.  They also tend to avoid situations in which they must display 
heightened levels of attention for an extended period of time.  Thought can be a slow and 
laborious process that requires significant effort. Therefore, people often seek familiar patterns 
and tend to apply solutions with which they are already knowledgeable.  This is a type of mental 
bias, which can be understood as a shortcut.  The goal is to reduce the cognitive effort rquired to 
decide [16].  
One of these mental biases is assumptions [17].  People frequently accept as true certain 
conditions which are not verified.  Another bias is habit.  This is an unconscious pattern for their 
behavior which has been acquired often due to frequent repetition.  Confirmation bias can be 
problematic and is exemplified by a reluctance to abandon solutions which already exist.  
Individuals will be reluctant to change their way of thinking or behaving.  This is true even when 
there is conflicting information for better solutions [14].  This leads people to support their 
position and ignore blatant evidence to the contrary.  Frequency bias refers to an individual’s 
gamble that a familiar solution will work.  It can also lead to people viewing information s more 
important when it has occurred more frequntly.  Finally, people often suffer from availability 
bias.  This refers to the tendency for people to use solutions which immediately come to mind.  It 
is also associated with greater importance being placed on facts which are readily av ilable [13]. 
Limited working memory can be a factor in active errors [18].  A person’s mind has a sort-term 
memory which is used to make decisions and solve problems.  This short-term memory can be 
understood as a storeroom which demands attention and is temporary.  It is used to recall new 
information and is actively involved with recall, storage, and learning.  When the limits of this 
memory are exceeded, errors can result [15]. 
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2.3 LATENT ERRORS 
With active errors fully expounded, the next tier human error category involv g latent 
errors can be defined with the intent to understand the distinctions and influences they have on 
active errors, the vulnerabilities that result from them, and a general comprehension of them in 
order to reduce their occurrence.  Like active errors, latent errors may also have adverse 
consequences, but may lay dormant within a complex system for a significant period of time 
before they manifest [18].  They often become evident only when they are combined with factors 
which lead to a breach of the system defenses.  Latent errors are frequently committed by 
individuals whose activities are removed in space and time from the direct human system
interface.  For example, latent errors may be committed by maintenance personnel, managers, 
construction workers, high-level decision-makers, or the system designers well before 
manifestation [18].   
An analysis of significant accidents such as Chernobyl or Three-Mil  Island found that 
latent errors frequently pose the most important threat when people interact with a complex 
system [14].  Traditionally, accident investigations and reliability analyses have concentrated on 
the direct equipment failures and operator errors [16].  While the operators do make mistakes 
such as those discussed in the section on active errors, many of the mistakes have an underlying 
cause connected to a latent error.  This error can be exemplified as when an operatorf a 
complex system inherits the mistakes made by the designers or installers [14]. 
A 21st century understanding of human error in the context of operators interacting with 
complex systems occurs when an awareness is made that the study of latent failur s may be more 
beneficial than a focus on operator mistakes [14].  Unfortunately, most of the work which has 
been done on human factors has concentrated on the improvement to the human-machine 
interface, which, if an error occurs, results in an active error.  While this is an important aspect of 
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the study of human error, the latent errors which are inherent within the system hav  a broader 
range of possible problems.  In other words, the active errors may only be the outcome of 
problems which are embedded within the system [15]. 
Latent human error comes into play when an individual's propensity for error is enhanced 
by the environment they work in and the systems with which they interact.  According to James 
Reason, there are two adverse effects which can result from latent conditions. The first of which 
is the ability for latent conditions to provoke errors.  The second being the impact the conditions 
have upon the long term health and welfare of the system which created them [19]. These 
conditions do not have to contribute to the possibility for error immediately.  Rather, they can rest 
hidden within a system, until the correct elements align and cause the latent error to activate and 
cause an error to manifest [19].  
 
2.3.1 TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES AND THE SUSCEPTIBILITY FOR LATENT 
ERROR 
The fairly rapid growth of technological advances across all industries has generated 
additional focus on latent error [18].  Many of the 21st century complex systems have operators 
who are remote and removed from the processes which they control.  As the systems hav  
become more complex, they can intervene between people and the physical tasks involved.  
When this technology was initially introduced, operators still employed direct manipul tion and 
sensing of the systems they were operating.  They still had the ability to touch and see the system 
which they controlled.  As this technology continued to advance, the remote manipulation of 




The most significant changes in how humans interact with complex systems came about 
due to the decreased cost of powerful computing [13].  Many system operators are now separated 
from the process by more than one component of a control system.  At a lower level, there is t  
task interactive system which controls the detailed parts of an operation. There is an intervention 
between the specialized system and the operators due to the necessity of a humansystem 
interface.  This involves the control system presenting pieces of information to the operator.  
However, the interface only allows a prescribed degree of interaction between the person and the 
remote process.  This creates the situation of supervisory control.  The person adjusts, monitors, 
and initiates processes and systems, which are also automatically controlled [15]. 
However, it is worth noting that the stimuli contained within the environment are 
impacting these remote operators at all times, and while they may not be in direct proximity to 
the site, there is still the possibility for errors to occur.  Nuclear facilities are often comprised of 
individuals deemed the best in their field, and those who are the best, unfortunately, may be 
prone to making the worst mistakes [19].  While the focus may be placed upon these operators, 
there is an error being made when the systems themselves are not scrutinized for th ir own 
propensity to cause errors [19].   
The increased computerization of nuclear facilities has led to installations which are 
progressively complex [14].  This added complexity on an already complex process result in 
latent errors being more difficult to detect which can lead to increasingly problematic results [18].  
For example, in the case of a semi-automated control processes, if an operator would detect that 
there was a problem they would then begin to take the necessary actions to correct the problem.  
However, if due to a latent error embedded in the system, the control processes do not respo d 




3.0 HUMAN FACTORS  
With human behavior and the fundamental human error categories practically understood, 
systems designers endeavor to incorporate these human considerations into the design of the 
system and strive to reduce the likelihood of active and latent errors.   In the design field of 
human factors engineering, designers are concerned with designing products, systems, or 
processes to take proper account of the interaction between them and the people who use them.  
In substance, it is the study of designing equipment and devices that fit the human body d its 
cognitive abilities [20].  In other words, it is the study of how human beings function within 
various work environments as they interact with equipment in the performance of various roles 
and tasks (at the human-machine interface) [8].  Common human factors considerations include 
anthropometric factors, human sensory factors, physiological factors, and psychologi al factors.   
As alluded to above, human factors is concerned with the smooth interaction between the 
people using the technology and the environment within which they are working.  When this is 
considered from the micro-ergonomic level, the focus is on the level of the human and machine 
[1].  Here the focus is the design of the individual control panels, workstations, the visual 
displays, and the ergonomically fitted seats upon which the nuclear facility operat rs spent the 
majority of the time.  Problems which can arise at this level may be due to improperly designed 
displays and workstations and result from new technology being installed that had not been 
designed well in ergonomic terms.  For example, in a minor incident, an operator reported that 
the display was too bright and after three hours working at the station, they were unable to clearly 
see the display.  This resulted in the operator not noticing that the plant was operating outside its 
normal parameters [21]. 
The building blocks for technological systems of nuclear facilities include the people as 
well as the engineered components [22].  However, the organization, as well as its structure, can 
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also be important.  This is referred to as macro-ergonomics.  In the example previously discussed, 
the operator had reported the problem to their supervisor several times [21].  If this supervisor 
would have followed up on the complaint of the operator, an incident may have been avoided.  
Therefore, it is crucial that systems be in place so that operators working with new equipment can 
alert their supervisor if there are difficulties.  With regard to human factors, it is usually only the 
operators of the facility who can gauge the success of the new system.  Often, any problems 
related to human factors engineering are not evident until a complaint or concern is raised or an 
incident occurs [22]. 
It should be recognized that performance and the inherent potential for mishaps of 
complicated technological systems is usually a function of the human and engineered subsystems 
[23].  The engineering will include items such as workstation design and the appearance of 
control boards.  The human engineering refers to organizational and personnel systems whil  
many systems failures are traditionally attributed to errors of the operator; this is often an 
oversimplification [22].  It is estimated that over 70% of all nuclear plant incidents can be 
attributed to operators.  However, this is likely to be an overestimation as it does not take into 
account that the failure can be attributed to the effect of various factors beyond the control of the 
operator.  For example, response systems that are ineffective, organizational designs that are not 
adaptable, and unresponsive managerial systems result in many problems which are attributed to 
operator error. There can also be ineffective training and operational processes that are overly 
complicated. This is especially problematic when new equipment has been installed [22]. 
 
4.0 HUMAN FACTORS IMPACT ON PLANT OPERATION  
With an understanding of human performance and human factors, the complexity 
surrounding the human interaction with advancing technologies can now be appropriately 
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explored.  In order to recognize design considerations necessary to combat human error during 
system design and integration, it is important to first understand human factors impact on lant 
operation.   As one can imagine, the reason for accidents occurring at nuclear facilities due to 
human error is complicated [2].  Both the human mind and the systems with which it is 
interacting at these facilities represent high levels of sophistication which can be challenging to 
understand individually, much less apprehending their amalgamated composite function.  
However, progress has been made toward determining the root causes of the problems that are 
likely to arise.  A close investigation into the human errors indicates that there are both micro-
ergonomic and macro-ergonomic reasons [22].  The accidents are nearly always the resul  of the 
way in which the systems operate and how humans interact with them.  Many of the errors are an 
attribute as well as an effect of the complicated operational processes involved.  They may also 
include managerial systems which are not responsive, ineffective training, organizational designs 
which are not adaptable, response systems which are poorly designed and environmetal 
disturbances of a chronic nature [1]. 
 
4.1 COMPLEXITY OF THE SYSTEM INTERFACE AND HUMAN FACTORS IMPACT  
The complexity and adaptability of the system interface plays a considerable role on the 
impact to human factors concerns.  The common application of sociotechnical systems illustrates 
the necessity of thorough system design and full deliberation of human factors considerations 
during design.  These systems also illustrate the intricacy associated with human-machine 
interface of complex systems.   
Sociotechnical systems must often reside in complex contexts to deal with situations that 
are unexpected and can lead to errors [24].  This means that the behaviors of these systems are 
deeply interwoven with multiple parameters, which are determined as part of the external 
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environment.  An important case of this contextual dependency is the ever-increasing 
significance of the human-machine interaction.  Pervasive applications that are advanced and 
include multimodal interfaces now have a need to maintain several complex hypotheses 
regarding the users and the situation in which the system is interacting to be of a practical value.  
These types of applications must provide behavior that is more flexible than a traditional 
computerized system.  To explain, these systems need to be contextually aware of the situation 
and knowledgeable of the people with which they are int racting.  Specifically, the system must 
understand the user’s plans, goals, capabilities, and identity [25]. 
When considering the situation of complex human and machine interactions from an 
engineering perspective, the interaction of the machine and human must be understood as a 
systemic aspect that has considerable relevance [25].  Furthermore, since the aspctual 
interweaving of concepts is becoming more intensive with regard to human error modeling, new 
concepts and terms must be developed.  Once the terms and concepts have been fully developed 
and are understood, the compatibility of the complex interactions occurring in the sys em  
involving both machines and people can be analyzed for performance and errors [26]. 
Sociotechnical systems will generally reduce the information-processing load using vague 
concepts [25].  In other words, human experts do not use precise mathematical expressions.  
Instead, they prefer vague expressions, which have been developed through natural languages.  
This results in a vagueness that is an important part of the system robustness and safety.  This is 
because the vague specifications can provide the system with the ability to change according to 
the context and become more robust.  Furthermore, the humans interacting with the system often 
must deal with incomplete specifications.  Many times the complete situation relevant 
information cannot be accessed by the human.  As a result of situational time pressures, the 
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person must make decisions which are uncertain and may be based on incomplete informatio  
[24]. 
An important aspect of sociotechnical systems is their level of structural dynamism [26].  
The internal structure of these systems must often rapidly change from one phase of operation to 
another to meet environmental demands.  For the structural dynamism to be properly describe , 
ideas related to active architectures must be used.  Transformation rules prove crucial for dealing 
with these system necessities [24]. 
The specification of the transformation rules defines the possible configurations that may 
be involved with the changing conditions within the context of operation [26].  Therefore, the 
transformation rules serve to describe the adaptive behaviors of these complex sociotechnical 
systems.  They specify the way in which the systems can react to environmental changes through 
the use of structural mutations [26]. 
The sociotechnical systems have distinct qualities with regard to their adaptive potentials 
[25].  This means that their ability to maintain stability during adverse environmental conditions 
or events, which are unexpected, is larger than that of the behavior of more traditional systems, 
which are component-based.  This also means that a richer understanding of an activity of the 
sociotechnical processes is likely to contribute to a more robust and flexible system [24]. 
As can be gathered from the description of sociotechnical systems, complexity resides at 
all levels of design and operation and requires thorough, detailed design attention to combat 
human error. 
 
5.0 HUMAN ERROR REDUCTION IN PLANT OPERATION  
Reducing the negative impact of technological advances on human error consists of 
improving human performance [23].  This type of performance improvement is a systematic 
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process.  The process is used to analyze and discover performance gaps, monitor performance, 
determine the desired level of performance, and develop effective interventions. Once the 
interventions have been developed, they must be implemented and continually evaluated with 
regard to their results.  The ultimate goal for human performance is to have the nuclear facility be 
as close to event free as possible.  This can be achieved by proactive management of human
performance.  It is also necessary to strengthen the facility defenses as well as the performance of 
the operators.  Once the organization and processes are optimized, the errors can be educed to a 
minimal level [1]. 
It should be remembered that even the best operators of nuclear facilities who are well 
trained and motivated will still make mistakes [27].  There is no amount of training or coaching 
which can prevent all errors.  It is important for the managers as well as the operators at the 
facility to understand that the organization, workplace, and tasks interact with the operator to 
provide a potential for errors.  The first step in preventing further problems is to understand why 
and how they occur [28]. 
The systemic errors at a nuclear facility can be reduced through using self-checks and 
specific tools [1].  Human errors can never b  eliminated, but they can be reduced.  For example, 
a maintenance professional at the facility may tighten a valve.  No matter how well train d the 
individual is there is always a chance that a mistake will be made when this task is performed.  
The valve may be too tight or not tight enough [23].  The question is why the individual has made 
the mistake and what can be done to prevent future occurrences.  After a mistake is made,there 
should be multiple barriers that prevent system failure.  This serves to minimize ultimate 
consequences of any state.  There will always be the chance that human error can occur.  It is 
essential that there be organizational infrastructure in place which both identifies errors and 
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protects the operators from negative consequences.  This creates a situation in which more 
significant problems can be avoided [21].   
While it is inevitable that people working at nuclear facilities will make errors, there ar  
measures that can be taken to manage, predict, and prevent these errors [27].  One beneficial 
approach to human error reduction is to recognize the error traps and communicate them o others 
in order to proactively manage problem situations and minimize errors [2].  The work 
environment can be changed in order to lower, prevent, or remove conditions which lead to 
errors.  Individual factors and tasks can be altered within the work environment in order to 
minimize future errors [28].   
It is important to understand that the organizational values and processes significantly 
influence the behavior of an individual working at a nuclear facility [21].  The values and 
processes of the organization can be developed in a manner that fosters individuals taking actions 
which increase the chance for achieving the organizational goals.  In the case of a nuclear facility, 
the values of the organization may focus on precision, accountability, and excellence for all 
employees of the facility [27].  This would encourage safe behaviors that decreas  the number 
and severity of errors.  The management of the facility can direct the behavior of workers and 
produce results that are more desirable and contain fewer errors.  These improve ents are 
achieved through increasing the performance of the staff.  They also require xcellence with 
regard to management systems, culture, and organizational processes.  It i the societal factors 
involved with the work at a nuclear facility that can significantly decrease the chance of errors 
[28].  
The improvements in human performance can be achieved through taking corrective 
actions after analyzing problem reports and events [23].  These types of corrective actions are a 
reactive method for learning that occurs after a problem.  Nevertheless, they are important for 
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improving the systems and technology involved.  This is the reason that continual improvements 
and changes in technology are inevitable.  Combining the reactive and proactive methods of 
learning allows for the anticipation of problematic events and the prevention of errors.  This is 
often more cost-effective than only using the reactive approach [1]. 
It is the collective behaviors of the people at all levels in the facility that determine the 
performance outcome achieved [23].  The individual work is a product of the mental processes of 
the person that has been influenced through a variety of factors and demands which are present in 
the work environment.  The work is also a function of the capabilities of each of the people 
involved.  When the facility achieves high performance, the individuals will nearly always be 
taking responsibility for their own behaviors [27].  They will also be committed to making 
improvements to themselves as well as the work environment and tasks.  Individuals working in a 
high-performance facility will exhibit certain behaviors.  These behaviors include improving their 
personal capabilities, confirming the integrity of the facility defenses, anticipating situations that 
are likely to precipitate errors, and communicating with others in order to create a shared 
understanding of the facility and work to be done [21].  
 
6.0 CONCLUSION 
Since the nuclear industries founding, advancing technology has driven development and 
innovation to make nuclear power safe, secure, and reliable.  Today’s advancing technologies 
have shaped the dynamics of the industry. These technologies can discern the environmet, solve 
complicated problems, make assessments, and learn from experience.  Although, they do not 
think the way humans do, they can replicate many human intellectual aptitudes.  Although 
technological advances are beneficial in many respects, there should be a continuous striving for 
a balance between advancing technologies integrated into plants and the interactio  humans have 
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with these new technologies.  New technologies should be designed and incorporated into 
existing systems to keep the human operator in the decision cycle, which consists of an ongoing 
process of action, feedback, and judgment.  This will ensure operators remain attentive and 
engaged and promotes the kind of challenging practice that strengthens skills.  Technology 
should play an essential, but secondary role.  It should assume functions that a human operator 
has already surmounted, broadcast warnings when parameters are exceeded, provide vital 
information that enhances the operator’s outlook and opposes the biases that often alter human 
thinking.  The technology will then become the operator’s partner, not the operator’s 
replacement.  This approach to technology application will not stifle technological progression.  
It only requires a shift in priorities and a rekindled emphasis on human strengths and weak ess s. 
Incorporating advances in technology is a wonderful and necessary enterprise, but must 
be properly balanced within the confines of the system.  It is often forgotten that humns are a 
vital part of this system.  Technology is strongly suited to perform many functions, but it lacks in 
the ability to rationalize.  Decisions concerning incorporating new technology into a plant must 
consider the human.  Even the smartest software lacks the common sense, ingenuity, and vitality 
of the skilled operator.  In the control room, human experts remain indispensable.  Human 
insight, imagination and perception, enhanced through hard work and experience, cannot be 
replicated by the most cutting-edge technologies.  If we let our own skills fade by relying too 
much on the technology crutch, we are going to render ourselves less capable, less resili nt and 
more submissive to our machines.   
Being cognizant of these realities is imperative during system design.  The human, 
including the human’s propensity for error, should be considered a vital element of the system
that requires substantial design consideration.  Engaged human participation is compulsory to 
 
231 
successful system operation, but like all systems, has its failure modes.  The human’s natural 
susceptibility for error in system operation needs to be combated from multiple fronts. 
It has been expressed multiple times throughout this paper that human error cannot be 
entirely prevented, but with proper tools and techniques, it can be reasonably minimized.  With 
this in mind, it is important to establish a system to minimize error impact or potential impact 
regardless of the scale and complexity of operation. Based upon the work of Reason and 
Rasmussen, it can be seen that human models of behavior and their understanding are critical to
the study of human performance systems. While errors and incidents are unavoidable, especially 
within the environment of a nuclear facility, there are ways to minimize these errors. E rors are 
going to be made, but the minimization of these errors is reliant upon a system which understands 
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Many unfortunate and unintended adverse industrial incidents occur across the United 
States each year, and the nuclear industry is no exception.  Depending on the severity, these 
incidents can be problematic for people, the facilities, and surrounding environments.  These 
incidents occur for a number of varying reasons, but more often than not, human error is an 
accomplice.  This article explores whether the complexity and changing technologies which 
affect the way operators interact within the systems of the nuclear facilities exacerbate the 
severity of incidents caused by human error.  A review of nuclear incidents in the United Sta s
from 1955 through 2010 reaching Level 3 or higher on the INES scale was conducted.  The cost 
of each incident at facilities that had recently undergone technological changes affecting plant 
operator’s jobs were compared to those facilities which had not undergone changes.  A t-t t was 
applied and determined a statistically significant difference between the two groups.  This 
affirmed that technological advances at nuclear facilities that affect how operators interact within 
the plant system increase the severity of resulting incidents.  Next, a follow-on study was 
conducted to determine the impact from the incorporation of new technologies into nuclear
facilities.  The data indicated that spending more money on upgrades increased the capacity of 
the facility as well as the number of incidents reported, but the incident severity was minor.   





1.0 INTRODUCTION  
The operational life of nuclear reactors is measured in reactor-years [1].  One reactor year 
is equivalent to a reactor operating for one complete year.  There are roughly 440 nuclear power 
plants that have been in operation for over 14,700 reactor-years.  During this time, there have 
been 23 reactor core meltdowns.  This is equivalent to one major nuclear accident for every 640 
reactor years.  However, according to the international design requirements for nuclear facilities, 
a reactor core meltdown should only occur about once every 20,000 reactor years.  This means 
that the incidence of reactor core meltdowns is been 32 times higher than theory would predict 
[2].  This significant departure from the theory indicates additional unaccounted factors are 
violating the base assumption of the model. 
Nuclear facilities represent some of the most complex systems which have ever be n 
designed [1].  These plants use state-of-the-art technology and continually update their systems to 
remain safe, regulatory compliant, and economically sound.  Unfortunately, like any complex 
system, the nuclear facilities are not immune to failure.  This is particularly true with regard to 
human performance.  As one can presume, many of these incidents have been the result of human 
error in one form or another.  Since these systems are astoundingly complex, any changes made 
in the technology has the potential to confuse human operators and result in a reduction in 
performance when they interact with machinery or software [2].  The complexity and changing 
technology of the intricate systems involved with the operation and management of a nuclear
facility may be part of the problem resulting in increased severity of human errors [1]. 
Of the 23 nuclear reactor meltdowns mentioned above, 17 were caused by some type of 
human error [3].  While it has been argued that this is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately 
predict, human error will endure necessitating relentless attention and continuous opposition.  
This being the case, there has been a great deal of literature devoted to the safety procedures used 
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by nuclear facilities [2].  There has also been research performed explaining the effect that new 
technologies can have on human performance, especially when complex systems are involved.  
This leads to the question of whether the complexity and changing technologies of th  nuclear 
facilities may exacerbate the severity of incidents caused by human error.  This is an important 
question because most nuclear facilities continually update their system technology.  This 
continuous technological improvement can create a situation where the operators mus change 
their routine and method of interacting with the system. 
 
2.0 RESEARCH METHODS 
2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design used in this investigation is that of an observational study [4].  In the 
case of this research, the nuclear facilities are grouped into those which have had accidents and 
those which have not [5].  The facilities that had accidents are considered the treatmnt group, 
while the incident-free nuclear facilities are the control group.  The variable affecting these 
plants, the treatment, is advances in technology.  While the groups are categorized into those that 
have had incidents versus those which have not, the treatment variable is not categorical.  Instead, 
it can be considered as existing on an interval scale [6]. 
 
2.2 METHODS 
The International Nuclear Event Scale (INES) was used to determine if an event at a 
nuclear facility reaches a significance level that is noteworthy for this study.  The INES has eight 
levels ranging from zero to seven (see figure 1).  The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) adopted the INES as a method for quickly and efficiently communicatig the safety 
significance of incidents occurring at nuclear facilities.  Because nuclear facilities are man-made, 
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unique, and vastly different in design, the incidents that result are subject to certain
interpretations when estimating the magnitude of the problem [5]. 
 
Figure 1 – INES Scale [7] 
 
2.3 MATERIALS AND INSTRUMENTS  
The IAEA and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) both record events which 
they have been reported and investigated [8].  However, possibly due to the diverse nature of 
their cultures, their policies, and their laws, the IAEA data is not as complete or detailed as that of 
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the NRC.  The NRC uses a nuclear event scale that is similar to that of the INES and is 
transferred to the international scale for reporting purposes.  While the NRC is responsible for 
nuclear safety in the United States, it cooperat s with the IAEA and converts its events to the 
INES [5].  This is also true of the predecessor nuclear regulatory agencies of th  US.  This study 
used the event notification reports of the NRC and predecessor US regulatory agencies prior to 
the formation of the NRC [5].  This provided an opportunity to use a standardized level system to 
judge the severity of the nuclear event while taking advantage of the more detail d reports of the 
NRC.  The information on incidents of INES severity level 3 or higher was collected and data 
from the plant where the incident occurred was gathered to determine if technological advances 
impacted the operators at the facility to cause the incident. 
Incidents that reached the INES severity level 3 and above criteria were utilized in this 
study for three reasons.  The first and most important reason is that any incident that does not 
reach the level 3 criteria was unlikely to cause a person to be permanently injured.  It is 
improbable that radioactive material released at this level of an incident would even temporarily 
harm an individual, though this is possible.  The second reason is related to the number of 
incidents.  As one decreases the incident level, the occurrences increase exponentially.  
Therefore, using incidents that re below level 3 would yield an overwhelming amount of data.  
This is due to the thorough daily reporting criteria of the NRC.  In fact, most days contain 
multiple reports, which are below the level 3 threshold.  The third reason is that different 
countries require the reporting of a level 0 and level 1 incident in an inconsistent manner and it 
that it has been determined that there are varying levels of reliability with the interpretation and 





2.4 DATA COLLECTION, PROCESSING, AND ANALYSIS  
The data collection for this study began with an examination of the event notificati n 
reports provided by the NRC and predecessor regulatory agencies.  The researcher noted which 
events had an INES severity level of 3 or higher.  This was done for the years 1999 to 2010.  For 
information on events that occurred prior to 1999, the information on the incidents was taken 
from books addressing the topic.  After the incidents wi h INES severity level of 3 or higher were 
identified, additional information was sought regarding technological changes that may have 
occurred in the plant.  The events were then sorted according to those that followed no 
technological changes and those which followed technological changes.  Only the technological 
changes that affect how the personnel of the facility interact with the systems were considered.  
For example, if there were changes in the speed with which information is passed betwen 
computers, but this is not likely to be something that a human operator would be aware of, this 
would not be a consideration for this study.  However, if the change in the speed with which 
information is passed between the computers modifies the way in which the operators interact 
within the system, then this would be a consideration. An attempt to reduce bias in this aspect of 
the study was made through recruiting colleagues of the researcher to rank he technological 
changes that have occurred at the plants with incidents.  If there were occurrences that were 
different from group consistency, they were not used for the study.  This decreased the likelihood 
that the researcher could inadvertently influence the outcome of the study by selectively placing 
incidents into the three groups of technological change. 
Because the INES is a logarithmic scale, each of the levels is roughly 10 times as s vere 
as the previous one.  This means that an accident with local consequences having an INES level 
of four will be about 1000 times as problematic as an anomaly having an INES level of one.  The 
statistical analysis on the data made use of a t-test.  This type of analysis is sensitive to the type of 
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data used.  If the INES level was used as a measure for the problem created by an accident, the 
accuracy of analysis would be impaired due to the logarithmic nature of the number.  Therefore, 
an alternative numeric measure, the cost of the incident, was used to determine incident severity 
and maintain the integrity of the t-test [4].  The cost of the incident i  terms of US dollars was 
used since the reports from incidents in the US already indicated the cost estima ion. They only 
needed to be normalized to a specific year for consistency in accounting for iflation.  This is an 
appropriate type of data for conducting a t-test [10]. 
The specific statistical test chosen to determine if a significant difference betw en the two 
groups existed (incidents caused by human error as a result of technological advances vs. 
incidents caused by human error n t due to technological advances) was an independent samples 
t-test.  An independent samples t-test determines if two independent groups are different from 
each other and if the two groups are not related.  Before conducting the test, sinc the t-test is a 
parametric test and requires normally distributed data, the outcome variable, costs of incidents, 
was checked for normality and homoscedasticity of variance by examining the dis ribution of the 
data using histograms and Q-Q plots.  After normality was established, the independent samples 
t-test was conducted. 
 
3.0 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1 DATA ANALYSIS  
From 1955 to 2010, 53 incidents were determined to meet the INES Level 3 and above 
criteria and had an average incident cost of $190,518,900 (SD = 461,511,400).  31 of the 53 were 
determined not to be due to human error as a result of technological advances whereas 22 of the 
incidents were determined to be due to human error as a result of technological advances.  Of the 
31 that were determined not to be due to human error as a result of technological advances, the 
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cost of the incidents ranged from $1,000,000 to $695,000,000.  The average cost of these 
incidents was $54,274,200 (SD = 142,559,800).  The other 22 incidents were determined to be 
due to human error as a result of technological advances.  The cost of these incidents ranged from 
$2,000,000 to $2,483,000,000.  The average cost of these incidents was $382,500,000 (SD = 
657,543,610).  See Table 1.  
Table 1 – Category Incident and Average Cost 
Category of Incident Mean SD Median 
No Human error as a result  
of Technological Advances (n =31) 
$54,274,200 $142,559,800 $9,500,000 
Human Error  as a result of 
Technological Advances (n=22) 
$382,500,000 $657,543,610 $61,500,000 
* All of the monetary values were adjusted to 2005 dollar values. 
As discussed previously, to examine whether incidents not caused by human error as a 
result of technological advances cost more than incidents caused by human error s a esult of 
technological advances at nuclear facilities, the independent samples t-test was conducted to 
examine the average cost differences of incidents between those two groups.  To test the first 
assumption of the t-test, normality of data, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was used to compare 
the scores in the sample to a normally distributed set of scores.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
was significant (p < .001), the distribution of scores of this sample is significantly different from 
a normal distribution of scores, and thus, the first assumption of the t-test was violated. 
A Q-Q plot of the scores also indicates that the data is not normally distributed (see figur  
2).  A histogram (see figure 3) reveals that the data is positively skewed.  Thus, the data was log-
transformed, making the skewed data more normally distributed (see figures 4 and 5).  A Q-Q 
plot is a form of scatterplot created by plotting two sets of quantiles against one another to assess 
normality of the data.  Quantiles are not the same as the actual observations and different ranges 
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of values can be presented compared with histograms.  When the data contains extreme values, as 
is the case in this study, these may not be rendered in the graph as seen in the histogram (as 
displayed in figures 4 and 5).  Thus, it is not expected to have the exact ranges of values between 
histograms and Q-Q plots since they plot different factors: quantiles for Q-Q plots and actual 
values for histograms.
 





Figure 4 – Q-Q Plot of Log-Transformed 
Cost 
 











Now, using the log-transformed data, an independent samples t-test was conducted.  
Once again, normality of data was checked using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  The test was 
non-significant (p = .200), indicating that the distribution of the log-transformed cost scores are 
not significantly different than a normal distribution.  To test the second assumption of the t-test, 
homogeneity of variance, the t-test was conducted and Levene’s test was used to see if the 
variances of the groups are equal or unequal.  Levene’s test was non-sig ificant (p = .953) and so 
it can be assumed that the variances are equal and the assumption was not violated.  On verage, 
the log-transformed costs of incidents due to technological advances were lower (M = .92, SD = 
.81) than the log-transformed costs of incidents caused by human error (M= 1.99, SD = .78), and 
this difference was significant, t(51) = -4.81, p <.001, one-tailed.  The difference between the 
log-transformed means of cost between the two groups represent a large-sized ffect, d = 1.34.  
Thus, incidents caused by human error as a result of technological advances, even though there 
are fewer, are more costly than incidents not caused by human error as a result of technological 
advances.   Based on this analysis, there is evidence that technological advances at  ucle r 
facility which affect the way operators interact within the system does increase the severity of 
incidents caused by human error.   
 
3.2 THE ECONOMIC AND SAFETY FACTORS INVOLVED WITH 
TECHNOLOGICAL IMPROVEMENTS  
If there is evidence that incorporation of advanced technologies in nuclear facilities 
increases the severity of incidents caused by human error, then why incorporate advanced 
technologies into existing nuclear facilities?  Many organizations find technological 
advancements necessary for three applications: replacing obsolete technology or equipment, 
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regulatory reasons, and economic motives.  Therefore, the outcome of technological 
advancement can be observed as two pronged: from a safety standpoint and from an economic 
standpoint.  The question now becomes, are organizations better off from incorporating adva ced 
technology at their facilities? 
In order to determine the economic and safety factors involved with technological 
improvements, the information for 12 nuclear facilities for the 2008 through 2013 years was 
collected.  For the aspect of safety, the number of reported incidents was used as an independent 
variable.  For the economic aspect, the capacity factor, ratio of the observed output for a given 
period of time versus the potential output if the facility were consistently running at its 
nameplate capacity, was used as the independent variable.  The cost of the upgrades was us d as 
the dependent variable.  An analysis of variance (ANOVA) and a regression analysis were 
performed on the data.  The ANOVA was used to indicate the significance of the results.  The 
regression equation indicates how much, and in what way, the upgrades affected the capacity and 
number of reported incidents [11].  Results are displayed in tables 2-4 below. 
Table 2 – Regression Statistics 
 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.926410175 
R Square 0.858235811 
Adjusted R Square 0.854126705 
Standard Error 2.717930638 
Observations 72 
 




df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 2 3085.7869 1542.89343 208.861884 5.35853E-30 
Residual 69 509.71314 7.38714695 
  Total 71 3595.5 
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Intercept -32.835 4.137640 -7.9357 2.6E-11 -41.089 -24.581 -41.089 -24.581 
Capacity 
Factor 0.59165 0.051067 11.586 7.6E-18 
0.48976
9 0.69352 0.48977 0.693522 
Incidents 0.07526 0.017708 4.250 6.6E-05 0.03994 0.11059 0.03994 0.110593 
 
There were 12 facilities in the sample and the information was collected over 6 yea s.
This yielded 72 data points for the ANOVA.  The F-test yielded an F statistic of 208.86.  This is 
significant at the p <0.01 level.  The regression analysis indicated that the regression coefficient 
for capacity factor was 0.592.  The coefficient for incidents was 0.075.  Both of these 
coefficients indicate that increased levels of upgrades will result in a higher capacity factor for 
the facility [6].  However, the number of incidents will also increase.  The relationship of these 
factors is shown in the figures 6 and 7 below: 
 
 
Figure 6 – Upgrades versus Capacity Factor 

























Figure 7 – Upgrades versus Incidents 
 
An examination of figures 6 and 7, as well as a consideration of the regression 
coefficients reveals that increasing the level of upgrades is associated with a higher capacity 
factor and more incidents being reported.  The capacity factor would generally b  seen as a 
positive outcome, while the increased number of incidents would be negative. 
The number of incidents was recorded as a way of measuring the safety associated with 
the upgrades.  As the amount of money spent on upgrades increased, the number of incidents 
rose as well.  However, these were only incidents which were at a INES severity level of 1 or 2.  
None of the 12 facilities randomly chosen this specific analysis had a major incident during the 6 
years of the data being collected. 
The data indicates that spending more money on upgrades will increase the capacity of 
the facility as well as the number of incidents reported.  However, the incidents in the randomly 
selected facilities for this study over the 6-year period of time were relatively minor.  Given that 





















the nuclear facilities produce vast amounts of power, and the upgrades significantly increase the 
capacity factor, there appears to be a financial advantage in conducting upgrades however, this 
should be weighed against the increased rate of INES severity level 1 and 2 incidents observed.  
It should also be remembered that many of the major incidents at an INES severity level 3 or 
higher, were probably associated with human error while working with new technological 
advances.  Since it does not seem likely that nuclear facilities can be fully automated anytime in 
the near future, engineers must continue to increase facility capacity factors with upgrades while 
minimizing human errors. 
 
4.0 CONCLUSION 
As discussed previously, over the years there have been numerous costly incidents at 
nuclear facilities in the United States [12].  In nearly every incident, the cause has been isolated 
and steps have been taken to alleviate problems and prevent future incidents.  However, there are 
thousands of upgrades to various pieces of equipment over the lifetime of a nuclear 
facility.  Since changing the technology associated with nuclear facilities is an ongoing and 
necessary process, based on the information and analysis presented in this article, the e is 
evidence that technological advances at a nuclear facility which affect the way operators interact 
within the system does increase the severity of incidents caused by human error.  Additionally, 
the economic impact of incorporating advanced technologies into facilities is advant geous to 
offset the risk.  This situation creates the necessity to continually optimize operator performance 
and investigate new methods or enhance existing methods to reduce human error resulting in a 
decreased number of incidents or reduced incident severity. 
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Unfortunately, human error reduction and system design and deployment are often 
treated as two separate subjects with their own distinct processes that commonly intersect upon 
conclusion of design, prior to operation.  This traditional approach to system design may have 
been successful for the antiquated, obsolete technologies of the past, but is proving to be 
problematic for the design of the more complicated systems of the present.  A  the complexity of 
advancing technologies crescendos, human-system interaction warrants a more prominent role in 
system design and therefore compels early consideration, deliberation, and integration in the 
beginning stages of the systems engineering process.  Incorporation of human error prevention 
means into the system design process harvests the sound development f systems with an 
improved probability of successful, error-reduced operation.   
Whether a system is being newly created or an existing system is undergoing a m or 
modification, plant operations personnel should to be involved in the design process from the 
onset.  Operators are a significant system stakeholder and not only bring a unique yet vital
perspective to the design team, but will eventually inherit the system being desgned.  Operators 
bring an essential perspective from the field, understanding the environment the system will 
operate in, the operator interface the system will undergo, and the robustness and redundancy the 
system will need to possess to successfully operate as required. 
Achieving balance of innovation and practicality often yields difficulty, as designs are 
conceptualized, iterated, and deployed.  The resulting product often requires a return to portions 
of the design stages for necessary alterations.  I  most cases, some of this duplication of effort 
can be avoided by simply appointing members of the operations staff to the system deign team 
and leveraging their experience into the needs identification through system design and 
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